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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores how regulated organizations respond to and manage regulatory 
change. It uses a case study of the significant wave of reforms to financial regulation 
that followed the financial crisis in 2007-8, reforms which created a moment of great 
uncertainty and complexity for banking organizations. 
Using a combination of discourse analysis on banks’ publicly available documents and 
semi-structured qualitative interviews with 22 members of banking organizations in the 
UK, this thesis examines how a sample of banks responded to and managed the changes 
in their regulatory environment. 
This thesis found that the uncertainty associated with unclear regulatory rules, 
unspecified regulatory expectations and shifts in the cognitive underpinnings of 
financial regulation exacerbated existing tensions between market and regulatory 
objectives within banks. Managing these tensions required an ongoing process of 
negotiation and settlement between organizational actors who were ‘institutional 
agents’ of market and regulatory logic respectively.  
This thesis found that that the balance in the use of these logics changed over time and 
argues that this is partly due to considerations of legitimacy relative to the external 
political and economic context, but is also related to the degree of uncertainty and the 
power and status afforded to the internal representatives of market or regulatory logic. 
Regulatory interactions between the banks and their supervisors were found to be a 
critical site where legitimacy criteria are communicated and regulatory professionals 
construct the bank’s regulatory identity.  
Finally, this thesis argues that when regulation is in a continual state of flux, possibilities 
for meaningful behavioural changes are reduced. At the same time, however, continuous 
regulatory change demanded greater organizational attention, suggesting an acceptance 
on behalf of the banks that regulatory change had become part of ‘business as usual’. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Large, complex business organizations have become increasingly prevalent and powerful 
over the last three decades (Carroll, Carson, Fennema, Heemskerk, & Sapinski, 2010; 
Scott, 1997; Wilks, 2013), generating incredible wealth but also significant risks (Hutter 
& Power, 2005; Short & Clarke, 1992b). These risks have the potential to cause great 
societal harm should they come to fruition as was clearly demonstrated by the global 
financial crisis in 2007-8 (Brian & Patrick, 2010; Foster & Magdoff, 2009; Ötker-Robe & 
Podpiera, 2013). In this instance, banks and other large financial corporations failed to 
adequately manage their risks and brought the financial system to the brink of collapse, 
causing widespread economic damage (Brian & Patrick, 2010; Foster & Magdoff, 2009; 
Grusky, Western, & Wimer, 2011; Stiglitz, 2010). 
Controlling societal risks and preventing harm is at the heart of much contemporary 
regulatory law (Black, 2010b; Hood, Rothstein, & Baldwin, 2001; Hutter, 2001, 2006a; 
Rothstein, Huber, & Gaskell, 2006), including that which governs the safety and 
soundness of the international banking system. The financial crisis called the efficacy 
of the extant financial regulatory regime into question (Financial Services Authority, 
2009e; Financial Stability Board, 2009b, 2009c; Financial Stability Forum, 2008; 
Larosière, 2009; London School of Economics, 2010) and an extended period of 
regulatory reform ensued  after the immediate shoring up of the financial system had 
been achieved (Black, 2010a; Ferran, 2012a; Ferran, Moloney, Hill, & Coffee Jr, 2012; 
Goodhart, 2009; Helleiner, Pagliari, & Zimmermann, 2010; MacNeil, 2010). This created 
a moment of great uncertainty for those organizations subject to financial regulation – 
new rules, new regulatory authorities and new cognitive frames were all mobilized by 
policy-makers against a backdrop of economic decline, increased market volatility and 
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe (Bank of England, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b; 
Financial Services Authority, 2010b; International Monetary Fund, 2010). This thesis uses 
this context to explore understandings of how those organizations that were the target 
of financial regulatory reform responded to those changes and the associated 
uncertainty. It examines how their public discourses and operational practices were 
10 
 
adapted (or not) to the changing regulatory environment and also how these changes 
affected the relationships between the regulator and the regulated. Examining the 
mechanics and practices of managing and implementing regulatory change is important 
because how banks deal with the uncertainties this causes has significant consequences 
for society as a whole. 
Crises, such as the global financial crisis, or other disasters are often the catalyst for 
regulatory change, because often, a crisis is perceived as a failure of the existing 
regulatory arrangements (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2011; Grabosky, 1995; Lodge, 2002) 
or because the causes of the crisis stemmed from risks that were previously unregulated. 
Regulatory change is also prompted by the emergence of new risks, associated with 
scientific innovations, such as nanotechnology (Hodge, Bowman, & Ludlow, 2009) or the 
development of digital currencies such as bitcoin and their associated technologies 
(Brito & Castillo, 2013; Tu & Meredith, 2015). Dynamism in regulation was also at the 
heart of early theories of regulation, such as Bernstein’s ‘natural life-cycle’ view of 
regulatory agencies (Bernstein, 1955, p. 74). He conceived of these authorities as evolving 
from ‘gestation’ to ‘old age’ in accordance with the level of political and support for the 
regulatory issue in question. Regulation and associated regulatory regimes are not static, 
and adapt to changes in technological, societal and political circumstances. 
Whilst there is considerable literature on how and why policies (including regulatory 
policies) change (Baumgartner, Jones, & Mortensen, 2007; Hood, 1994; Keeler, 1984; 
Sabatier & Weible, 2014), the response of the regulated organizations to these changes 
remains relatively under-explored (Hutter, 2011b, p. 306). The importance of 
investigating how business corporations manage regulatory change stems from the role 
that these organizations play as key producers of risk in society. Corporate 
organizations are the engine room of wealth creation in neoliberal, market based 
economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001) but, as Beck notes, ‘in advanced modernity the social 
production of wealth is systematically accompanied by the social production of risk’ 
(Beck, 1992, p. 19). As these new risks emerge, new regulatory strategies and regimes 
are enacted in attempts to control them (Black, 2010b; Hood et al., 2001; Hutter, 2006a). 
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The effective management or mitigation of these risks depends to a large extent on how 
the target organizations respond to the changing regulatory requirements. This becomes 
even more significant considering the trend in recent years for regulation to move away 
from traditional ‘command and control’ regulation towards so-called ‘new governance 
techniques’ (Black, 2002a; Coglianese & Lazer, 2003; Ford, 2008; Gilad, 2010; 
Gunningham & Sinclair, 2009; Hutter, 2011c) which aim to harness an organization’s 
own mechanisms for managing risks. It is worth noting here that this thesis makes a 
distinction between uncertainty and risk, and follows Power (2007) who contends that 
the difference between uncertainty and risk does not depend on the level of probabilistic 
knowledge that is available (Knight, 1921), rather, ‘Knightean uncertainties become risks 
when they enter into management systems for their identification, assessment and 
mitigation’ (Power, 2007, p. 5). 
Investigating business responses to regulatory change is also therefore an examination 
of the relationship between governments and private market actors which has 
consistently been a central theme in economic sociology (Block, 2010). In this tradition, 
the state and the market are envisaged as ‘mutually constituting spheres of activity’ as 
opposed to ‘distinct and opposing modes of organizing economic activity’ (Block & 
Evans, 2005, p. 505). Government and business are not considered as being in direct 
opposition to each other, rather, they are in a relationship of mutual dependence (Block 
& Evans, 2005). With respect to regulation, and the regulation of risks in particular, the 
nature of this mutual dependence can be understood in terms of where responsibilities 
lie for the control of societal and economic risks. Socio-legal scholars consider 
regulatory law to be both ‘simultaneously constitutive and controlling’ (Hutter, 2001, p. 
15) and in the context of risk management, the constitutive aspects of regulation ‘may 
aim to penetrate the corporation and to define compliance systems, routines and 
practices’ (Hutter, 2001, p. 16) that are used for managing risks. Starting from this 
position, this research project explores what happens within organizations not only 
when those ‘constitutive’ requirements change, but also when the approach to 
‘controlling’ their implementation also changes. 
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This introductory chapter provides a brief explanation of the empirical background to 
this thesis, showing how regulation, risk and the banking industry are interconnected 
and how they stand in relation to each other. This is followed by a discussion of the 
sociological and socio-legal literature about regulatory change and regulatory 
organizations, highlighting the areas that this thesis contributes to. The key research 
aims and questions are presented, followed by an explanation of the thesis’ theoretical 
orientation.  
Regulation, risks and banks 
In the world of financial markets and banking specifically, regulation and risk are closely 
intertwined and interdependent and it is difficult to discuss one without the other. This 
reflects a broader trend in the regulatory sphere where risk and regulation are being 
increasingly linked together (Black, 2010b; Hood et al., 2001; Hutter, 2001). Risk can be 
the object of regulation, a principle around which regulatory agencies organize 
themselves, a rationalization for regulatory intervention and has a role in evaluating and 
holding regulators themselves to account (Black, 2010b). Regulation has not always been 
articulated in terms of risk. Indeed, early regulatory theorists viewed regulation as a 
purely economic intervention to correct market failures, so called ‘command and 
control’ regulation. More recently, the growth of sociological interest in regulation has 
resulted in a view of regulation as a form of social control, ‘an organized response to 
problems, to deviance, and in particular to risk in economic life’ (Hutter, 2001, p. 12) 
involving both state and non-state actors (Black, 2002a; Hutter, 2006b, 2011c). This 
thesis follows this concept of regulation as the regulation of risk, and focuses mainly on 
state-based sources of control, acknowledging that this does not necessarily always take 
the form of command and control regulation. 
Regulation targets the risks of economic life that are the inadvertent, manufactured risks 
resulting from technological and scientific expansion and the increasing complexity and 
globalization of contemporary life (Beck, 1992, 2006; Giddens, 1999). The task of 
regulating these risks is not an easy one, as risk as both a concept and an object is 
slippery and unstable. Conceptions of risk vary according to academic disciplines, from 
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the rational and objective view of risk as something that can be measured and analyzed, 
to social psychological research on the variability of psychological perspectives on risk 
through to the sociological understandings of risk found in the risk society thesis 
(Lupton, 1999b; Renn, 1992; Zinn, 2008). As object, decisions have to be taken as to 
which risks require regulation, how they should be assessed and whether regulation 
should be aimed at risk prevention and/or increasing resilience (Black, 2010b).  
These problems surrounding the control or management of risks are not unique to 
regulators. Banks have had to consider these issues since their early days of simple 
money-lending. To some degree, the question of which risks need to be managed was 
more straightforward given that their borrowers might default on loans (credit risk), that 
their depositors might request their funds to be returned simultaneously (liquidity risk) 
or the that there may be adverse movements in interest or exchange rates (market risk). 
More pertinent, perhaps, is the question of how these risks should be measured. The 
last forty years have seen exponential increases in the sophistication of risk 
measurement models and techniques for risk analysis in the financial industry (Buehler, 
Freemen, & Hulme, 2008; Guill, 2016) sparked by the development of the Black-Scholes-
Merton model for pricing financial instruments (MacKenzie, 2006). Driven by the 
increasing sophistication of financial products and the parallel availability of ever 
greater computing power, these risk management models spread and became part of 
core banking operations. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the emergence of the use 
of other risk management techniques, such as the use of Value-At-Risk1 for measuring 
and managing market risk (Buehler et al., 2008; Guill, 2016).  
The 1980s also witnessed the increasing globalization of the banking industry with 
differences in national capital regulations affording banks from some countries, such as 
Japan, competitive advantage over others in the UK and US. At the same time, there was 
growing concern about the stability of the global financial system due to low levels of 
                                                 
1 Value-At-Risk or VaR is a statistical technique which measures the worst expected loss over a given time 
interval under normal market conditions and at a particular confidence level, the latter being a measure of the 
reliability of a result. 
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capital2 held by internationally active banks (Tarullo, 2008, pp. 44-49). These two issues 
resulted in calls for international regulations on capital ratios3 and under the auspices 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision4 (BCBS), the first global capital accord, 
known as  Basel 1, was brought into force in 1988 (BCBS, 1988). This required banks to 
perform a simple calculation, based on the riskiness of the credit assets they held, to 
determine a minimum amount of capital they should hold in order to absorb losses in 
the event of a crisis or default. 
The increasing risks posed by the rise in derivatives5 trading and the volatility of the 
foreign exchange markets prompted an amendment to Basel 1 in 1996 to include market 
risks (Goodhart, 2011; Tarullo, 2008; Wood, 2005). The large banks pushed for the 
regulation to align with the risk management techniques that they had already been 
using  (Holton, 2002) for the calculation of market risk, namely Value-At-Risk (Goodhart, 
2011, p. 250; Tarullo, 2008, p. 63). They were successful as the Market Risk Amendment 
(BCBS, 1996) permitted banks to calculate their capital requirements for market risk 
based on VaR. This set a precedent for prudential regulation to assimilate the risk 
analysis technologies that banks were already employing, and further revisions to the 
Basel Accords (known as Basel 2), in force in the UK from 2007 onwards, included more 
sophisticated methods for the calculation of credit risk, allowing banks to use their own 
risk models to determine the riskiness of their assets.  
Basel 2 (BCBS, 2004), however, was not just about more advanced risk measurement. It 
was about improving risk management practices within the financial markets and 
ensuring that senior management of financial organizations are responsible for the 
                                                 
2 Capital is primarily composed of shareholders’ equity in the bank and in the event of default, will act in a 
loss absorbing capacity 
3 A capital ratio measures the amount of shareholder equity relative to the banks total assets (see Chapter 3). 
4 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is an international standard setting body which focusses on the 
prudential regulation of the global banking industry with the objective of enhancing the stability of the global 
financial system. At the time the research for this thesis was conducted, the members comprised senior 
officials responsible for banking supervision or financial stability issues in central banks and regulatory 
authorities from the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The Chairman of the Committee at this time was Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank. 
5 A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is dependent on an underlying market variable such as an 
equity price, an interest rate or a foreign exchange rate 
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effectiveness of their risk management and internal control processes. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision states that 
‘It is not the Committee’s intention to dictate the form or operational detail of bank’s 
risk management policies and practices. Each supervisor will develop a set of review 
procedures for ensuring that banks’ systems and controls are adequate to serve as 
the basis for capital calculations’ (BCBS, 2004, p. 2). 
Basel 2 then, was an example of management based regulation, a type of ‘new 
governance technique’ where ‘regulators do not prescribe how regulatees should 
comply, but require them to develop their own systems for compliance and to 
demonstrate that type of compliance to the regulator’ (Black, 2012a, p. 1045). Power 
considers that Basel 2 went even further and ‘as a regulatory project of control may be 
without precedent in its attempt to reach into the micro-managerial world of banks’ 
(Power, 2007, p. 109).  
The standards themselves contained a mixture of high level principles and very 
prescriptive rules, detailing the precise formulae that banks had to use to calculate their 
minimum capital requirements. One of the high level principles of the Basel 
requirements which demonstrates the pervasive intent of Basel 2 was known as the Use 
Test (BCBS, 2006a). This requires that if a bank is using its own internal risk models for 
the calculation of regulatory capital requirements, the outputs of these models also had 
to be used in the day-to-day risk management activities of the firm such as strategy and 
planning, the reporting of risk information and the ongoing monitoring and control of 
credit risk exposures. Prudential regulation, therefore, with the move from Basel 1 to 
Basel 2 and the inclusion of sophisticated risk modelling techniques in regulation, had 
morphed into the regulation of risk management itself – ‘the risk management of risk 
management’ (Braithwaite, 2003, p. 7). Following the financial crisis, significant 
amendments and additions have been made to the BCBS prudential standards (see 
Chapter 3). It is these changes and more importantly, banks’ responses to them that 
comprise the empirical setting for this research. 
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Academic perspectives on regulatory change and regulated 
organizations 
Regulatory Change 
For the purposes of this thesis ‘regulatory change’ has been understood broadly to 
encapsulate small scale changes to particular regulatory rules to wholesale shifts in how 
the government exerts control over social and economic life (Hood, 1994; Moran, 2003). 
Academic approaches to regulatory change tend to highlight the key questions of what 
prompts or provokes regulatory change6 and how that change manifests itself in 
regulatory reform. 
As mentioned above, triggers for regulatory change can be endogenous or exogenous to 
the regulatory system. In the case of the former, private interest theories of regulation 
suggest that the ‘capture’ of the regulatory regime creates conditions which prompt 
regulatory reform (Bernstein, 1955; Keeler, 1984; Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971). Capture 
of a regulatory agency is said to occur when that agency no longer operates in the public 
interest, rather, it aligns with the interests of the regulated community. Different 
mechanisms of capture are suggested by the various capture theorists – from the life-
cycle approach of Bernstein (Bernstein, 1955), to the ‘original sin’ version proposed by 
Stigler (Stigler, 1971) whereby the regulator was corrupted by the regulated industry 
from the start. More recently, additional non-materialist mechanisms such as ‘cultural’ 
or ‘cognitive’ capture have been developed (Kwak, 2013) particularly in relation to the 
events of the financial crisis. For the purposes of this thesis, the specific mechanism of 
capture is of secondary importance. The key point is that capture is regarded as a failure 
of regulation (Lodge, 2002) and is therefore a trigger for regulatory reform. Other 
endogenous factors which might trigger change have also been identified by the 
‘institutionalist’ school of regulatory theories. These include problems with the design 
of the institutional structure of the regulatory system itself or side-effects associated 
with the overlapping of various parts of the regulatory system (Baldwin et al., 2011, p. 
                                                 
6 There is also a vast literature within political science which studies the public policy process. This includes 
several theories that attempt to account for policy changes over time, acknowledging that the policy process 
is complex and dynamic involving many actors with different preferences and interests, situated within 
specific socio-economic contexts (Weible, 2014). The specifics of these theories are not directly relevant to this 
thesis which focuses on the effects of these policy changes on the target population. 
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76). Additionally, cultural theory suggests that unintended consequences and 
paradoxical outcomes are inherent in the pursuit of any one particular regulatory 
strategy (Baldwin et al., 2011; Grabosky, 1995; Hood & Peters, 2004) and that regulatory 
change is required to address these. 
Exogenous factors such as the creation (or construction) of new risks associated with 
scientific and technological advancements can also prompt regulatory change – either 
by extending existing regulatory regimes or creating new regulatory structures. For 
example, the creation of virtual currencies such as bitcoin and its associated risks (such 
as use for criminal activity, money laundering and terrorism financing) has prompted 
discussion amongst policy-makers as how best to mitigate these risks, either within the 
existing legal framework or by the creation of new laws (Brito & Castillo, 2013; Chuen, 
2015; Kaplanov, 2012; Tu & Meredith, 2015). Secondly, crises or disasters can elicit 
significant regulatory reform (Boin, McConnell, & Hart, 2008; Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock, 
Forthcoming), demonstrated clearly by the 2008-9 financial crisis (Ferran, 2012a; Ferran 
et al., 2012; Goodhart, 2009). There are many other examples of regulatory change 
following a crisis such as the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation following 
the Enron fraud in 2002, the creation of the UK Food Standards Agency in the UK 
following a series of food crises in the 1980s and 1990s (Hutter, 2011a) and the 
introduction of the Fire Precautions (Sub-surface Railway Stations) Regulations 19897 in 
response to the fire at King’s Cross Underground station. 
Finally, examinations of large scale policy and regulatory reforms, such as the move 
from Keynesian macro-economic policies to the monetarist school have pointed to the 
‘power of ideas’ to explain regulatory change (Hood, 1994). This explanation suggests 
that policy changes arise out of a shift in the prevalent ideological or intellectual climate, 
drawing on ‘theoretical breakthroughs’ in the realm of economics or other academic 
disciplines (Hood, 1994, pp. 6-7).  
                                                 
7 Available from http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1989/1401/contents/made 
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In thinking about the types of regulatory change that may occur, Black draws on Hall’s 
typology of the three orders of policy change (Hall, 1993) and applies it in the regulatory 
context (Black, 2005, pp. 9-11). According to Hall, first-order changes occur when the 
settings of policy instruments are ‘changed in the light of experience and new 
knowledge, while the overall goals and instruments of the policy remain the same’ (Hall, 
1993). Black equates these changes to the ‘sharpening of the scythe’ which, though 
seemingly minor, may actually have a large impact on the target population (Black, 2005, 
p. 9). In the world of prudential regulation, first-order changes would consist of changes 
to the prescribed calibration of the formulae used to calculate regulatory capital 
requirements. Second-order changes involve modifications to regulatory techniques or 
processes and can include the re-organization of regulatory authorities, changes to legal 
rules or even a shift from legal rules to other regulatory instruments (Black, 2005, p. 10). 
The move from the first Basel Accord to the second is an example of second order 
change. Finally, third-order changes are labelled ‘paradigm shifts’ (Hall, 1993, p. 279), 
where a paradigm is a kind of ‘interpretive framework’ through which the policy-makers 
view the world. The ‘power of ideas’ explanation for regulatory change discussed above 
attempts to account for how such shifts in the interpretive frameworks of a regulatory 
regime may come about. Such a shift occurred in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
when policymakers began to focus on the overall risks of the financial system (systemic 
risk) and began the process of developing macroprudential8 policy (Baker, 2013; 
Moloney, 2012). The scale of regulatory change can therefore vary, but as Black notes, 
‘the cumulative effect of several first-order changes may over time have radical or 
transformative effects’ (Black, 2005, p. 9) and so it is important to note that what may 
seem to be small adjustments to regulatory instruments may still have a large impact 
on the regulated population. 
                                                 
8 Macroprudential policies are those aimed at the stability of the financial system in its entirety, aimed at 
mitigating systemic risk. They include (but are not limited to) countercyclical capital buffers, limits to leverage 
(the ratio of assets to liabilities) for a financial institution and system-wide stress testing. For a full review see 
Freixas, Laeven, and Peydró (2015)  
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Regulated organizations 
In the early regulatory literature, commensurate with the dominant views of 
organizations in the 1970s and early 1980s, regulated firms were conceived of as self-
interested, rational actors with the goal of utility maximization (Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 
1971). Organizations were treated as undifferentiated wholes, with very little attention 
paid either to their ‘inner life’ or to their relationship with their external environments. 
Regulation was considered, therefore, to be the natural opponent to organizations, an 
intervention to constrain the market, and deterrence as the most effective method of 
regulatory enforcement (Hutter, 2001, p. 13). Challenging this neo-classical view of 
organizations were the emerging models of organization theory, where organizations 
were understood to have multiple goals, internal diversity of interests and cultures, and 
interdependent relationships with their environment (Scott, 2003). This also prompted 
a reimagining of regulation and an increasing academic interest in regulation from the 
perspective of the regulated. 
By far the most frequent theme for this body of research has been that of compliance, 
where the notion of compliance itself is problematized and explored. Compliance is 
fundamental to the understanding of regulation as it is the key mechanism through 
which regulatory objectives are achieved and risks are controlled. Two distinct but 
related sets of literature investigate compliance from the perspective of the regulated. 
First, compliance is often used as a lens to assess the effectiveness of regulation (Amodu, 
2008). By understanding the factors that determine compliance (or non-compliance), 
better regulation with flexible enforcement strategies can be designed to obtain greater 
levels of compliance from regulated firms (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Baldwin & Black, 
2008; Black & Baldwin, 2010). Second, compliance is envisaged as an ongoing process of 
negotiation rather than a one off event (Hutter, 1997). This allows for the examination 
of how the meanings of compliance are constructed in the social interactions between 
the regulated and the regulators, how understandings of compliance may vary within a 
regulated organization and how an organization’s external environment can have a 
bearing on its compliance behavior. 
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The empirical studies that consider compliance as the key to understanding the 
effectiveness of regulation have examined several aspects; exploring the motivations of 
firms to comply, (Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2004; Winter & May, 2001) 
identifying the characteristics of firms which impact compliance (Corneliussen, 2005; 
Gray & Shadbegian, 2005; Howard‐Grenville, Nash, & Coglianese, 2008) and creating 
typologies of attitudes or ‘motivational postures’ of regulated organizations towards 
regulatory compliance (Braithwaite, 1995; Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Gibson, & Makkai, 
1994; Kagan & Scholz, 1984). This substantial body of work covers a range of industries 
such as care homes, paper and pulp mills, agriculture, manufacturing and even 
individual tax payers and there is a strong focus on environmental and health and safety 
regulation, and on inspection-based regulatory regimes. The findings from these studies 
have made a significant contribution to understanding the factors that can influence 
compliance behavior, with the corollary being how that knowledge can then shape better 
regulation and enforcement strategies (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).  
In viewing compliance as a process, the ways in which varying meanings of compliance 
are constructed throughout a regulated organization can be investigated. This research 
tends to focus on individuals within the organization, and has discovered that there are 
‘significant differences among compliance efforts by differentially located individuals 
within firms’ (Gray & Silbey, 2011, p. 127). Indeed, empirical research into safety 
regulations in laboratories has uncovered variations in conceptions of regulation 
depending on the autonomy of the organizational actor, their technical expertise and 
how much they know about the regulators (Huising & Silbey, 2011; Silbey, 2009). This 
variation in understandings of regulation (and risk) was also a finding in Hutter’s studies 
of environmental health and safety inspectors, and risk and regulation on the British 
Railways (Hutter, 1997, 2001). 
The processual view of compliance also points to the repeated regulator-regulatee 
encounters, through which compliance is constantly negotiated and renegotiated 
(Hutter, 1997, pp. 13-14). In her model of legal endogeneity, which draws on neo-
institutionalist theory, Edelman and her colleagues regard organizational compliance as 
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‘a processual model in which organizations construct the meaning of both compliance 
and the law’ (Edelman & Talesh, 2011, p. 103). Gilad takes this model further to suggest 
that ‘meanings of regulation and compliance are shaped by regulators’ and business 
professionals’ interactive and iterative framing of regulatory problems and solutions’ 
(Gilad, 2014), again emphasizing the importance of the space where the regulated and 
the regulators meet. Finally, Hutter and Jones (2007) have shown there are other, 
external influences on an organization’s compliance behavior with regards to regulation. 
As might be expected, the regulators themselves exert a considerable amount of 
influence, but organizations are also mindful of other actors, including the media and 
trade associations, which can help to shape the motives and preferences of business and 
thus affect their internal workings. 
This large body of regulatory research uses compliance as a lens to explore the wider 
regulated organization. There is an opportunity for further investigation from the 
perspective of how regulated organizations manage other aspects of regulation, 
especially regulatory change. This might include how firms make sense of the changes 
and their impact on the organization, decision-making about how best to implement 
regulatory changes and how to manage regulatory changes in terms of interactions with 
the regulator. This study then, builds on the literature about regulated organizations 
and acknowledges two specific suggestions for further work. Hutter (Hutter, 2011b) calls 
for greater knowledge about how ‘businesses respond to this changing regulatory 
environment’, and Gray and Silbey propose that more research into the ‘habitual 
quotidian enactment’ (Gray & Silbey, 2011, p. 123) of regulation would help to 
understand the ‘other side’ of the compliance relationship.  
Research aims and research questions 
The key objective of this research project was to explore how regulated organizations 
responded to regulatory change. It uses the case study of the prudential regulation of 
the banking industry, which is designed to be constitutive of the risk management 
activities of banking organizations to maintain financial stability (Hutter, 2001; Shearing, 
1993). This case has been selected because prudential regulation is the regulation of risk 
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management, risks which have the potential to cause significant societal and economic 
harm. In addition, the degree of regulatory change exhibited after the financial crisis is 
significant, and consisted not only of changes to regulatory rules but also to styles of 
supervision and more fundamentally, the underlying philosophies and cognitive frames 
of the regulators.  
As Ford (2013) has noted, much of the literature on regulated organizations, particularly 
that which asks questions about regulatory effectiveness, has taken place in  
‘a context where an inspector is engaged in a direct relationship with an inspected 
party, in relation to a bounded physical space, around a relatively straightforward 
set of regulatory compliance criteria’ (Ford, 2013, pp. 17-18) 
The prudential regulatory context differs significantly to Ford’s description in three key 
aspects. The prudential ‘regulatory space’ (Hancher & Moran, 1989) comprises a 
multiplicity of regulators with the division of regulatory tasks between several bodies 
across many jurisdictions. Policymaking occurs at international, regional and national 
levels (see Chapter 3) whereas the supervision and enforcement of the prudential 
standards is usually the responsibility of the national regulatory authorities9. Prudential 
regulation also relies more on anticipatory, monitoring activities than ex-post 
enforcement10 (Moloney, 2012, p. 120). The set of criteria by which compliance is judged 
by bank supervisors are also somewhat opaque. As an example of management-based 
regulation, the prudential standards put the onus on banks to make their own decisions 
about what constitutes compliance because not all the criteria against which supervisors 
judge compliance are written into the regulatory rules.  
The intention is that the uncertainties and additional complexities of this regulatory 
setting will enable the study to add to existing understandings of regulated 
organizations, and the regulatory process more broadly in three key ways. First, to 
address the gaps in the regulatory literature highlighted by Hutter and Gray & Silbey, 
                                                 
9 The exception to this is the European Single Supervisory Mechanism, whereby the European Central Bank is 
responsible for the prudential supervision approximately 150 banks within the eurozone (Ferran & Babis, 2013; 
Moloney, 2014). 
10 It should be noted that regulatory approvals related to the compliance of risk models are required before 
they can be used for regulatory purposes. 
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the study investigates the symbolic and material practices that banks use to manage 
change in the prudential regulatory environment, and how they transform the 
uncertainty of regulatory change into a risk to be managed. Second, by viewing 
regulation as both the regulation of risk and an object of risk management, the aim is 
to develop the risk regulation literature further by focusing on the internal management 
of regulation and determining the manner and extent to which regulation is ‘constitutive 
and controlling’ of a particular set of organizations. The final research objective is to 
extend the existing compliance literature by exploring the dynamics of the 
regulator/regulatee relationship from the perspective of the regulated organization to 
better understand the nature of compliance. 
Based on these research aims and in relation to the empirical setting, the central research 
question is: 
How do banks in the UK respond to uncertainty and changes in the prudential 
regulatory environment? 
As Chapter 3 explains, the post-crisis regulatory environment in the UK was in a state 
of flux at the time this research was conducted between 2013-14. There were new rules 
coming into force, and new regulatory bodies had been created declaring significant 
changes in their approach to banking supervision, all of which directly affected banks 
in the UK. Several of these banks were the sites for the empirical fieldwork which was 
conducted between 2013 and 2014. They were (and still are) regulated by the UK’s 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), a new regulatory body set up after the financial 
crisis, following the break-up of the then extant Financial Services Authority (FSA)11. More 
broadly, regulatory change had taken an increasingly prominent place in banks’ public 
discourses since the financial crisis, and the research also explores this over the period 
2006-13 to investigate the nature of this discourse and how and why it changed in 
relation to the regulatory environment. 
                                                 
11 The Financial Services Authority (FSA) was disbanded in 2012 and three new regulatory bodies were created, 
the Financial Conduct Authority (to focus on customer protection, market abuse and conduct of business 
regulation), the Financial Policy Committee (which has a mandate to monitor systemic financial risk) and the 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) both of which are part of the Bank of England (see Chapter 3). 
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The central research question broken down into three sub-questions, each one relating 
specifically to the three research aims outlined above: 
How do banks respond to and manage changes in the prudential regulatory 
environment?  
How do changes in the prudential regulatory environment affect UK banks’ 
interactions with the national prudential regulator? 
To what degree do changes in the prudential regulatory environment become 
institutionalized within UK banks? 
Theoretical orientation 
This research project draws on three distinct sets of sociological theory to explore the 
research questions articulated above. First, neo-institutional organizational theory 
provides a framework for understanding how organizations might be affected by and 
respond to changes in their external environments. Second, sociological literature on 
organizations, uncertainty and risk is used to explore how organizations might deal with 
the uncertainty associated with external change, and regulatory reform in particular. 
Finally, socio-legal literature about corporate responses to regulation and regulatory 
enforcement and compliance is used to frame the inquiry into the possibilities for the 
institutionalization of prudential regulation and the nature of the post-crisis regulatory 
interactions.  
Organizations and changing environments 
It is widely acknowledged in organizational theory that organizations are embedded in 
wider environments consisting of specific social, physical, technological and political 
contexts (Granovetter, 1985; Scott, 2003, 2007; Tsoukas & Knudsen, 2005). 
Organizational institutionalism is of particularl relevance because it conceives of 
organizational environments as containing institutional forces that both empower and 
constrain the actors within it. Institutions themselves are the ‘taken-for-granted’ 
frameworks for patterning social behavior, consisting of normative beliefs, cognitive 
understandings and material practices which infuse social life with meaning (Friedland 
& Alford, 1991; Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby, & Sahlin-Andersson, 2008; Scott, 2007). The 
environments of contemporary organizations are characterized by institutional plurality 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008), where competing and conflicting demands stem from a variety 
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of institutional sources such as the state, the market, family or religion (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991). These conflicting pressures are ‘constitutional and ideational; suffusing 
the organization rather than impinging upon it’ (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 244). This 
thesis makes use of the institutionalist perspective on organizations in two main ways. 
Firstly, the idea of ‘institutional logics’ provides a heuristic framework to help to 
understand the organizational environment of the UK banks as subjects of this research. 
Second, the institutional approach theorizes a repertoire of possible strategic responses 
that organizations may employ to make adaptations to their changing environments. 
The institutional logics approach argues that organizations need to be examined in the 
context of the wider society in a way that can show how interests are institutionally 
influenced. Accordingly, society is viewed as an ‘inter-institutional system’ comprising 
of a number of institutional orders (such as the state, religion, the market) each of which 
has its own logic. These logics are defined as ‘a set of material practices and symbolic 
constructions which constitutes its organizing principles and which is available to 
organizations and individuals to elaborate’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991 p248). The 
symbolic aspects of institutions are made concrete via social relationships and 
‘institutional transformations are therefore associated with the creation of both new 
social relationships and new symbolic orders’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991 p250). This 
means that not only do the institutional logics shape the behavior of social actors but 
they provide those actors with practices and symbols which can be manipulated, 
reinterpreted or used to serve their own purposes12.  
What is meant by ‘symbolic constructions’ and ‘material practices’ and how are they 
connected together? Thornton et al. (2012) explain: 
‘By material aspects of institutions, we refer to structures and practices; by symbolic 
aspects we refer to ideation and meaning, recognizing that the symbolic and the 
material are intertwined and constitutive of one another’ (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 10)  
                                                 
12 This is not to say that institutional logics are deterministic. Indeed, Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012) 
hold that logics have both enabling and constraining effects on social action and they provide a model to 
account for the role of agency in organizational and institutional change. According to this model, institutional 
logics provide the cognitive and social building blocks for how social actors ‘transform and reproduce social 
and cultural structures’ (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 98) through their social interactions. This then allows for 
variation in the degree to which social actors are embedded in and are committed to particular institutional 
logics within the same organization. 
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Symbols are represented in the theories, narratives and frames contained in discourse 
or texts such as the public documents produced by banks e.g. annual reports and 
regulatory consultation responses (see Chapter 2). Theories are internally coherent, 
abstract forms of symbolic representation and contribute to the consistency of 
institutional logics. Frames act as interpretive schemas, and are ways of viewing and 
conferring meaning to the world. Narratives attribute meaning to a series of specific 
events or actions and according to Thornton et al. (2012), link frames and theories to 
the material practices of institutional logics. The focus on the symbolic lends itself to 
an interpretive style of analysis, focusing on the discursive mechanisms that 
organizations might employ, such as creating narratives or story telling (Lounsbury & 
Glynn, 2001), using rhetoric (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and creating texts (Phillips, 
Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004).  
Following the so-called ‘practice turn’ in social sciences (Ortner, 1984; Reckwitz, 2002; 
Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & von Savigny, 2001), Thornton et al conceive of practices as 
‘constellations of socially meaningful activity that are relatively coherent and 
established’ (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 128). In this research context, examples of material 
practices might be the IT systems and processes that banks use to measure, monitor 
and manage risks. 
Thornton et al. (2012) build on Friedland and Alford (1991) by creating ‘ideal type’ 
institutions for the key societal institutional orders of state, market, community, family, 
religion, profession and corporation. For each of these institutional orders or systems, 
these authors provide examples of their categories or organizing principles.  
Several scholars have used the institutional logics perspective as the basis for empirical 
inquiry to research topics such as the effects of logics as they change over time 
(Lounsbury, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), the plurality and complexity of the 
institutional environment (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Boxenbaum, 2006; Greenwood, 
Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Kraatz & Block, 2008), how logics can affect the behavior of 
groups and organizations (Alvarez, Mazza, Pedersen, & Svejenova, 2005), and the 
interactions between organizational (or individual) identity and institutional logics 
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(Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005; Pache & Santos, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2005, 2009; Smets, 
Morris, & Greenwood, 2012). These studies cover an array of research contexts from 
healthcare (Currie & Spyridonidis, 2015; Reay & Hinings, 2005, 2009) to design (Durand, 
Szostak, Jourdan, & Thornton, 2013) to finance (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Lounsbury, 
2007). 
Four key insights that result from this significant body of scholarship are particularly 
useful for this study. Firstly, several studies have demonstrated that organizational 
fields do not always exhibit one dominant logic (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Greenwood et al., 
2010; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Indeed, ‘often there is no 
decisive shift from one logic to another, but an ongoing interaction between two or more 
logics’ (Berman, 2012, p. 263).  
Secondly and following on from the first point, the existence of several logics in a 
pluralistic institutional environment does not necessarily result in conflict or 
competition between them. Indeed, as Currie and Spyridonidis (2015) suggest, the 
relationship between multiple logics may be ‘co-operative, orthogonal or blurred’ (Currie 
& Spyridonidis, 2015, p. 78).  
Thirdly, standing in opposition to several other studies (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Lounsbury, 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002), McPherson and Sauder (2013) importantly 
challenge the assumption that ‘each logic is tied to distinct subgroups, and it is the 
balkanization of commitments to different logics that creates dynamic tensions within 
these fields’ (McPherson & Sauder, 2013, p. 167). As their research into the ground level 
enacting of logics in the day-to-day workings of a drug court in the United States shows, 
the picture is more complex: 
‘logics serve as tools that can be used by actors in a contested environment to influence 
decisions, justify activities or advocate for change. The same logic, for example, could 
be used in different situations to achieve opposite goals, and the same actor may 
choose to employ different logics at different times depending on the perceived needs 
of the immediate situation’ (McPherson & Sauder, 2013, p. 167) 
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This suggests that the meanings of the symbols and practices of institutional logics are 
not stable, and can be used strategically by organizational actors, echoing the clams 
made by Friedland and Alford (1991) and Thornton et al. (2012) discussed above.  
Finally, given that institutional logics themselves can be dynamic, they must be 
considered as contingent on the particular historical and geographical context of the 
empirical setting (Greenwood et al., 2010). Therefore, it is not possible to fully 
understand how an organization may respond to the plurality of its institutional 
environment without also considering the prevailing political, economic and social 
context. 
Organizational institutionalism is also instructive regarding the types of strategies that 
organizations may mobilize in response to changes in their environment. Oliver (1991) 
developed a typology of responses to institutional pressures, drawing on resource-
dependence13 and institutional analysis of organizations. She identified five broad 
strategies of response, presented here in Table 1.1 in order of increasing agency on 
behalf of the organizational actors. These are acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, 
defiance and manipulation. Within each of these categories, three types of tactics are 
available, also shown in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Strategic responses to institutional pressures 
Strategies Tactics Examples 
Acquiesce 
Habit 
Imitate 
Comply 
Follow invisible, taken-for-granted norms 
Mimicking institutional models 
Obeying rules and accepting norms 
Compromise 
Balance 
Pacify 
Bargain 
Balancing the expectations of multiple constituents 
Placating and accommodating institutional elements 
Negotiating with institutional stakeholders 
Avoid 
Conceal 
Buffer 
Escape 
Disguising nonconformity 
Loosening institutional attachments 
Changing goals, activities or domains 
Defy 
Dismiss 
Challenge 
Attack 
Ignoring explicit norms and values 
Contesting rules and requirements 
Assaulting the sources of institutional pressure 
                                                 
13 Resource dependence is an organisational theory developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) that also 
considered the environment to be of importance to understanding organisations, but in a more realist sense 
in that organisations depend on their environment for physical and financial resources and must therefore 
interact with this wider social context, despite the constraints that it may impose 
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Strategies Tactics Examples 
Manipulate 
Co-opt 
Influence 
Control 
Importing influential constituents 
Shaping value and criteria 
Dominating institutional constituents and processes 
Source: Reproduced from Oliver (1991)  
Strategies of acquiescence are adopted when organizations conform to the demands of 
their institutional environment which may be out of habit, imitation (similar to mimetic 
isomorphism as envisaged by DiMaggio and Powell (1983)) or compliance, which is an 
act of ‘conscious obedience’ (Oliver, 1991, p. 152). Compromise strategies involve more 
active organizational behavior, which may be to bring conflicting institutional demands 
into balance, demonstrating partial conformity or to assert their own interests through 
bargaining. 
Avoidance strategies can be likened to the idea of ‘decoupling’, when an organization 
appears to be in conformity with the pressures of the institutional environment but at 
the same time protects the technical core of its activities from these demands (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). Presenting the ‘window dressing’ of acquiescence may conceal that in 
reality, the organization is not conforming at all. Alternatively, the organization may 
protect its core operations from institutional pressures through buffering. The final 
avoidance tactic is to exit the domain altogether, so the organization is no longer subject 
to the institutional demands. 
A more aggressive stance is to openly defy the demands of external constituents by 
dismissing them, overtly challenging them or attacking the institutional source of the 
demands as ‘an unequivocal rejection of the institutional norms and values’ (Oliver, 
1991, p. 157). Finally, organizations may seek to exert their power by changing the 
substance of the institutional demands. Oliver suggests that one tactic is to co-opt actors 
from the institutional source to act in the interests of the organization. Attempts to 
achieve influence over the agenda can be achieved by activities such as lobbying but the 
most aggressive and active tactic of all is for an organization to take control of the 
institution itself. 
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Oliver then goes on to suggest the environmental factors which could be used to predict 
the type of response an organization might select in a specific context, also taking into 
consideration that organization’s willingness and ability to conform. The multiplicity of 
demands, the alignment of the demands with the organizational goals, the degree of 
legal coercion, legitimacy of the institution, efficiency and the level of environmental 
uncertainty are all cited by Oliver as predictive factors. The intention here is not to test 
the predictive power of these factors but to use this framework as a way of explaining 
the possible types of responses that emerge inductively from the fieldwork.  
More recent work on organizational responses to institutional environments has 
emphasized the pluralistic nature of these environments, drawing upon the institutional 
logics perspective outlined above (Greenwood et al., 2010; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, 
Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010, 2012). Pache 
and Santos (2010) build on Oliver’s typology to explore organizational responses to 
conflicting institutional demands associated with multiple institutional logics. Rather 
than the predictive factors presented by Oliver, Pache and Santos (2010) maintain that 
the nature of the institutional demands and the degree to which they are represented 
internally within the organization are more likely to influence the response strategy. 
Institutional demands may either prescribe the goals which an organization should 
pursue or, the specific means which are appropriate for the organization to adopt (Pache 
& Santos, 2010, p. 460). Where there are conflicting institutional demands, there may be 
varying levels of internal representation of these demands. For example, there may be 
no representation, or only one side of the conflict might be represented internally or 
there may be multiple representations of conflicting demands. What this adds to Oliver’s 
framework is a means of exploring how organizations might deal with the conflicting 
demands of their institutional environment and also allows for the possibility that 
different organizations may respond differently to the same conflicts depending on how 
well represented the institutional logics are internally. 
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According to Greenwood et al. (2011), there are additional organizational factors14 or 
‘filters’ which can influence the way an organization responds to its complex 
institutional environment. Organization field position is the first organizational filter. 
An organizational field comprises 
‘those organizations, that in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of 
institutional life; key suppliers, resources and product consumers, regulatory agencies 
and other organizations that produce similar services or products’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983, p. 148). 
Field positions are either ‘core’ or ‘peripheral’, with core organizations tending to be 
those that are largest and possess considerable status. Organizations at the periphery 
tend to be less inclined to preserve the status quo because they are less embedded in 
the existing arrangements (Greenwood et al., 2011). On the other hand, core 
organizations are much more visible and this can have the effect of amplifying the 
institutional demands but at the same time, also gives them more power to influence 
the nature of those demands. Second, the structure of power within an organization is 
also likely to influence its response to institutional complexity. Related to the idea of 
internal representation put forward by Pache and Santos (2010), actors who occupy 
particular structural positions will interpret institutional pressures from the perspective 
of those institutional logics to which they have had the greatest exposure (Greenwood 
et al., 2011, p. 342). Greenwood et al. maintain that the ownership and governance of 
the organization can have a bearing on how receptive that organization will be to specific 
logics. Both the type of the owner (e.g. public versus private) and the structure of 
ownership (partnership, publicly traded company, not for profit) may make a difference, 
given how decision-making processes vary between them (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 
345). 
Any discussion of possible organizational responses to environmental change must also 
consider organizational legitimacy, which is a core tenet of organizational 
institutionalism (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Organizational legitimacy has its roots 
                                                 
14 Greenwood et al. (2011) also suggest features of the ‘organizational field’ that may affect response choices, 
however, since this research is being conducted amongst organizations occupying the same field, these have 
not been elaborated. 
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in both Weber and Parsons’ sociological work (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008) and is 
considered key to organizational survival:  
‘organizations that incorporate societally legitimated rationalised elements 
[institutions] in their formal structure maximise their legitimacy and increase their 
resources and survival capabilities’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977 p352). 
However, the concept of legitimacy itself has experienced ‘substantial plasticity’ 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008 p49) but Suchman provides an inclusive and much cited 
definition, aptly synthesizing previous concepts of legitimacy: 
‘Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995 p574). 
Legitimacy contributes to an organization’s overall survival by creating continuity and 
credibility which interact together to enable organizational persistence. Not all 
organizations need to ‘achieve’ the same level of legitimacy, but if they are seeking 
‘active support’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) then the legitimacy stakes are much higher, and 
more effort must be made to achieve, maintain and repair legitimacy should it be 
damaged for some reason. 
To gain legitimacy, an organization must conform to the demands of its environment – 
it may seek an audience whose legitimacy demands are congruent with its current 
activities or it may work to manipulate the environment to create this congruency 
(Suchman, 1995, pp. 586-593). Because the conferral of legitimacy is an ongoing social 
process, organizations have to work to maintain legitimacy over time, requiring them to 
anticipate and monitor changes in their environment to avoid shocks which could 
damage their legitimacy position. Organizations may also pursue additional activities to 
boost their stocks of goodwill and support from their external referents (Suchman, 1995, 
pp. 593-597).  
Perhaps of most relevance to this thesis are the strategies that organizations may 
employ to repair their legitimacy as ‘a reactive response to an unforeseen crisis of 
meaning’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 597). Such strategies involve creating a narrative which 
either denies, excuses, justifies or explains the problems that led to the legitimacy crisis. 
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Organizations may also choose to restructure, perhaps by inviting external scrutiny or 
investigations or by replacing senior members of staff associated with the crisis. Such 
strategies are only likely to be successful, Suchman warns, if they are performed with 
subtlety – heavy handed, ‘knee-jerk’ reactions may be counter-productive (Suchman, 
1995, p. 599). 
An organization operating in a pluralistic institutional environment is likely to have 
multiple sources of legitimacy or external constituencies identified with multiple 
institutional logics all of which have their own legitimacy criteria (Kraatz & Block, 2008). 
For example, key sources of legitimacy for a bank are the market, the regulator, its 
customers and even the media (Deephouse, 1996). Regulators will require banks to act 
appropriately, in line with the cultural, cognitive and normative aspects of regulatory 
logic. Its shareholders, however, will consider the bank to be legitimate if it is acting so 
as to maximize profits and deliver optimum returns, in line with the logic of the market. 
The legitimacy criteria of the market and the state are different, and may even come into 
conflict, resulting in a complex situation for a bank requiring legitimation from both 
institutional orders. In this case, Kraatz and Block (2008) suggest several options are 
open to the bank. These include avoiding the legitimacy demands altogether by denying 
their validity or invoking other strategies of defiance or manipulation (Oliver, 1991). 
Alternatively, the bank could pursue a ‘decoupling’ strategy, whereby different internal 
groups relate differently to the various conflicting legitimacy criteria. Finally, strategies 
of compromise could also be employed, with attempts to balance conflicting legitimacy 
demands (Kraatz & Block, 2008, pp. 250-251). Legitimacy, therefore, is an important 
consideration for organizations when they determine how to respond to changes or 
pressures in their institutional environment, particularly when that environment 
comprises multiple logics with multiple legitimacy criteria. 
Institutionalist theory proposes a range of responses that banks may adopt in relation 
to their changing regulatory environment and also offers a number of explanatory 
factors to account for differentiated responses within an organizational field. It is also 
worth noting that Greenwood et al. (2011) make the important point that an organization 
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may not adopt just one single, sustainable response over time. This allows for the 
possibility of multiple responses over time because ‘an organization that complied with 
institutional pressures a year ago may resist them today and an organization that used 
to circumvent a mandate may have embraced it by now’ (Tilcsik, 2010, p. 37). 
Organizations, risk and uncertainty 
The uncertainties associated with organizations’ environments has long been a subject 
for scholars of management and organizational theorists15 (Power, 2007). Indeed, the 
management of uncertainty is central to the conception of an organization; ‘organizing 
and managing are fundamentally about individual and collective human efforts to 
process uncertainty’ (Power, 2007, p. 8). This is not to suppose that processing 
uncertainty is a straightforward and easy task to accomplish. By its very nature, in trying 
to manage uncertainty, organizations are trying to manage that about which they have 
very little knowledge. This section explores related literature on how organizations 
perceive and process environmental uncertainty and how they make decisions under 
these conditions. 
Uncertainty can be thought of as having two dimensions which affect how organizations 
perceive the degree of uncertainty in their environments (Duncan, 1972). One dimension 
is the level of complexity within the environment, based on the number and 
heterogeneity of environmental factors considered in organizational decision making. 
The other dimension is the stability of these decision-making factors over time. 
Organizations will perceive high levels of uncertainty when their environments are 
complex and dynamic (Duncan, 1972, p. 325). In the post-crisis regulatory environment, 
not only was there a considerable volume of change, it was also highly complex, covering 
as it did several types of financial regulation, involving many actors across multiple 
jurisdictions (see Chapter 3). According to Duncan’s framework, banks would therefore 
perceive the post-crisis regulatory environment to be a very uncertain one indeed. 
                                                 
15 See Samsami, Hosseini, Kordnaeij, and Azar (2015) for a comprehensive review of organizations and 
uncertainty in the strategic management literature. 
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It is also worth interrogating the meaning of uncertainty more closely, not necessarily 
to arrive at a precise definition but to understand the types of conditions that 
uncertainty creates for organizational decision-making. A lack of information, an 
inadequate understanding of that information and the inability to evaluate alternative 
courses of action provide the context for the managerial processing of uncertainty 
(Duncan, 1972; Grote, 2009; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1986). All three of these aspects have 
to be navigated before organizations can decide on a course of action, requiring what 
Weick (1995) terms as ‘organizational sense-making’. Milliken (1987) goes further in 
specifying the types of uncertainty that organizational members might perceive – these 
are state, effect and response uncertainty. The first of these, state uncertainty, ‘means 
that one does not understand how components of that environment might be changing’ 
(Milliken, 1987, p. 136). For example, banks might not be clear about the details of the 
prudential regulatory rules or how different pieces of regulation may interact with each 
other. Secondly, effect uncertainty relates to an inability to predict how changes in the 
environment might affect the organization. An instance of this might be banks being 
unable to specify the impact that new regulatory rules might have on their future 
financial performance. Finally, response uncertainty occurs when organizations are 
unable to determine the consequences of choosing one possible response over another. 
This could be the case if a bank implements a new compliance management system but 
is not sure whether it is in line with regulatory expectations. 
Uncertainty and equivocality (or ambiguity) in an organization’s environment are 
deemed to be occasions for sense-making (Weick, 1995, p. 91) which is conceived as a 
collective, social process of meaning-making which enables the subsequent actions 
required to bring stability to organizational life. Sense-making is more about plausibility 
than accuracy, ‘about the continued redrafting of an emerging story so that it becomes 
more comprehensive, incorporates more of the observed data, and is more resilient in 
the face of criticism’ (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 415). As a result, despite the 
potential lack of accuracy, it is possible to change the nature of the uncertainty over 
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time. Stinchcombe (1990) suggests that uncertainty is ‘reduced through news; then 
finally, the residual uncertainty is transformed into risk’ (Stinchcombe, 1990, p. 5). 
The idea that uncertainty can be transformed into risk is picked up by Clarke (2001) who 
suggests that this process of transformation is a drive towards rationalization, reflecting 
a ‘societal-level expectation that organizations should be able to control the uncertain, 
and be able to respond effectively to the untoward’ (Clarke, 2001, p. 12). This expectation 
is evident in the emergence of a ‘managerial concept of risk management and the 
different logics and values which underlie it’ (Power, 2007, p. 3). According to Power, as 
soon as uncertainties are organized within a framework of risk management, they are 
transformed into risks (Power, 2007, p. 4). 
Due to the nature and complexities of organizational life, combined with the contestable 
and elusive nature of risk itself, this is not a straightforward task. Hutter and Power 
(2005) present a useful approach for understanding how organizations deal with risk 
through their idea of ‘organizational encounters with risk’. Three distinct ‘lenses’ are 
used to explore these encounters – attention, sense-making and re-organization. 
Organizational attention to risk relates to the problematization of risk, how it is 
measured, calculated and identified and the technologies of control that are used in 
these activities. Sense-making about risk is undertaken in response to ‘errors, accidents 
and anomalies’, a means by which organizations attempt to understand risks and 
‘transform new encounters with risk into acceptable managerial practices’ (Hutter & 
Power, 2005, p. 19). The final perspective examines the re-organizing undertaken in 
response to risks, including efforts to improve their control and management 
throughout the organization. 
This thesis will use these understandings of the organizational processing of uncertainty 
to explore how banking organizations attend to and gather information about regulatory 
change, how they respond to the equivocality and possible lack of clarity in that 
information and how they then make determinations of how to act and re-organize in 
response to those changes. 
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Organizations, regulation and regulators 
Within the large swathe of regulatory literature on corporations and regulation (see 
above), of most relevance here is that which explores ‘new governance’ techniques16 and 
their adoption within business organizations (Coglianese & Lazer, 2003; Ford, 2008; 
Gilad, 2010; Gunningham & Sinclair, 2009; Hutter, 2001, 2011c). These regulatory tools 
have been developed as an alternative to the ‘command and control’ regulatory strategy 
in the hope of achieving ‘better’ regulation (Baldwin, 2010; Better Regulation Task Force, 
2003). Of particular interest is the technique of management-based regulation because, 
as established above, this best describes the approach of the Basel 2 prudential 
standards and the FSA’s approach to supervision before 2009. For management-based 
regulation to be successful, the target organization has to internalize the ‘constitutive’ 
rules that comprise the regulation (Hutter, 2011c, p. 461) and do this ‘to the point that 
there is no longer a need to refer to the law since the distinction between the rule and 
the ruled activity disappears’ (Hutter, 2001, p. 16). Organizations are supposed to 
accomplish this by integrating the regulatory requirements and appropriate behavior 
into the corporate culture of the organization in such a way as compliance becomes a 
‘taken-for-granted’ part of organizational life (Parker, 2002). In other words, the 
achievement of regulatory goals becomes institutionalized within the organization.  
From her research into health and safety on the British Railways, Hutter develops a three 
stage model which envisages how organizations might progress towards the 
normalization or institutionalization of a system of enforced self-regulation17 (Hutter, 
2001, pp. 301-312). The first stage is ‘design and establishment’, involving activities such 
as responding to regulatory consultations, designing new organizational structures and 
processes, developing plans for change programmes and training and communication 
activities related to the new regulation. The second ‘operational’ phase sees the plans 
                                                 
16 Various regulatory instruments or tools are captured under this broad heading, including principles-based 
regulation, risk-based regulation, management-based regulation, meta-regulation and enforced self-regulation. 
Though there is no one accepted classification of these techniques, Gilad (2010) has developed a useful 
typology which will be followed here. 
17 Enforced self-regulation is very similar to management-based regulation and is a regulatory strategy 
developed by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) and combines both state and corporate regulation. The state sets 
out broad standards which firms must meet and which firms must monitor on an ongoing basis. However, 
regulatory authorities also have powers to oversee this process and enforce sanctions in instances of non-
compliance.  
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being put into action within the organization, the systems and process changes are made 
and become part of “business as usual” and the awareness and compliance with risk 
management spreads throughout the organization. The final ‘normalization’ phase is 
achieved when ‘risk management and regulatory compliance are fully integrated parts 
of the corporate culture’ (Hutter, 2001, p. 302). This three stage model provides a useful 
heuristic to analyze the degree to which prudential regulation has become 
institutionalized within banks and how regulatory change might affect banks’ progress 
back and forth between the three stages.  
Reaching the final stage of this model is akin to a ‘regulatory Utopia’ (Black, 2008b, p. 
432) but some scholars have warned of the potential ‘pathologies’18 of new governance 
techniques (Parker, 2002), the possibility of unintended consequences (Gray & Hamilton, 
2006) and the paradox inherent in its reliance on firms to have the ability and willingness 
to design appropriate internal systems, processes, controls and cultures (Black, 2012a). 
This study is therefore open to the possibility that there may be both internal and 
external factors that may hinder this process, and that by identifying these, Hutter’s 
model can be further developed.  
This thesis considers regulation and regulatory supervision (understood as compliance 
monitoring and enforcement) as an inherently social process (Colebatch, 1989; Hawkins, 
1984; Hutter, 1997; Meidinger, 1987). Whilst for convenience, regulatory authorities and 
regulated organizations are often referred to in the aggregate, as if they are actors in 
their own right, it is more accurate to view them as comprised of many individuals and 
constituencies of individuals that comprise a ‘regulatory community’ (Meidinger, 1987). 
In this sense, regulatory interactions are not depersonalized, anonymous occurrences, 
rather they happen between people, and often between the same people as encounters 
are repeated over time (Hawkins & Hutter, 1993). The need for repeated interactions is 
created by the interdependent nature of the regulatory relationship. As Hawkins puts it, 
regulators and the regulated ‘depend on each other for information and assistance’ 
                                                 
18 Parker (2002) suggests four possible pathologies that can arise a s a result of the conflict between business 
and compliance goals: ceremonial compliance, shifting responsibilities and risks, scapegoating and 
stakeholder containment (Parker, 2002, pp. 144-164).) 
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(Hawkins, 1984, p. 45). Regulatory inspectors or supervisors cannot be expected to know 
every detail of the regulated organization’s business. In the case of bank regulation, 
significant asymmetries of information arise from the nature of the bank’s role as an 
intermediary between borrowers and lenders. Only the bank is privy to the specifics of 
these transactions and more importantly, to the risks associated with them. But the 
information does not flow one way, banks are also reliant on their supervisors for 
guidance and assistance in the implementation of regulatory standards, particularly 
when they take the form of new governance techniques (discussed above). Regulatory 
capture theorists warn of the downsides of this interdependence (Stigler, 1971) but it is 
an inevitable result in situations where both sides of the regulatory relationship require 
information from each other.  
Ethnographic studies of regulatory inspectors and the organizations  which they inspect 
(Hawkins, 1984, 2002; Hutter, 1997, 2001) have revealed that the repeated encounters 
or interactions result in a kind of reflexive relationship, characterized by ‘a continual 
process of adaptation and readaptation by one party and then the other according to 
responses received’ (Hawkins & Hutter, 1993, p. 203). The influential theory of 
responsive regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992) and the extensions of this by Black 
and Baldwin (Baldwin & Black, 2008; Black & Baldwin, 2010) also considers the reflexive 
nature of the interpersonal dynamics between the regulator and the regulated. Here, 
adaptions are central to the enforcement strategies adopted by the regulator and how 
the nature of compliance and non-compliance is perceived. The responsiveness here 
comes from the way in which the regulator views the regulatee and how this then 
influences the regulator’s approach to enforcement, possibly responding in a tit-for-tat 
way depending on how compliant and co-operative the regulatee is considered to be 
(Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992).  
Various theoretical and empirically derived typologies have been developed to classify 
firms according to their perceived dispositions towards compliance with regulation 
(Baldwin, 1995; Kagan & Scholz, 1984). Other factors can (or should) also influence how 
a regulator characterizes a regulated organization based on the regulated organization’s 
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behavior, attitude and culture (Baldwin & Black, 2008; Black & Baldwin, 2010). Through 
their encounters with the regulator, regulatees create their own understandings of the 
regulator. Gray and Silbey (2014) have identified three variants of how regulators might 
be regarded – as threat, ally or obstacle. These characterizations of the regulator vary 
within an organization, depending on the expertise, role in the organizational hierarchy 
and the frequency of regulatory interactions of the organizational members.  
Given this propensity to identify and label the ‘character’ of the other party in the 
regulator / regulatee relationship, the smallest details of these interactions can become 
significant. The following passage from Hutter’s work on environmental inspectors 
illustrates this point: 
‘Inspectors interpreted the reception they received from the regulated according to 
the nature of their relationship. For instance, difficulties in parking could be 
interpreted as a company being awkward or as an understandable pressure on 
parking. Being asked to sign a visitor’s book would be seen either as a sensible 
precaution in case of fire or as obstructionist and rude. Inspectors also reacted 
differently to offers of coffee and lunch according to the social distance they wished 
to maintain between themselves and the regulated. Where there was a close and co-
operative relationship inspectors would expect to be offered coffee and possibly 
lunch.’ (Hutter, 1997, p. 188) 
The converse is also likely to be true, that small nuances in the regulator’s behavior can 
influence how the regulated organization responds. These ‘relational signals’ are 
characterized by ambivalence (Etienne, 2012, p. 31), adding to the uncertainty 
experienced by the regulated. However, this uncertainty can be reduced through 
repeated interactions resulting in both the regulator and the regulated sharing ‘a 
common understanding’ of their relationship. Moreover, this provides a basis for the 
proactive management of the relationship by both parties (Etienne, 2012). 
The continued development of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated 
produced by repeated interactions may also cause this relationship to become 
increasingly cooperative (Pautz & Wamsley, 2011, p. 6). Opinions in the literature vary 
as to the benefits of a cooperative regulatory relationship – some claim that such 
cooperation can increase regulatory effectiveness (Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Pautz & 
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Wamsley, 2011; Scholz, 1991) whilst others suggest that close ties can lead to subtle 
forms of regulatory capture or even the tolerance of deviant behaviour, to which the 
regulator turns a blind-eye (McCaffrey, Smith, & Martinez-Moyano, 2007; Vaughan, 
1997). Notwithstanding this debate, the representation of the relationship between the 
regulator and the regulated as being deeply interpersonal and interdependent, possibly 
co-operative and continual over time provides a valuable foundation from which to 
explore post-crisis regulatory relationships.  
Thesis outline 
This thesis continues with Chapter Two which explains the research methods used in 
the study, why they were appropriate, how the data was sampled, collected and 
analyzed. It also discusses ethical considerations and the methodological limitations of 
the research.  
The next five chapters comprise the empirical part of the thesis, beginning with Chapter 
3 which provides a more detailed explanation of the rationale for prudential regulation 
and how prudential regulatory standards have developed over time. This chapter also 
explains the key regulatory changes to prudential regulation that have resulted from the 
financial crisis. Because of the interconnections between global rule making and national 
implementation, this chapter describes the key changes at an international, EU and UK 
level, drawing out the complexities of this process. These changes included not only the 
changes to the regulations themselves, but also to the cognitive frames and intellectual 
assumptions which underpinned prudential regulation prior to the crisis and the 
approach to the supervision of banking organizations in the UK.  
Having set the empirical stage, Chapter Four presents the findings from the discourse 
analysis work, which explores how the five largest UK banks responded to regulatory 
change in their annual reports and regulatory consultation responses over the period 
2006-2013. This chapter does two key things. First, it analyzes banks public discourses 
about regulatory change, highlighting the presentation of their organizational selves in 
relation to regulation and how this changed over time. Second, it reveals that the 
institutional logics of the market and regulation were the dominant logics used by the 
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banks in their public discussions of regulatory change, but the balance struck between 
their use changed over time in relation to considerations of legitimacy, levels of 
uncertainty and organizational characteristics. 
The fifth chapter uses the data from fieldwork interviews to explore the material 
practices and structures of managing regulatory change as a risk. It explores where the 
responsibilities for managing regulatory change lie within large, complex banks and how 
these have been adapted in the post-crisis environment. Ten core categories of 
regulatory practices are identified over the regulatory life-cycle (from initial legislative 
proposals through to ongoing compliance monitoring). These practices are examined in 
terms of banks attend to the risk of regulatory change, how they make sense of those 
changes and the re-organizing activities implemented to control the risks of regulatory 
change.  
Chapter 6 also draws on the interview data and considers the routine interactions 
between the bank supervisors and actors within the banks themselves. It demonstrates 
that the nature of these relationships varied over time and were influenced by broader 
political and economic circumstances. The final substantive chapter uses Hutter’s model 
of corporate responses to regulation (Hutter, 2001) to investigate the institutionalization 
of post-crisis regulatory changes within banks. The interview data revealed several 
indicators of regulatory institutionalization as well several internal and external factors 
that can help or hinder this process.  
The final concluding chapter presents the key thematic arguments that emerge from the 
findings in the empirical chapters and discusses them in relation to the contribution this 
study makes to the sociological and socio-legal literature about risk, regulation and 
organizations. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the study’s limitations and 
maps out the implications of this thesis for future research. 
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Chapter 2:  Research methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the research questions and aims presented 
in Chapter 1 were translated into the methodological approach. It explores the 
epistemological and ontological underpinnings of the study and how the theoretical 
orientation informed the selection of methods for analyzing and collecting data. The 
practicalities of the processes used to conduct the fieldwork are then described. Finally, 
the chapter considers how issues such as ethics and researcher positionality were taken 
into account, especially the latter given the researcher’s prior experience of working in 
the financial industry. 
Qualitative research methods were the most appropriate choice for this study because 
of the project’s conception of regulation as a social process and the focus on meanings 
and interpretations. The aim was not to test pre-determined hypotheses nor to confirm 
or negate a specific theoretical position, therefore this thesis took an inductive approach 
to the data. The epistemological basis of this inquiry arises in both neo-institutionalist 
organizational theory (Phillips & Oswick, 2012; Scott, 2007) and the sociological 
conceptions of risk (Hilgartner, 1992; Lupton, 1999a; Renn, 1992; Zinn, 2008) which 
draw on social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Gergen, 1999) and its 
concern with how knowledge about the world is gained. This perspective holds that what 
is understood as reality, and the information that is available about that reality, is 
created through social interactions. That is not to say that there isn’t some ‘objective’ 
reality outside these social constructions, rather that this reality can only be made sense 
of and given meaning through relationships and use of language and other semiotic 
resources. Indeed, Berger and Luckmann (1966) stress the notion of 
‘institutionalization’, a process whereby meanings are stabilized through the production 
and repetition of actions over time, largely through the use of language. Qualitative 
methods, therefore, allow for such understandings and meanings to surface in the 
fieldwork data and the texts produced by the banks themselves (see below). 
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The research design also had to consider more pragmatic matters associated with the 
specific empirical context. Banks and the banking industry had been a frequent, almost 
daily, topic of media scrutiny since the financial crisis and were also subject to 
significant political scrutiny. Such factors, combined with the confidentiality and 
sensitivity of regulatory matters, meant that the researcher had to establish 
relationships of trust to negotiate access and guarantee anonymity, as well as respecting 
the other time commitments of the participants.  
Two qualitative research methods were used – discourse analysis on bank annual reports 
and regulatory consultation responses and semi-structured interviews with 
representatives from banking organizations. The temporal boundaries for the period of 
data collection were determined by considering the timing of the crisis and the post-
crisis regulatory reforms (see Chapters 1 and 3). However, accounts of the crisis timeline 
vary as to its precise duration (Edmonds, 2010; Guillén, 2009; New York Federal Reserve 
Bank, 2011). This project therefore takes the period from mid-2007 to the end of 2009 
as the period of the financial crisis, and considers the regulatory changes from 2008 
onwards (see Chapter 3). The fieldwork interviews were conducted between 2013 and 
2014 and the documentary data analysis sample covered the years 2006-2013 (see 
below)19. The initial focus was on the discourse analysis, followed by the interview 
fieldwork but some of the work was done in parallel. 
Discourse analysis 
The purpose of the discourse analysis was to understand what banks themselves were 
publicly (or officially) saying about financial regulation and regulatory change during 
the period under investigation (2006 – 2013). Texts produced by the banks were 
examined using discourse analysis techniques to identify the different ways in which 
they discussed regulation and regulatory change. 
                                                 
19 The aim was to complete the fieldwork interviews and discourse analysis by the end of 2013, however, due 
to access issues, some interviews had to be scheduled in early 2014 hence the discrepancy in the end dates 
for data collection between these two methods. 
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Corpus construction 
Three general criteria were applied to selecting the texts that comprise the discourse 
analysis corpus. The first follows one of the important principles of discourse analysis 
in that the texts under analysis should be naturally occurring so that 'data are in 
principle not edited or otherwise 'sanitized' but studied 'as is', that is, close to their 
actual appearance or use in their original contexts' (Van Dijk, 1997b, p. 29). Secondly, 
given the sensitivity relating to regulatory matters, it was unlikely that access would 
have been granted to private documents regarding regulation, so the documents had to 
be available publicly. Finally, and most importantly, the documents had to have enough 
content that related to financial regulation to make their analysis meaningful. Two 
classes of documents were identified – annual reports and responses to regulatory 
consultation papers. 
Annual reports are produced as a legal requirement by all public companies in the UK 
and their content is largely dictated by company law, financial reporting regulations and 
accounting standards. However, there is also a significant element of discretion allowed 
in the narrative and therefore they also serve other purposes for the firm as ‘part of a 
corporate communication strategy that pursues strategic objectives, such as 
strengthening the corporate image or brand, or seeks to strengthen other marketing 
objectives with particular stakeholders’ (Stanton & Stanton, 2002, p. 496). The 
‘stakeholders’ that are the audience for these reports include the shareholders of the 
company, employees, customers, suppliers and various other publics such as the media, 
investor analysts and regulators that have an interest in the contents. Annual reports 
provide a fertile ground for discourse analysis as they consist of several different textual 
‘genres’ compiled together in one document. They combine narrative text with financial 
information, graphs, tables and visual imagery and often run to hundreds of pages. It 
was therefore necessary to apply some parameters to obtain a sample that was 
manageable and created some uniformity and comparability across the corpus.  
The annual reports were sampled along two different dimensions. Firstly, the time frame 
for the documentary analysis was from 2006 to 2013. 2006 was chosen as a starting 
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point so that banks’ responses to regulatory change and how they might have altered 
before, during and after the financial crisis could be examined. Secondly, the population 
of all possible annual reports produced by banks in the UK needed to be narrowed to 
specific organizations to make the analysis feasible in the available research time. 
particular organizations. The largest five UK banks – Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC, 
Lloyds, Barclays and Standard Chartered were chosen because they occupied the same 
organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and also represented some diversity in 
terms of geographical coverage, products and types of customer. The sample also 
includes banks that had and had not received UK government support during and after 
the financial crisis. Table 2.1 shows these characteristics for each of the five banks. 
Table 2.1 Characteristics of sample banks 
Bank Size 
(Assets, 
£bn) 
State Help Key Markets Customers 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
1027.9 Yes 
UK 
Europe 
Middle East 
Americas 
Asia 
Retail 
Commercial 
Wholesale 
HSBC 1602.8 No 
UK 
Europe 
Hong Kong 
Rest of Asia-Pacific 
Middle East & North Africa 
North America 
Latin America 
Retail 
Commercial 
Wholesale 
Barclays 1312.3 No 
UK 
Europe 
Africa & Middle East 
Americas 
Asia 
Retail 
Commercial 
Wholesale 
Lloyds 847  Yes 
UK Retail 
Commercial 
Standard 
Chartered 
404.6 No 
Asia 
Africa 
Middle East 
Retail 
Commercial 
Wholesale 
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Source: Bank Annual Reports, 2013 
Whilst many internationally active banks are incorporated in the UK, focusing on the top 
five of UK origin enabled greater comparability between the documents as the legal 
requirements for the annual reports and the regulatory situations of the banks are 
similar. An additional complicating factor is that annual reports are produced for bank 
legal entities at different levels of the company hierarchy20. Only the annual reports for 
the top level of this hierarchy were examined as these provided the best comparison 
across the five banks. 
This resulted in a sample of forty annual reports for these five organizations which were 
downloaded from their websites and given a preliminary reading to identify the sections 
to include in the scope of the discourse analysis. If any sections in the report contained 
references to regulation or regulatory change in any year for any of the five banks they 
were included in the corpus21. The sections identified were: 
Chairman’s statement: This is presented as a letter from the Chairman of the Board of 
the bank to the shareholders. This section provided an insight into how the Chairman 
communicated understandings of the events of the prior year and the priorities of the 
organization for the year ahead. This section revealed the issues that were commanding 
the most organizational attention for that reporting period. 
CEO statement: As the figurehead of the business, the CEO is responsible for the 
performance of the business over the preceding year. This section was therefore deemed 
relevant as it highlighted regulatory issues that affected business performance and that 
may have been of concern in the future.  
                                                 
20 Large corporate organizations have complex company hierarchies, comprising subsidiary companies which 
are established as legal entities in their own right. The legal entity at the top of the hierarchy is the holding 
company and it is at this level that the overall prudential capital requirements are measured.  
21 Content deemed out of scope of the discourse analysis included all quantitative data tables, all non-risk and 
financial business performance commentary, the financial accounts and notes to the accounts, the reports 
from the Board committee and the Directors’ Remuneration Reports. Furthermore, only narrative text was 
included in the analysis of the sections named above, all tables of financial data were explicitly excluded as 
not being relevant to the research question. 
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High-level risks (principal risks): This section typically identified a bank’s assessments 
of the high-level risks to which it was exposed, which varied from market conditions, 
the macro-economic outlook to regulation and regulatory change.  
Risk management / risk review: All the bank annual reports contained detailed sections 
regarding risk management in which they presented their policies and procedures for 
managing different risk types and also provided quantitative data regarding risk 
exposures for the prior year. 
Regulation and supervision: This section typically contained information about the 
bank’s supervision, the regulations to which it was subject in its various jurisdictions 
and relevant changes in regulations.  
Consultation papers are produced by policy-makers and standard setters such as the 
BCBS, the EU and the UK financial regulatory authorities when new pieces of regulation 
are in the process of being developed. These lay out the proposed changes and invite 
responses from any interested parties. Policy-makers are usually mandated to release 
these consultation papers in the interests of transparency and democracy and any 
organization or individual is permitted to submit a response. In general, respondees to 
regulatory consultations include private individuals, academics, industry bodies and 
trade associations, and individual firms. These responses are collated and reviewed, and 
further consultation papers may be released or the rule-making body will progress to 
confirming the changed rules in a final version of the text. Consultation responses are 
usually made publicly available unless the respondent has requested they be kept 
confidential22. Being easily accessible, these documents were especially useful for this 
research project because they provided a direct insight as to how organizations are 
responding to particular aspects of regulatory change. 
Consistent with the discourse analysis of the banks’ annual reports, the same five 
banking organizations were also used to create the sample of consultation responses. A 
‘long list’ of all the relevant consultation papers related to prudential regulation 
                                                 
22 The exception to this was the FSA / PRA which did not publish individual consultation responses on its 
website. Instead, these were obtained by requesting them directly from the PRA. 
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produced by the relevant rule-making bodies (BCBS, the EC and the PRA / FSA) since the 
financial crisis was created. Second, these responses were classified according to the 
banks that had responded to each paper. Where three or more of the sample banks had 
provided a response, these were included in the corpus. The final corpus for the 
discourse analysis of both annual reports and consultation responses comprised 82 
documents and is shown in Appendix 1. 
Analysis 
As a method, discourse analysis allows for a closer examination of ‘language as 
constitutive and constructive rather than reflexive and representative’ (Phillips & Hardy, 
2002, p. 13). This follows the moderate social constructionist ‘claim that the social world 
is textually constructed’ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 9) but not a radical claim that objects in 
the world or subjects of knowledge are nothing but social constructions (Sayer, 2000, p. 
90). In this understanding, language and texts are ‘sites in which social meanings are 
formed and reproduced, social identities are shaped and social facts are secured’ 
(Tonkiss, 2004). 
Discourse analysis has a diversity of approaches, from detailed textual analysis used in 
linguistics to critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2003; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). The 
latter is concerned with how language constitutes the unequal distribution of power in 
society. Hardy and Phillips (2002) offer a useful framework which has been used to 
locate this study within this variety of approaches to discourse analysis arranged along 
two axes. The horizontal axis represents a continuum between constructivist approaches 
and those of critical discourse analysis. The vertical axis signifies the degree to which 
the analysis is concerned with the fine-grained detail of a text, as in conversational 
analysis (Myers, 2000) or whether the context surrounding the text is of greater 
importance.  
Figure 2.1 shows where the present study is situated in this classification, with the 
orientation towards a constructivist epistemology and towards the importance of the 
context within which the texts are situated. The contextual setting of these texts goes to 
the heart of the project aim of understanding and exploring how an organization 
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experiences and contends with modifications in its external environment i.e. the changes 
associated with prudential regulation since the financial crisis.  
Figure 2.1 Hardy & Phillips’ typology of discourse analysis approaches 
 
Source: Adapted from Hardy and Phillips (2002) 
Organizational and management scholars have increasingly turned to discourse analysis 
to explore organizational phenomena (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000; Grant & Iedema, 
2005; Phillips & Oswick, 2012) such as identity, strategy organizational change and 
institutions (Phillips & Oswick, 2012). Indeed, proponents of institutional theory 
frequently employ discursive methods of investigation. These methods are used to both 
understand institutional mechanisms and to provide insights into particular 
institutional cases, which ‘open[s] up the “black box” of institutional processes in a way 
that other methods of empirical investigation cannot’ (Phillips & Oswick, 2012, p. 449). 
This method is therefore appropriate for this study because it is concerned with how 
banks are constructing their responses to regulatory change using various rhetorical 
devices and particular language structures.  
Discourse analysis does not have the same kind of standardized practical approach as 
other types of qualitative data analysis and this can be advantageous because the 
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analysis can be tailored specifically to the particular research study. To guard against 
other aspects of methodological discipline such as reliability and validity being 
compromised, the analysis was performed in a rigorous manner, using a detailed, 
inductively derived coding framework and analytic memos to capture decision making 
and reflections during the analysis process. 
The approach to discourse analysis used in this study, therefore, was an amalgam of 
several techniques that were deemed most appropriate given the texts involved and the 
core research questions. The types of discursive features that were interrogated in the 
texts included the following: 
Key themes and arguments: The key themes and sub-themes regarding regulatory 
change were identified. The various lines of argument relating to these themes were 
analyzed and considered in relation to wider societal discourse (Gill & Whedbee, 1997; 
Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Tonkiss, 2004; Van Dijk, 1997b). 
Variation and consistency: The texts were analyzed for patterns of variation and these 
were examined in terms of what they indicated about potential conflicts and 
inconsistencies in the texts (Gill, 2000; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Tonkiss, 2004). 
Use of language and tone: The specific lexical constructions used to discuss regulatory 
change were investigated, particularly where the use of jargon appeared to be taken for 
granted. The use of euphemistic language was also noted, as was the use of metaphor 
and other stylistic tropes. Finally, repetition of certain words and phrases was also 
considered and related back to the key themes and arguments (Fairclough, 2003). 
Characterization of actors: Particular ways of portraying various actors (such as the 
bank, its customers or shareholders) or phenomena (such as regulation or risks) were 
identified and the textual devices used to construct identities were also considered 
(Fairclough, 2003; Gill & Whedbee, 1997; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). 
The whole corpus was analyzed using the same process and coding framework and the 
analysis was performed inductively. The texts were allowed to ‘speak for themselves’ 
rather than imposing a pre-determined schema onto the data. The coding was conducted 
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in two phases (Saldaña, 2012). The initial phase of coding was performed in a ‘bottom 
up’ manner, identifying individual elements that discussed regulatory change or 
regulation and these elements were assigned a descriptive code. During this first phase, 
approximately 2,400 textual elements about regulatory change were coded. In the 
second phase, NVivo (a CADQAS software programme) was used to create a hierarchical 
coding frame which allowed the first phase coding to be refined. This involved grouping 
together and integrating the codes from the first phase in a way that allowed them to be 
linked to possible explanatory concepts derived from the theoretical literature discussed 
in Chapter 1. For example, 106 references were found in the documents that discussed 
regulatory change in relation to the economy. These were aggregated into the category 
‘economic impacts’, which in turn was assigned to a higher level grouping called ‘market 
logic’. Categories of codes that directly linked to theoretical concepts therefore emerged 
inductively from the second phase of the data, allowing patterns that had emerged 
inductively to be linked to theoretical explanations. 
Semi-structured interviews 
The use of qualitative interviews to gain a ‘fine-textured understanding of beliefs, 
attitudes, values and motivations in relation to the behaviors of people in particular 
social contexts’ (Gaskell, 2000, p. 39) is a well-established method in sociology, and the 
most appropriate method for gathering individual views, perspectives and opinions 
from members of banking organizations to explore the study’s research questions. Given 
that a research interview is also a communicative interaction where the researcher takes 
an active role, the researcher paid careful attention to her own role in co-constructing 
the interview. The use of a reflective fieldwork diary allowed the researcher to refine her 
interviewing techniques as the fieldwork progressed and provided a mechanism for 
helping to maintain critical distance from the field (see below). 
Sample selection and access 
Initially, the research design had been to use a case study approach, investigating two 
comparable banking organizations in some depth. The aim was to perform twelve to 
fifteen interviews in each organization, selected by purposive sampling based on where 
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in the organization they worked. Participants at different levels in the organizational 
hierarchy were to be interviewed to explore variations in risk and regulatory 
understandings throughout the organizations.  
Two potential candidate fieldwork sites had been identified – both were large, 
internationally active banks subject to significant prudential regulatory requirements. 
Access was granted for the first site and twelve interviews were secured. However, in the 
case of the second proposed site, the access request was escalated to the executive 
management of the bank who unfortunately refused. They judged their organization’s 
participation in project to be too risky due to ongoing regulatory issues and had 
questioned whether the research methodology would represent a consistent picture of 
the organization’s perspective on regulatory change23.  
The case study approach was therefore revisited, as it had not proved possible to gain a 
comparable level of access to any other organizations. Instead, the sampling strategy 
was amended to widen the number of organizations in the sample and to reduce the 
number of interviews per bank. Interviewees were to be selected from specific functions, 
all of which were relevant to prudential regulation in some way. The sample also 
focused, where possible, on the Group Central and Wholesale Divisions of the bank. The 
focus on wholesale rather than retail banking was primarily driven by the changes in 
prudential regulation since 2008, which tended to focus more on wholesale and capital 
markets than on retail banking.24 
The following are the areas of banking organizations that were identified as having some 
level of interaction with prudential regulation and regulatory change. 
Risk Management is responsible for the day-to-day risk management of the firm and 
typically split into the various risk types of market, credit and operational risk (see 
Chapter 3). Risk managers monitor and manage the exposure of the bank to these risks 
                                                 
23 This latter concern was especially interesting, given the study’s aspiration to explore differential 
understandings of regulation and regulatory change within organizations. 
24 Though there have also been some major changes in regulation that have impact retail banking such as the 
Retail Distribution Review, these tend to be more focused on conduct or consumer protection regulation under 
the purview of the Financial Conduct Authority. 
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in compliance with the prudential regulations to produce the inputs to the regulatory 
capital calculations. 
Regulatory Affairs consists of staff who are usually responsible for managing the day-
to-day liaison with the banks’ regulators, keeping records of all meeting with the 
regulators and briefing senior management in advance of regulatory meetings. In 
addition, this department may be responsible for monitoring the development of new 
regulatory rules and ensuring that the business areas are aware of the potential changes 
and impacts on the firm. 
Prudential Regulatory Policy / Advisory comprises employees who advise other parts 
of the business on more detailed regulatory issues, such as the compliance of 
particularly complex transactions with the regulatory rules. Advisory staff also provide 
guidance on the interpretation of new rules and potentially understanding the detailed 
impact of the changing rules on the business. 
Finance functions include teams who are responsible for capital management processes 
which are directly impacted and influenced by prudential regulation. These processes 
include capital planning as well as the production of mandatory regulatory reports 
disclosing the bank’s capital and liquidity position and other information related to the 
measurement and management of risk. Regulatory reports must be provided on a 
regular basis to the PRA. Finance staff may also be called on to explain the resulting 
numbers internally, to help the business understand the use of the bank’s capital, for 
example. 
The researcher employed a tactic characterized by Shenton and Hayter as the 
endorsement of a ‘known sponsor’ (Shenton & Hayter, 2004, p. 224) to gain access to 
interviewees. The researcher applied ‘snowball sampling’ using personal and 
professional networks. This approach secured interviews with individuals in four banks 
in addition to the initial organization and these respondents invited other appropriate 
colleagues to participate. This proved particularly effective as it allayed prospective 
informants’ concerns regarding anonymity and endorsed the researcher’s credibility and 
integrity. 
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Gaining access to the required number of research participants from banking 
organizations, in an environment of considerable sensitivity, required careful planning, 
flexibility and tenacity. The strategies employed were ultimately successful and in total 
twenty-two interviews were conducted from October 2013 to May 2014 broken down as 
shown in Table 2.225.  
Table 2.2 Interview sample summary 
Bank Function Number of 
Interviewees 
A –International Universal Bank Risk Management 
Regulatory Affairs 
Finance 
5 
4 
3 
B – International Custodian Bank Risk Management 
Regulatory Affairs 
1 
1 
C – UK Subsidiary of European Bank Risk Management 
Finance 
Regulatory Affairs 
2 
2 
1 
D – Large International Bank Regulatory Affairs 2 
E – Large UK Bank Regulatory Affairs 1 
Moving from an in-depth case study in just two banks to a sample of five organizations 
with fewer interviews per bank had implications for the overall project and the nature 
of the data that was collected. For example, it was harder to investigate the variability 
of understandings of risk and regulation within an organization (Hutter, 2001). In 
instances where there were only a small number of respondents per organization, such 
variability was harder to observe and validate. However, the wider spread of 
organizations allowed for more analysis at the organizational field level and potential 
for more cross-organizational comparisons. 
Developing the interview guide 
A guide for the interview was prepared prior to the interviews, based on the research 
questions, the empirical context and the relevant academic literature. Given that the 
overall approach of the study was interpretive and inductive, allowing themes and even 
                                                 
25 Please note that the researcher had previously had contact with 14 out of the 22 interviewees prior to the 
beginning of the research project. 
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potentially theoretical points to emerge from the data, the topic guide was ‘lightly’ 
structured (Wengraf, 2001, p. 60). It consisted of broad questions to encourage detailed 
and wide-ranging answers which gave the researcher the flexibility to adapt the 
conversation to the specific information that arose. The final version of the interview 
guide can be found in Appendix 2. 
Crafting the interview questions themselves required careful consideration of language 
and heavily theoretical or academic terms were avoided to prevent alienating the 
interviewees (Gaskell, 2000). Instead, questions were couched using more business-
oriented language. This proved to be advantageous in two ways. First, it created an 
immediate rapport between the researcher and the participant and second, as Wengraf 
(2001) suggests, even if the answer given was not particularly relevant to the interview 
question, it might contain useful data for the overall research questions.  
The final consideration was the sequencing of the questions. The first few questions 
required the respondent to give descriptive, factual answers about their job within the 
organization, designed to put them at ease before asking more substantive questions. 
Again, this was a successful strategy for building trust during the interview, as well as 
producing valuable data. 
Conducting the interviews 
Once access was confirmed, interviews were arranged individually with participants and 
the interviews were conducted at their business premises or in a more neutral space 
according to the interviewee’s preference. Informed consent was gained in writing from 
each interviewee prior to starting the interview. The topic guide was used as a basis for 
the interviews, but adapted as necessary depending on the nature of the participant’s 
role in the organization. For example, some interviewees did not come into contact with 
the regulator at all in the course of their work. In these cases, the conversation naturally 
focused more on the changes to the regulatory rules and the respondent’s opinions and 
experiences of managing those changes within the organization. Each interview lasted 
for approximately one hour and where consent was granted, the interviews were 
recorded. Otherwise, the researcher made detailed notes during the course of the 
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interview. The researcher made a point of maintaining ‘double attention’ during the 
course of the interviews (Wengraf, 2001, p. 194), attending to both the substance of the 
interviewees’ answers as well as managing the overall interview within the time 
constraints.  
Analysis 
The completed interviews were transcribed using standard orthography, omitting the 
paralinguistic characteristics as the analysis was focused on the thematic content of the 
interviews and other conversational behavior would not be analyzed (Kowal & O’Connell, 
2004).  
After careful reading and re-reading of each transcript, the coding and analysis was also 
performed using NVivo. Some initial categories for coding had emerged during the 
transcription process and others were derived from the relevant literature. However, the 
largest proportion of the coding framework was arrived at inductively as each transcript 
was read and coded. When approximately one third of the interviews had been coded, 
the framework was rationalized and given a hierarchical structure to better identify the 
high level analytical categories on which to base the findings.  
Once all the interviews had been coded, the researcher once again left a period of two 
months before re-checking the consistency of the coding which created some critical 
distance and contributed to the validity of the analysis. 
Ethical considerations 
Given the sensitivity of the context, it was critical that the researcher demonstrated 
trustworthiness and integrity in all her dealings with the participants and the banking 
organizations to which they belonged. To adhere to these important ethical standards 
the following steps were taken before, during and after the interviews were conducted.  
Firstly, at the beginning of each interview, both the researcher and participant read and 
signed copies of an Informed Consent form which outlined the provisions for the 
protection of the identity of the participant, their right to withdraw from the process at 
any time and how the resulting data would be used and kept secure. All interview 
transcripts, recordings and notes were password protected and stored in private folders 
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to which only the researcher had access. If hard copies were made, they were kept in 
locked filing cabinets. 
The researcher was very careful to keep the identity of other participants confidential, 
even with members of the same organization. Similarly, no reference was ever made to 
the identity of the other participating organizations. Finally, the identities of 
participating organizations and individual interviewees have been completely 
anonymized in the entirety of this thesis, 
Managing two data sets 
The fieldwork and analysis resulted in two discrete data sets analyzed according to two 
distinct coding frameworks and methods. The discourse analysis provided an 
‘organizational field’ level view of the banks’ public responses to regulatory change, 
highlighting areas for further exploration in the interview data. No attempt was made to 
match or perform a direct comparison between the two data sets given that the sample 
organizations were different in each case. However, by comparing the more general 
themes and evidence that emerged from one set with the other, similarities and 
variabilities were identified and interrogated. This gave the researcher a broader and 
better view of different perspectives and understandings. 
Researcher positionality and reflexivity  
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the researcher had previously worked in 
the financial industry. Despite having this previous ‘insider’ experience, the researcher 
recognized the importance of maintaining critical distance with respect to the data 
collection and analysis. The importance of researcher reflexivity in qualitative research, 
and in particular on qualitative research in organizations, is well documented (Cunliffe, 
2003; Haynes, 2012; Hibbert, Coupland, & MacIntosh, 2010). Described by Haynes, 
reflexivity is ‘an awareness of the researcher’s role in the practice of research and the 
way this is influenced by the object of the research, enabling the researcher to 
acknowledge the way in which he or she affects both the research processes and 
outcomes’ (Haynes, 2012). Given the interpretive epistemological and ontological basis 
of this study, it is vital that reflexivity ‘is used here to question knowledge claims and 
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enhance understanding by acknowledging the values and preconceptions that the 
researcher brings to that understanding’ (Haynes, 2012, p. 72). 
Several strategies were employed to enable this reflexive process and to maintain critical 
distance including the use of a fieldwork diary, using theory from the relevant academic 
literature to analyze and interpret the data and listening to the interviews themselves 
several times to understand how the data had in part been co-constructed. Much of this 
reflection focused on the positionality of the researcher herself, along the insider-
outsider continuum (Haynes, 2012, p. 201) 
Insiders are defined as ‘the members of specified groups and collectivities or occupants 
of specified social statuses’ (Merton, 1972, p. 21). This gives the insider a priori 
knowledge of, and familiarity with, a particular social setting, which can have both 
advantages and disadvantages for scholarly research. The researcher in this case was no 
longer an insider, having left the industry a year prior to conducting the fieldwork. 
However, given her previous acquaintance with several of the interviewees, it was very 
likely that they may still have viewed her as an insider. This required careful handling 
in the interviews themselves (see below). 
Despite the disadvantages documented by Hockey (1993), (over-familiarity or the 
potential for bias) the previous insider status of the researcher was advantageous in 
terms of securing access to the financial industry, which has been a problematic industry 
within which to conduct academic research. The familiarity of the researcher with the 
subject matter of the interviews also added to her credibility and enabled her to build 
significant levels of trust with the participants, resulting in candid interviews and a rich 
set of data. Several of the interviews were with senior members of banking 
organizations, usually with very busy schedules, and the researcher’s existing level of 
knowledge enabled the interview to explore substantive issues rather than the 
interviewee having to explain basic concepts.  
Notwithstanding these benefits, the researcher was careful to use techniques to mitigate 
the potential drawbacks of over-familiarity. These centered around ‘making the familiar 
strange’, questioning the researcher’s own taken-for-granted assumptions and 
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preconceptions. The primary mechanism for this reflection was a fieldwork diary in 
which observations and thoughts were recorded as soon as possible after each interview 
was completed. One of the most consistent observations was the need for the researcher 
to ensure that the tacit knowledge that the interviewees possessed was rendered explicit 
in the course of the interview. To overcome this, at the beginning of the interview, the 
researcher emphasized that the participant should not assume that the researcher 
possessed any prior knowledge. In addition, in cases where the researcher’s knowledge 
was taken for granted, the interviewee was asked to elaborate and/or provide specific 
examples of the phenomena under discussion. 
Once all the interviews were completed and transcribed, the researcher focused solely 
on the documentary data analysis for three months, putting some temporal distance 
between her exit from the field and the analysis of the interview data. During the analysis 
process, the researcher approached the data with an attitude of open curiosity. 
Additionally, by using inductive analysis informed by theory, and allowing the coding 
framework to emerge from the data, the risks of researcher bias and the application of 
an insider perspective were minimized. 
Limitations  
The translation of a well thought out research design into the practical activity of 
conducting fieldwork is not straightforward because of the ‘messiness’ of the real world, 
and the constraints that this places upon the research project. Thus, the methods that 
are applied are always, to some degree, a result of pragmatism and compromise. In the 
case of this current study, several of the difficulties encountered in conducting the 
fieldwork have already been mentioned but it is worth reflecting on how these 
limitations have shaped the resultant research. 
Firstly, the use of discourse analysis is inherently an interpretive practice, the researcher 
bringing to it her own assumptions, situation, experience and understandings of the 
world. Thus, whilst every effort was made to introduce rigour in the coding process to 
increase the reliability of the findings, they are this one researcher’s interpretation of 
the data. This is, however, not an insurmountable problem for this study as in the main, 
61 
 
the results were triangulated where possible with secondary data sources, adding 
reliability to the findings overall (Flick, 2004).  
Second, the biggest compromise that was made to the original research design was 
changing from an in-depth case study approach to a broader but shallower sample. This 
was due to the concrete realities of gaining access to organizations in a particularly 
sensitive context and whilst it required a change in approach, the resultant data from 
the five organizations was no less useful or interesting. Indeed, it has resulted in 
findings which are suggestive of phenomena applying across the organizational field. 
Finally, a trade-off had to be made between protecting the anonymity and confidentiality 
of the interviewees and participating organizations and the interesting data and findings 
that emerged as result of their own unique positions vis-à-vis the regulators (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Such compromises are necessary and important in social science 
research, not only in maintaining the researcher’s integrity but also to avoid damaging 
prospects of access for future research projects. 
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Chapter 3:  The changing regulatory environment 
It is estimated that if all the new rules that have been produced internationally to 
implement the G20’s post-crisis regulatory framework were printed, there would be a 
‘pile of paperwork more than three Eiffel Towers tall’ (Lee, 2015). Since the financial 
crisis, conduct of business and prudential regulation have been significantly 
reconfigured. Regulations also now increasingly prescribe how financial markets and 
those firms that operate within them should be structured (European Commission, 2014; 
Prudential Regulation Authority, 2015b) and require banks to have workable plans in 
place for an orderly resolution should they become insolvent (European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union, 2014a; Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014c). 
A bank which is headquartered in the UK but operates in multiple countries with 
multiple lines of business (such as retail banking, investment banking and trading in the 
financial markets), will be subject to supervision26 by many different regulatory 
authorities, each of which will have its own rules and expectations27. Following the crisis, 
the structures of the regulatory authorities responsible for creating and enforcing the 
regulations have been substantially reconfigured at a global, EU and national level. This 
chapter has two main aims. Firstly, it explains the empirical setting within which the 
research is situated, describing the changes to both regulations and the regulators which 
constitute the dynamic regulatory environment. Secondly, the chapter explains the 
technical complexities of prudential regulation which is important to grasp because this 
complexity adds to the challenges and uncertainties experienced by banks in the post-
crisis situation. The chapter begins by explaining the rationale for prudential regulation 
and how this relates to banks and risk and how the prudential regulatory rules 
developed over time. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the post-crisis changes 
                                                 
26 A distinction is often drawn between regulation and supervision. The former refers to the ‘establishment of 
specific rules of behavior’ and the latter is ‘the more general oversight of financial firms’ behavior’ (Goodhart, 
1998, p. xvii). This thesis also follows this convention. 
27 The terminology of ‘home’ and ‘host’ supervisors is used to distinguish between the supervisor in the nation 
where the bank is headquartered and those supervisors in the countries where the bank has subsidiaries. 
Effective co-operation between home and host supervisors of cross-border banks is Principle 13 of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2012a) 
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to prudential regulations and its supervision within the UK from 2008 onwards, and 
describes this in relation to the changes which occurred at the EU and international 
levels. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key changes faced by banks in the 
UK. 
What is prudential regulation? 
Banks have generally been considered as fragile or even inherently unstable (Diamond & 
Dybvig, 1983; Minsky, 1977) which is related to the structure of their balance sheets. 
The maturity (or duration) of bank assets (e.g. loans) is longer than that of their liabilities 
(short term customer deposits) and through this process of maturity transformation 
banks play a valuable role in the economy. The risk is, however, that depositors will all 
wish to withdraw their cash on demand. The nature of fractional reserve banking 
compounds this risk, because banks have a relatively small proportion of assets in cash 
in relation to their total assets. If confidence in the bank diminishes, customers are more 
likely to simultaneously withdraw their deposits (Jacklin & Bhattacharya, 1988) and if 
this lack of confidence is widespread, it can cause a ‘run on the bank’ as with Northern 
Rock in 2007 (Baltensperger & Dermine, 1986; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Postlewaite & 
Vives, 1987). Banks may not have enough cash assets to honor their customer demands 
which could go on to cause a liquidity crisis, potentially leading to insolvency (Goodhart, 
Hartmann, Llewellyn, Rojas-Suarez, & Weisbrod, 2013; Llewellyn, 1999). 
Banks play two additional roles in the financial system, which further contribute to 
systemic risk. Firstly, banks are providers of liquidity28 to both financial markets and the 
wider economy. Second, they act as intermediaries in the payments system to ensure the 
transfer of funds for the settlement of mutual obligations (Goodhart et al., 2013) This 
interconnectedness, coupled with the asset to liability mismatch resulting from 
fractional reserve banking, means that the failure of one bank can be contagious, 
contributing to the fragility of the overall financial system as levels of trust and 
                                                 
28 Liquidity refers to the speed at which an asset can be sold in a market without a significant alteration to its 
price. Cash is the most liquid asset as it can easily and quickly be converted into other assets. The liquidity of 
a market is the extent to which assets can be bought and sold at stable prices. The provision of liquidity by 
banks refers to their ability to provide illiquid loans to customers whilst also allowing depositors access to 
funds on demand. 
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confidence in the banking system are reduced further. As witnessed with the 2007-8 
financial crisis, the consequences of such systemic failure are not just confined to the 
financial markets but can have a significant negative impact on the wider economy (Brian 
& Patrick, 2010; Foster & Magdoff, 2009; Grusky et al., 2011; Stiglitz, 2010). 
Prudential regulation aims to resolve or at least reduce the risk associated with the 
‘structural dilemma…[of] the asset-liability mismatch; the basic conflict between 
guaranteeing a return of capital (e.g. insurance claim, interest on deposits) whilst also 
putting that capital at risk’ (Weber, 2010, p. 108). It does this by requiring that an 
appropriate portion of a bank’s assets or investments are funded by money that has not 
been borrowed i.e. shareholder’s equity. Because these funds do not have to be repaid 
at a particular time (instead, dividend payments are made based on profitability), 
increased amounts of equity enhance the loss absorbing capability of the bank29. The 
amount at which the minimum capital requirement is set depends on the levels of risk 
to which the bank is exposed (see Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1 - Asset and liability structure of a typical bank 
 
                                                 
29 It is important to understand that this does not imply that banks ‘hold capital in reserve’ as a store of funds 
that can be used to cover losses. As Admati and Hellwig (2014) argue capital is on the liability side of the 
balance sheet and cash reserves are on the asset side. Instead, the point of having minimum capital 
requirements is to prevent banks from taking on excess leverage (significantly more debt than equity funding) 
which can lead to insolvency. 
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Prudential regulation can also address the liability side of the balance sheet by ensuring 
that banks have adequate liquid assets (both in the short and long term) to service their 
liabilities. Historically, however, prudential regulation has tended to focus more on the 
asset side of the balance sheet (capital adequacy) rather than the liability side (liquidity). 
This changed after the financial crisis (see below).  
Banks and risk 
The ‘identification, calculation, pricing and packaging of risk’ is at the heart of today’s 
financial markets (de Goede, 2004). It could even be argued that the management of risk 
is what constitutes the practice of banking itself. There are risks associated with both 
sides of the balance sheet. On the asset side are the risks related to loans and the trading 
of securities (equities30, government and corporate bonds31 and more complex products 
such as derivatives32) – credit risk, counterparty risk, market risk, and trading liquidity 
risk. The key risk connected with the liability side is liquidity risk. Banks also monitor 
and manage several non-financial risks which are also described below.  
Credit risk is the risk that a borrower may not be able to repay a loan, i.e. the borrower 
goes into default. The management of credit risk has evolved since the 1990s from ‘being 
based on gut feeling and experience to the use of statistical models, as technological 
and computing advancements enabled banks to adopt new, more scientifically based 
risk management systems’ (Sappideen, 2004, p. 63). These statistical models monitor 
the creditworthiness of borrowers and typically assess the likelihood of the borrower 
defaulting, the amount of the loan exposure that would remain at the time of default, 
and the proportion of the loan that could be recovered in the event of a default.  
When more complex products such as derivatives are considered, a specific type of risk 
needs to be measured. This is known as counterparty risk and is ‘the risk that a 
counterparty in a derivatives transaction will default prior to the expiration of a trade 
                                                 
30 An equity is a share or stock issued by a company on a listed stock exchange 
31 A bond (either corporate or government) is a debt security which is issued in order to raise funds for the 
issuer, who in return pays a specified rate of interest over set period of time or ‘tenor’. 
32 A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is dependent on an underlying market variable such as an 
equity price, an interest rate or a foreign exchange rate 
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and will not therefore make the current and future payments required by the contract’ 
(Gregory, 2010, p. 16). Measurement of counterparty credit risk is performed using 
mathematical models that attempt to predict the value of the contract in the future and 
then calculate the associated potential risk exposure. 
Derivative transactions and investments in other types of securities such as bonds and 
shares are also subject to market risk. This arises from the changes in the value of a 
market variable (or risk factor) such as an interest rate, an equity index or a foreign 
exchange rate. Changes in these risk factors will impact the prices of securities and 
derivative instruments that are held by banks.  Again, these risks are managed and 
monitored using sophisticated mathematical models such as Value-At-Risk (VaR) that 
aim to predict the likely future movements in these market variables and the impact 
that that will have on prices. 
Trading liquidity risk is concerned with whether a bank can sell an asset at short notice 
(to ‘liquidate’ it) and this in turn is dependent on whether there is a liquid market for 
that asset. When markets are illiquid, prices offered for an asset tend to be lower and 
thus larger losses are likely to be incurred by the seller but the buyer will get a bargain.  
On the liability side, funding liquidity risk concerns the ability of a bank to meet cash 
obligations as they arise – such as the need to repay a deposit, pay interest on loans or 
pay for securities that have been purchased. Banks have several mechanisms available 
to raise funding liquidity when necessary, such as selling assets or borrowing money 
either from the wholesale market or the central bank. Each of these options has a cost 
involved such as the payment of interest, so in order to minimize funding costs, banks 
have to understand and monitor their future liabilities and assets to ensure the latter 
can cover the former. 
The other financial and non-financial risks which banks manage include concentration 
risk (the risk of concentrating loans and other assets in one particular product type, 
industry sector or counterparty), interest rate risk (the risk associated with fluctuations 
in interest rates on loans), reputational risk (the risk of damage to the bank’s reputation 
with customers, shareholders and investors resulting from its own conduct) and 
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operational risk (the risk of losses associated with external events, including legal risk, 
and internal failures in systems, processes, and errors associated deliberate or 
accidental human conduct). 
Prudential regulatory standards - the Basel Accords  
Understanding the nature and level of risks to which banks are exposed is vital to 
determining levels of regulatory capital and is at the heart of prudential regulation. 
However, prior to 1988, there was no international regulatory consensus on how banks 
should prudently manage their balance sheets in light of these risks. In general, capital 
adequacy regulation was fairly simplistic and fragmented, with the typical requirement 
being for banks to hold a minimum capital ratio, calculated very simply as a ratio of 
capital to total assets (Tarullo, 2008). In the UK, this had only been a requirement since 
the Banking Act of 1987 (Rawlings, Georgosouli, & Russo, 2014, p. 14). There were no 
standards for taking the quantum of risk into account when calculating this ratio. 
Moreover, the constitution of capital, the size of the ratio and the stringency of 
enforcement varied by jurisdiction, giving rise to regulatory competition and an 
international playing field which was very much uneven (Davies & Green, 2008). Financial 
markets were becoming increasingly global and the types of financial products were 
growing in sophistication. Mounting concerns over the deteriorating levels of bank 
capital, the increasing levels of risk and the potential impact on the stability of the 
financial system led to the need for international convergence on capital adequacy 
standards and the creation of the first Basel Accord in 1988, known as Basel 1 (Davies & 
Green, 2008; Goodhart, 2011; Kerwer, 2005; Tarullo, 2008; Wood, 2005). As Figure 3.2 
illustrates, the Basel Accord evolved over time, incorporating capital requirements for 
market risk in 1996 and then significant revisions between 1999 and 2004 resulting in 
Basel 2. 
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Figure 3.2 Evolution of the Basel Accords 1988 - 2007 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was formed by the nations of the 
G-10 in 1974 following the collapse of the German Bank Herstatt which created an 
international consensus that a transnational supervisory organization was required 
(Goodhart, 2011; Schenk, 2010; Tarullo, 2008; Wood, 2005). The BCBS is hosted by the 
Bank of International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland and states its mandate is to 
‘strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the 
purpose of enhancing financial stability’ (BCBS, 2013b, p. 1). 
Discussions about Basel 1 began as early as 1981 and culminated in the release of the 
first Basel Accord in July 1988 which applied only to large, international banks. It was 
hoped that this new framework would: 
‘serve to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system; 
and, secondly, that the framework should be fair and have a high degree of 
consistency in its application to banks in different countries with a view to diminishing 
an existing source of competitive inequality among international banks’ (BCBS, 1988, 
p. 1). 
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Simply put, this regime required banks to hold a minimum of 8% of capital33 against their 
credit risk-weighted assets34 only, calculated as 
 
These standards defined the quality and composition of the capital numerator, along 
with how the denominator of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) 35 needed to be calculated.36  
This simple approach was not to last however, because ‘the analysis of financial risk 
changed fundamentally in the 1990s for a number of reasons, not least perceptions 
about the potential for technology to support the applications of finance theory’ (Power, 
2007, p. 71). The growth of increasingly sophisticated methods for managing market 
risk within banks, such as VaR, led some financial institutions to challenge the existing 
regulatory requirements as being too conservative and not ‘risk sensitive’ enough, with 
the potential to damage the competitiveness of the market and dampen innovation. Of 
the risks outlined above, it is worth noting that Basel 1 was only concerned with credit 
risk assets and the risk of the default of borrowers37.  
The BCBS began its work on market risk in the late 1980s (Goodhart, 2011) at the same 
time as there were huge increases in the volume of derivatives trading (Anderson & 
McKay, 2008)38. This was accompanied by innovations in technology and mathematical 
modelling, such as VaR, allowing financial institutions to measure the downside risks of 
these investments as well as the potential for profit. Almost inevitably, these advances 
                                                 
33 It is interesting to note that the value of 8% was not based on objective calculations but was ‘judged to be 
the kind of level that would allow well run banks to stay out of trouble most of the time’ (Davies & Green, 
2008, p. 38) 
34 Risk weighted assets refers to the measure of a bank’s assets that has been adjusted to reflect the riskiness 
of that asset to the bank. The higher the risk weighting (e.g. 100%), the riskier the asset is considered to be. 
35 For a full listing of the risk weight categories, please see BCBS (1988) Annex 2 
36 The latter was a fairly straightforward approach of assigning risk weights to both on and off-balance sheet 
assets, based on the broad category to which the borrower belonged. These risk weights are 0% (cash and 
sovereigns), 20% (OECD banks), 50% (residential mortgages) and 100% (corporates, non-OECD banks) 
37 This was acknowledged by the Basel 1 Accord itself, which stated that ‘the framework of measurement in 
this document is mainly directed towards assessing capital in relation to credit risk (the risk of counterparty 
failure) but other risks, notably interest rate risk and the investment risk on securities, need to be taken into 
account by supervisors in assessing capital adequacy. The [Basel] Committee is examining possible approaches 
in relation to these risks’ (BCBS, 1988, p. 1) 
38 For example, in its 1992 Annual Report, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) showed an increase in 
the value of derivatives markets from $1.083bn in 1986 to $6.9bn in 1991 (Bank of International Settlements, 
1992, p. 192). 
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also increased the need for tighter regulation around derivatives and the risks they 
posed to the financial system. The BCBS released the culmination of its work on the 
broadening of the existing Basel Accord to include market risk in a consultation paper 
in 1993 (Goodhart, 2011, p. 246). This proposal faced significant criticism from the 
industry largely based on the lack of sophistication in the proposed approach and the 
divergence from the risk management systems that were emerging in the market 
(Goodhart, 2011; Tarullo, 2008; Wood, 2005). As Tarullo notes, ‘the large banks were 
essentially unanimous in urging the committee to permit the use of the so-called VaR 
models’ (Tarullo, 2008, p. 63). The industry lobbying was eventually successful and the 
VaR approach was finally adopted by the BCBS in the ‘Amendment to the capital accord 
to incorporate market risks’ (BCBS, 1996). 
The simplicity of the Basel 1 regulation was both its strength and its weakness. Basel 1 
implementation was widespread across the BCBS member countries, largely because 
banks only had to perform straightforward calculations, requiring only minimal changes 
in existing regulatory reporting processes. The common approach across all banks also 
made the resulting capital ratios easily comparable and transparent. However, the 
dynamism of the financial environment caused BCBS to comment that: 
‘the financial world has developed and evolved significantly during the past ten years, 
to the point where a bank’s capital ratio, calculated using the current Accord, may 
not always be a good indicator of its financial condition. The current risk weighting 
of assets results, at best, in a crude measure of economic risk, primarily because 
degrees of credit risk exposure are not sufficiently calibrated as to adequately 
differentiate between borrowers' differing default risks.’ (BCBS, 1999, p. 9 para 6) 
The primary rationale for revising Basel 1 was to increase the risk sensitivity of the 
Accord, to remove the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage39 and to support the 
calculation of the minimum capital requirements with stronger supervision and 
enhanced market discipline (Benink, Danielsson, & Jónsson, 2008; Danielsson, 2003; 
Danielsson et al., 2001; Tarullo, 2008). The negotiations for the revised Accord were 
long, protracted and arduous, but Basel 2 was finally published in July 2004, after some 
                                                 
39 Regulatory arbitrage occurs when banks exploit loopholes in regulatory standards to avoid certain types of 
regulation.  
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eight years of development, three substantial consultation papers and three quantitative 
impact studies (Tarullo, 2008; Wood, 2005). It represented a step change in terms of 
sophistication (and complexity) from the previous Accord and aimed to develop  
‘a framework that would further strengthen the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system while maintaining sufficient consistency that capital 
adequacy regulation will not be a significant source of competitive inequality among 
internationally active banks’ (BCBS, 2004, p. 2 para 4). 
Basel 2 consisted of three ‘pillars’. Pillar 1 concerned the setting of the minimum capital 
requirements and prescribed the risk calculation methodologies that banks were 
permitted to use in determining their capital requirements. It provided a menu of 
increasingly sophisticated measurement methods, and the expectation was that the 
largest, internationally active banks would implement the most advanced methods. 
Pillar 2 focused on the requirements for the national supervisors. Their role was to 
ensure that banks under their supervision held enough capital for the risks they faced 
and national supervisors had the discretion to increase the capital requirements should 
they deem this necessary. In parallel, Pillar 2 also outlined the processes banks needed 
to assess their own capital adequacy vis-à-vis their risk profile, such as stress testing40. 
The third Pillar outlined the requirements for the public disclosure of capital and risk 
information, in the hope that this would garner greater discipline in risk management 
processes. On an annual basis banks had to disclose detailed qualitative and quantitative 
information on aspects of the Basel 2 standards. Such disclosures had never been 
required before and represented an increase in the amount of capital and risk data that 
banks had to produce, manage and report. 
Pillar 1, in particular, transformed the way that banks had to calculate their capital 
requirements. For Credit Risk, the approaches ranged from the simple Standardized 
                                                 
40 Stress testing is a type of scenario analysis whereby banks subject their current portfolio to market 
conditions under stress to try to understand what happens to the associated risk and therefore capital 
requirements. Different scenarios can be used based on different economic variables. 
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Approach (STD)41 to the more complex, Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approaches42. The 
IRB approaches followed the precedent set by the 1996 Market Risk Amendment in 
allowing banks to use their own internal models for the assessment of credit risk 
parameters which are then used as inputs into the supervisory defined RWA and capital 
calculation. To qualify for the IRB approaches, banks had to be able to demonstrate the 
soundness of their internal models, the availability of the requisite amount of historical 
data and meet other stringent requirements for their risk management systems and 
processes.  
As Figure 3.3 shows, there was no change at this time to the requirements for Market 
Risk. However, a new category of risk management was introduced, that of Operational 
Risk. This is defined as ‘the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events. This definition includes legal 
risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk’ (BCBS, 2006b, p. 144 para 644) and has 
posed banks with significant challenges in terms of applying some of the statistical 
approaches for the measurement of credit and market risk to an altogether broader type 
of risk and one with a less established practice of management (Power, 2005a, 2007). 
Basel 2 was not without its critics, who drew attention to two specific shortcomings – 
the reliance on banks’ statistical risk models in the setting of minimum capital standards 
and the inherent pro-cyclicality of the rules which posed a risk to the whole financial 
system (Benink et al., 2008; Danielsson, 2003; Danielsson et al., 2001). The advanced 
credit risk models under Basel 2 assume that the behavior of market participants has no 
impact on the outcomes predicted by the risk models. However, as Danielsson et al. 
(2001) explain ‘by encouraging all market participants to employ similar risk modelling 
techniques regulation renders them more homogenous in risk-aversion and trading 
strategies, thus rendering the financial system less stable’ (Danielsson et al., 2001, p. 7). 
                                                 
41 The Standardised Approach is similar to Basel 1 in that it categorizes credit exposures by the nature of the 
borrower, but is much more granular and risk weights are derived from a mapping to external credit ratings. 
42 There are two Internal Ratings Based Approaches – Foundation and Advanced (FIRB and AIRB). The 
Foundation approach allows banks to use own estimates of Probability of Default only, whereas the advanced 
approach allows own estimates of Loss Given Default, Exposure at Default and maturity also. 
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The problem of pro-cyclicality is related to the economic business cycle of ‘boom and 
bust’. In the good times, banks will expand their lending activities and contribute to 
economic growth. As economic conditions worsen, however, banks will suffer higher 
defaults on loans, and will potentially scale down lending activity in response. The 
argument is that Basel 2 could amplify these effects and worsen the economic conditions 
in a downturn (Allen & Saunders, 2004). Notwithstanding these criticisms, the 
implementation of Basel 2 went ahead with the release of the final version of the accord 
in 2004 (BCBS, 2004). 
Figure 3.3 - Decomposition of Basel 2, Pillar 1 
 
Even though Basel 2 applied to large internationally active banks, the Accord itself did 
not have the status of law (Brummer, 2015; Kerwer, 2005). In order for these 
international standards to be legally enforceable by banking supervisors, they had to be 
enacted in law in national jurisdictions. As a European Union member state, the 
applicable legislation for the UK was the Capital Requirements Directive (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2006) which was then adapted into UK 
law as the Prudential Standards section of the Financial Services Authority Handbook 
(the FSA’s compendium of regulatory rules). The Financial Services Authority (FSA), as 
the UK financial regulator, was also responsible for monitoring UK banks’ 
implementation and compliance with these rules. To use the advanced risk modelling 
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approaches under Pillar 1, banks had to apply to the FSA for a ‘waiver’43. The initial 
approval of these waivers often had conditions attached both pre-implementation and 
on an ongoing basis and indeed, for the IRB waivers, all approvals that were issued were 
subject to conditions (FSA, 2011a, p. 336 para 843). The FSA also had to conduct its 
supervisory responsibilities in accordance with Pillar 2 and, in addition to the Pillar 3 
disclosure requirements, the FSA required the reporting of capital and risk information 
on a regular basis, consisting of nine reporting templates containing some 2,000 
individual items of data in total (FSA, 2006). 
The move from Basel 1 to Basel 2 required banks in the UK to make significant changes 
to achieve compliance with the new rules. Implementing the advanced risk models 
involved the design of new mathematical risk methodologies and the collection of large 
amounts of historical transaction data (James & Ong, 2004). The new rules also 
necessitated major changes to information technology systems, systems and processes 
for the collection and aggregation of risk data, business processes and procedures, risk 
management policies and even governance and organizational structures (Wilson, 2004). 
It is estimated that the incremental cost of compliance with Basel 2 for the UK financial 
services industry was £1.1 billion (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005).  
The BCBS’s aim was for Basel 2 to be implemented by the end of 2007 for the most 
advanced approaches, and sooner for the simpler ones. This ambition, however, was 
thwarted not only because of a global divergence in adoption timetables44 but more 
importantly, the advent of the global crisis in 2007-8, raised serious questions regarding 
the efficacy of the Basel 2 regime and heralded a further wave of regulatory reform, as 
the next section will describe. 
                                                 
43 Waivers are granted under Section 148 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. There were three 
types of waiver available – one for credit risk (to use the IRB approach), one for counterparty credit risk (to 
use the Internal Models Method [IMM] approach) and one for market risk, (to use VaR for calculating market 
risk). 
44 The 2013 implementation survey by the BCBS shows that three of its 27 member were yet to complete Basel 
2 implementation, five years after the target date (BCBS, 2013e). 
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Global and European regulatory reform 
2007 witnessed the beginning of the global financial crisis, triggered initially by fears 
about defaults on mortgage lending following the ‘housing bubble’ in the US. These fears 
spread to the UK, which experienced the first run on a bank – Northern Rock – in over 
one hundred years. As market liquidity and confidence dried up, there were a number 
of near or actual collapses of financial institutions in the UK, the USA and continental 
Europe. Governments stepped in to inject money into failing banks and central banks 
pumped liquidity into the financial system. The crisis was followed by the ‘Great 
Recession’, the worst global recession since World War 2, according to the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund, 2009). 
Amongst many other causes, regulatory failure has been cited as a key contributing 
factor to the global financial crisis (Financial Services Authority, 2009e; Financial 
Stability Board, 2009b, 2009c; Financial Stability Forum, 2008; Larosière, 2009; London 
School of Economics, 2010), precipitating an unprecedented level of regulatory reform 
(Black, 2010a; Ferran, 2012a; Ferran et al., 2012; Goodhart, 2009; Helleiner et al., 2010; 
MacNeil, 2010). Most fundamentally, this regulatory failure was a failure of the 
intellectual footing which underpinned the structures and mechanisms of international 
financial regulation (Baker, 2013; Black, 2012b; Financial Services Authority, 2009e). 
Prior to the crisis, regulators, policy-makers, politicians and the financial industry had 
shared beliefs about the efficiency of the markets and their capacity for self-correction. 
In addition, the crisis revealed the flawed assumptions regarding the way the financial 
system worked – that risks were efficiently diversified, largely through financial 
innovation and that the risk of the system of the whole was best understood as an 
aggregate of the risks of individual financial firms (Baker, 2013; Black, 2012b). Instead, 
the crisis demonstrated the significant interconnectedness of the financial system, 
likened by Haldane to a complex ecosystem (Haldane & May, 2011) which was much 
more fragile than the previous orthodoxy had suggested. 
Resolving the problems of the crisis and preventing a future financial collapse of this 
scale were the clear priorities of policy-makers in the aftermath of 2007 – 8. These 
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solutions required significant cognitive or ideational shifts (Baker, 2013; Black, 2012b) 
away from the crumbling intellectual edifice of the efficient markets hypothesis towards 
other ideas about how to preserve the stability of the financial system, and about how 
much regulatory authorities should intervene in the financial industry. The championing 
of ‘macro-prudential’ regulation by the BCBS (Caruana, 2009), the Bank of England (Bank 
of England, 2009) and the G20 (G20, 2009) is one such example of these shifts. 
Macro-prudential regulation is targeted at maintaining the stability of the financial 
system as a whole, as opposed to the micro-prudential approach which focuses on the 
risks of individual firms failing. Whilst macro-prudential ideas were not new (Baker, 
2013; Clement, 2010; Galati & Moessner, 2013) they had been marginalized in favor of 
the micro-prudential regulation of the first two Basel Accords. Elements of the macro-
prudential policies were therefore incorporated into the regulatory reform packages at 
both an international and an EU level (see below).  
Approaches to regulatory supervision were also revisited as a result of these ideational 
shifts. Because macro-prudential regulation views risk as both ‘endemic and endogenous 
to the financial system’ (Baker, 2013, p. 118), there were stronger arguments for 
increased state intervention in the financial industry to better understand and manage 
these risks. As the discussion below on the changes to the UK prudential regulatory 
regime illustrates, this led to the adoption of more intrusive styles of banking 
supervision, and more globally, an understanding that the level of surveillance of the 
financial system needed to increase (Black, 2012b).  
This section explains the nature of the post-crisis reforms at both a global and EU level. 
Whilst the empirical context for this study is the regulatory change experienced by banks 
in the UK, to fully understand the dynamics of the regulatory environment for UK banks, 
it is necessary to put these in the context of the changes that have occurred at a global 
and European level. Not only do banks in the UK operate internationally, but the 
regulatory changes at an international level also form part of the UK context within 
which the UK regulators operate. 
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Basel 3 and the fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD 4) 
In November 2008, the G20 summit in Washington produced an Action Plan detailing 
how the issues of the global financial crisis were going to be addressed. This plan laid 
out five key principles for reform, including ‘Enhancing Sound Regulation’ through 
which the G20 countries declared ‘we pledge to strengthen our regulatory regimes, 
prudential oversight, and risk management’ (G20, 2008, p. 3). This commitment broke 
down into several both immediate and medium term activities pertinent to prudential 
regulation. These are clearly articulated in the subsequent ‘G20 Declaration on 
Strengthening the Financial System’ and summarized below: 
• Post recovery, strengthen prudential regulatory standards in terms of quantity 
and quality of regulatory capital, with a harmonized definition of what counts as 
regulatory capital. 
• Measures to mitigate pro-cyclicality45 
• Creation of a non-risk based measure of leverage46 
• Improving the framework for risk management of securitization47 
• Development of framework to promote stronger liquidity buffers 
• Development of enhanced guidance to strengthen risk management practices 
• Ensure capital requirements for counterparty credit risk (related to derivatives 
products) are adequate and enhance them where necessary (G20 2009) 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was charged with developing standards 
around these elements which crystallized into two consultative papers released by the 
BCBS in December 2009 (BCBS, 2009c, 2009d). These papers built on the existing Basel 
2 framework by firstly strengthening the rules relating to securitization, which was 
implemented at the end of 2010 (BCBS, 2009a). The second set of amendments, 
                                                 
45 Pro-cyclicality refers to the fact that the riskiness of assets varies over the business cycle and that the Basel 
2 regulations exacerbate this. 
46 Leverage is the ratio of debt to equity (or assets to liabilities) of a company 
47 Securitization is the process whereby assets, such as mortgages, are pooled and carved up and sold to 
different types of investors with different rates of interest depending on the riskiness of that security. The 
need to strengthen the prudential rules for securitization arose from the growth, complexity and opacity in 
this market. The risks of complex structures such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) were not fully 
understood and inadequately capitalized. These structures were also implicated in the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis. See Tett (2009) and Stiglitz (2010). 
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implemented at the end of 2011, enhanced the market risk framework to better capture 
the full range of risks associated with capital markets ‘traded’ products such as 
derivatives, bonds and equities, particularly under conditions of stress (BCBS, 2009b). 
These two papers together became known colloquially as Basel 2.5. The major overhaul 
of the Basel 2 Accord was achieved through the publication of the Basel 3 rules in 2011 
(BCBS, 2011). 
This comprehensive framework made changes to the micro-prudential rules in terms of 
the quality and quantity of regulatory capital, enhancements to risk coverage and risk 
management, particularly for derivative instruments. Macro-prudential measures such 
as a non-risk based leverage ratio measure and requirements for counter-cyclical capital 
buffers were also introduced. Liquidity risk was also incorporated into global prudential 
regulation for the first time in the form of short and long term liquidity measures and 
associated reporting and monitoring requirements (BCBS, 2011). Implementation of 
these new measures was on a phased basis, beginning in 2013 with the enhanced risk 
coverage and risk management elements and then a transition period for the leverage 
ratio, capital buffers and liquidity risk until 2019. Additional final rules relating to the 
leverage ratio (BCBS, 2014a) and the new rules for liquidity (BCBS, 2013a, 2014b) were 
produced after the initial publication of Basel 3. At the time of writing (2016), the BCBS 
has released final versions of all the standards that comprise Basel 3.  
In addition, at the time the fieldwork was conducted, the BCBS released three 
consultation papers regarding further reform of the market risk element of the Basel 
Accord (BCBS, 2012b, 2013c, 2014c). It had been signaling this for some time under the 
moniker ‘The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book’. This proposed an overhaul of 
the market risk framework by introducing a replacement for VaR for the calculation of 
capital requirements for market risk, and final rules were released in 2016 with the 
framework coming into effect on 1st January 2019 (BCBS, 2016). 
To reiterate the point made above, the standards set by the BCBS do not have the status 
of legal enforceability within national jurisdictions and therefore have to be translated 
into legislation in order for them to be binding on banks and financial institutions. For 
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those banks based in the EU (including those in the UK), the BCBS standards are enacted 
through EU law, which must go through the full European legislative process. In terms 
of the changes to Basel 2 outlined above, the first set were incorporated into Directive 
2009/111/EC (known as Capital Requirements Directive [CRD] 2) and the Basel 2.5 
market risk changes became EU Directive/2010/76/EU, known as Capital Requirements 
Directive 3 and both were in legal force throughout the EU member states from 
November 2010 with a final implementation date of December 2011. 
Within the EU, legislation either takes the form of a Regulation or a Directive. An EU 
Directive allows for EU Member States to interpret and adjust the legal text to the 
national context whereas an EU Regulation requires that all Member States adopt the 
regulation as is, with no opportunity for the use of national discretion. For Basel 3, some 
elements of Basel 3 were enacted as a Directive, but the majority of the rules that relate 
to capital adequacy and liquidity were enacted as a Regulation. The EU is taking the 
opportunity to harmonize the prudential regulations across all member states to create 
a single rule book for all Member States. This package is known as CRD 4 and was 
approved by the European Parliament on 16 April 2013 (European Parliament, 2013) and 
passed into law in July 2013 (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2013). However, the negotiation of CRR/CRD 4 experienced delays due to extensive 
negotiations amongst the nation states (Ferran, 2012a). The Directive included rules for 
bankers’ remuneration which proved to be a particular bone of contention between the 
UK and other EU Members (Barker, 2013a, 2013b). As a result, the original planned 
implementation date of 1 January 2013 for some elements of the rules was postponed 
until 1 January 2014, with the rest of the implementation timetable mirroring that of 
Basel 3.  
In addition to the primary legislative text, in line with the EU’s legislative process48, by 
2016, the European Banking Authority (EBA) had drafted three quarters of the required 
                                                 
48 The European Union Legislative process for the development of regulation in the European Union is known 
as the Lamfalussy process and comprises four levels, each of which focus on a different stage of the regulatory 
implementation process. Level 1 refers to the development of a Directive or Regulation. Level 2 is level at 
which Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) and Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) are produced by the 
relevant European regulatory body. RTS and ITS differ in terms of how they are adopted by the European 
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additional technical standards for CRR / CRD 4 (European Banking Authority, 2016) 
which give further details and guidance to banks and national supervisors. This is of 
relevance here because even through the high-level rules had been agreed and published, 
these more detailed guidance standards also had to be incorporated into banks’ 
compliance plans. Finally and further to the release of the BCBS final rules on the 
leverage ratio and liquidity risk, the EU passed two additional delegated acts to enshrine 
these final rules in EU law (European Commission, 2015a, 2015b). 
Figure 3.4 summarizes the global, EU and UK development of prudential regulatory 
standards and their implementation dates and shows the data collection timelines for 
both the discourse analysis work and interview fieldwork carried out for this study. The 
timeframe for the discourse analysis spanned not only the final implementation of Basel 
2 but also all the changes that culminated in Basel 3. By the time the interview fieldwork 
was conducted in 2013-14, most of the Basel 3 and CRD4/CRR rules had been formally 
agreed and some rules were already in force. 
Changes to global and EU regulatory authorities 
At an international level there is a balance to be struck between enabling the global co-
ordination and oversight of the global financial industry and compromising national 
sovereignty (Davies & Green, 2008). International organizations such as the BCBS act as 
global standard setters but do not have enforcement powers or responsibility for the 
day-to-day supervision of banks, both of which fall to national regulatory authorities. 
Within the European Union, the situation is slightly different given that laws are set at 
an EU-wide level but again, at least prior to 2008, supervision and enforcement were 
performed by ‘national competent authorities’ (bank supervisors in the EU Member 
States). The financial crisis revealed the inadequacies of the regulatory architecture as 
both an international and EU level (Financial Services Authority, 2009e; G20, 2009; 
Larosière, 2009; London School of Economics, 2010) and the subsequent reforms have 
focused on strengthening the powers of the regulatory bodies and improving co-
                                                 
Commission. RTS are adopted through a Delegated Act which is a non-legislative act used to supplement or 
amend elements of an existing legislative act. Implementing Acts, though which ITS are adopted, are used 
when there is a need for uniform conditions for implementation in EU Member States. 
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operation and co-ordination between them (Black, 2012b; Ferran et al., 2012; Helleiner 
et al., 2010). 
Figure 3.4 Development of prudential regulation 2004 - 2019 
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The global financial crisis highlighted that the truly international and systemic nature 
of the global financial market had not been adequately recognized in the regulation and 
supervision of significant cross-border financial firms (G20, 2008; Larosière, 2009; 
Turner, 2009). To ensure better information sharing and to gather a more holistic picture 
of the risk of these firms to global financial stability, both the G20 and the EU favoured 
the development and implementation of ‘supervisory colleges’ for the most significant 
cross-border firms. Supervisory colleges are ‘multilateral working groups of relevant 
supervisors that are formed for the collective purpose of enhancing effective 
consolidated supervision of an international banking group on an ongoing basis’ (BCBS, 
2010d). The Financial Stability Board (FSB) reported in 2012 that core supervisory 
colleges had been established for 29 of the most globally significant banks (Financial 
Stability Board, 2012a, 2012b). 
Strengthening the powers of some of the key regulatory bodies in place at both a regional 
and global level was necessitated by the increased focus on systemic financial stability 
and macro-prudential regulation. There was also a recognition that the authority of the 
existing bodies responsible for overseeing the implementation of regulatory standards 
needed to be bolstered (Arner & Taylor, 2009; Black, 2012b; Helleiner, 2010). On an 
international scale, the Financial Stability Forum49 was renamed to the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) and given a mandate by the G20 to ‘to coordinate at the international level 
the work of national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies 
(SSBs) in order to develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, 
supervisory and other financial sector policies’ (Financial Stability Board, 2009a). 
Similarly, within Europe, the need for macro-prudential regulation was highlighted by 
the Larosière report (Larosière, 2009) which recommended the creation of the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) under the auspices of the European Central Bank. The ESRB 
was formally established in December 2010 with responsibility for  
                                                 
49 The Financial Stability Forum was founded in 1999 by G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank governors to 
promote international financial stability. See Davies and Green (2008, pp. 113-118). 
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‘the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system within the Union in order to 
contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to financial stability in 
the Union that arise from developments within the financial system and taking into 
account macroeconomic developments, so as to avoid periods of widespread 
financial distress.’ (Union, 2010). 
Further institutional reform in the EU followed with the creation of the European System 
of Financial Supervision (Ferran, 2012a, 2012b; Moloney, 2010, 2012). This comprised 
the ESRB, plus three additional European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). These ESAs 
effectively replaced the extant European bodies that advised the European Commission 
on the detailed technical regulatory rules underpinning the high-level principles set at 
Commission level. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) became the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) which had oversight for banks in the EU. The 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was succeeded by the European 
Securities and Markets Authority ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority replaced the Committee for European Insurance and Pensions 
Supervisors (CEIOPS) (Ferran, 2012b). The ESAs were established as legal personalities 
by the end of 2010 and are part of a network of authorities, along with national 
supervisors and the ESRB that will ‘ensure that rules are applied in a rigorous and 
consistent fashion throughout the European Union, to monitor developments within the 
financial system as well as to detect potential risks to financial stability’ (European 
Commission, 2011c).  
In 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) became responsible for the prudential 
supervision of banks in the euro area as part of the EU’s Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM). This is a framework for banking supervision in Europe and comprises the ECB and 
the national competent authorities of the participating countries (European Central 
Bank, 2014a, 2014b). The UK falls outside the SSM but subsidiaries of UK banks 
operating in euro area countries are subject to the SSM. 
Changes to the regulatory architecture at both an international and EU level are 
important to understand because they show the increase in supervisory powers. In the 
case of Europe, there was a blurring of the responsibilities between the regulatory tasks 
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of the EU authorities and the UK regulators, the FCA and the PRA, contributing further 
to the uncertainty of the regulatory environment of UK banks. 
Regulatory change in the United Kingdom 
Prior to the financial crisis, the importance of the financial sector to the UK economy 
was rarely called into question (Bell & Hindmoor, 2015; Engelen et al., 2012; Johal, Moran, 
& Williams, 2014). Politicians of all colours made statements of support for the UK 
banking industry (Furness, 2012), exemplified by the then Economic Secretary Ed Balls 
who asked of his City audience, ‘what more can I do – can we do together – to support 
and enhance the critical role that the banking industry plays in our economy?’ (Balls, 
2006). The City of London was valued because of its position as a competitive 
international financial centre, its contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and tax 
revenues and the number of people it employs (Darling, 2011; Norfield, 2016). As an 
industry, banking was viewed as playing a critical part in society, providing finance 
(credit) to households and the public and private sectors.  
As Engelen et al. (2012) outline, this view of the social value of banking was further 
bolstered by widely held beliefs about the stability and efficiency of the financial 
markets. Economic and financial theories, such as the efficient market hypothesis led 
politicians, economists, regulators and industry actors to share a belief in the discipline 
of the market. Because the financial markets were thought to diversify risk effectively 
through innovative financial instruments such as derivatives and securitization, there 
was seen to be no need for intrusive or interventionist regulation. Thus, a consensus 
about the necessity of ‘light-touch’ regulation was held amongst the policy elite and 
became the cornerstone of the UK bank regulatory regime in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. 
As the events of the financial crisis unfolded, the flaws in the assumptions underpinning 
the light-touch regulatory philosophy were exposed. For politicians, this meant 
intervening in the market and part re-nationalizing banks such as RBS and Lloyds (HBOS) 
to prevent them from collapsing into insolvency. Such actions were antithetical to the 
neoliberal ideology of the free market but, as Darling (2011) argues in his memoir ‘the 
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risk of one bank collapsing and taking all the others with it was acute…I would not have 
wanted to be responsible for the economic and social catastrophe that might follow’ 
(Darling, 2011, p. 142). 
Moreover, politicians asked existential questions about the role of banks in society and 
the ability of these organizations to discipline themselves (Darling, 2009; HM Treasury, 
2009; House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2008) and so did regulators (Financial 
Services Authority, 2009e) the banks themselves (Bischoff & Darling, 2009) and also the 
public at large (Bennett & Kottasz, 2012; Edelman, 2009, 2010; Heath et al., 2010; Ipsos 
Public Affairs, 2012). The legitimacy of the banking industry was damaged and the 
increasing political salience of regulatory reform meant that banking regulation was no 
longer a matter of ‘quiet politics’ (Culpepper, 2010).  
Rather than being discussed behind the closed doors of the City, regulation was now in 
the ‘glare of a highly politicized arena involving aggressive new actors in government 
and the regulatory sphere armed with new ideas that are far more sceptical and critical 
of the City than was the case prior to the crisis’ (Bell & Hindmoor, 2015, p. 458). The 
previous narrative hegemony of the benefits of financial innovation and market self-
discipline was undermined and with it, the power of finance in the UK was destabilized 
(Bell & Hindmoor, 2014, 2015; Johal et al., 2014; Moran & Payne, 2014). In this 
environment, the previous orthodoxy of non-intrusive regulation was revisited and both 
politicians and regulators called for more adversarial bank supervision and more 
effective enforcement of regulatory rules (HM Treasury, 2009; Sants, 2009).  
This section discusses the regulatory changes that came about in the UK, reflecting not 
only these shifts in how regulation was viewed in the UK but also the changes that were 
happening on a global and EU level. Two distinct stages of regulatory reform can be 
identified – those that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (between 2008 
and 2010) and those from 2010 onwards. This division corresponds to the change in the 
UK Government following the 2010 general election, when a coalition government 
comprising the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties replaced the previous Labour 
government. It is worth noting that most of the changes across these periods had been 
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accomplished prior to the interview fieldwork and therefore banks were in the process 
of responding and adapting to these changes. 
Regulatory reform 2008 – 2010 
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis and prior to the research period, when the 
Labour Government, led by Gordon Brown was still in power, changes at a national level 
echoed those that were taking place regionally and internationally. The focus was on 
improving oversight and giving the existing regulatory bodies additional powers. The 
Council for Financial Stability was created, comprising the Treasury, the Bank of England 
and the Financial Services Authority. The remit of this Council was ‘to analyze and 
examine emerging risks to the financial stability of the UK’s economy and co-ordinate 
the appropriate responses’ (HM Treasury, 2009, p. 47). 
The Bank of England’s objectives for financial stability were made statutory in the 
Banking Act 2009 which also established a Financial Stability Committee under the 
auspices of the Bank of England to support the achievement of this objective. Similarly, 
the FSA was to be given a statutory objective for financial stability. The intention was to 
further strengthen the FSA’s enforcement and information-gathering powers (HM 
Treasury, 2009, p. 60). Thus, there were to be no changes in the existing tripartite 
structure (HM Treasury, Bank of England and the FSA), just a greater focus on financial 
stability and some enhancement of existing powers.  
In terms of the shifts in supervisory approach, it is worth looking retrospectively at the 
assumptions and rhetoric that surrounded the FSA’s style of supervision prior to the 
failure of Northern Rock in 2007. The FSA has been characterized as a 'light touch' 
regulator, with an underlying philosophy based on two key assumptions - that the senior 
management of financial organizations can be trusted to do the 'right thing' and that 
financial markets are inherently stable (FSA, 2000, 2007; Larosière, 2009; Turner, 2009). 
This, combined with a political desire to retain London's competitiveness as a global 
financial centre and not to overburden businesses with ‘red tape’, led to a style of risk-
based, outcome-focused, principles-based regulation. This is summed up by this extract 
of a speech made by Gordon Brown in 2005: 
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‘In a risk based-approach there is no inspection without justification, no form filling 
without justification, and no information requirements without justification. Not just 
a light touch but a limited touch. Instead of routine regulation attempting to cover all, 
we adopt a risk-based approach which targets only the necessary few.’ (HM Treasury, 
2005) 
Risk-based regulation meant that regulatory resources were allocated to those 
institutions considered to be at the highest risk to the FSA's statutory objectives. The 
regulatory standards with which banks were meant to comply were couched as broad 
principles, with the emphasis on senior management to adhere to these principles 
without prescribing how - this was at the discretion of senior management. However, the 
failure of Northern Rock in 2007 and RBS in 2008 called into question the effectiveness 
of this style of regulation. The FSA’s internal audit report on the failure of Northern 
Rock highlighted several flaws in the FSA’s supervisory approach (FSA Internal Audit 
Division, 2008), stating that the FSA’s ‘overall regulatory philosophy as a risk-based, 
outcomes-focused regulator is supported and reinforced by this analysis…[but] there 
are clearly a number of management, operational and cultural improvements that 
should be made to the overall supervisory process’ (FSA Internal Audit Division, 2008). 
These improvements comprised the FSA’s Supervisory Enhancement Programme (SEP), 
put in place in 2008. The key elements of this programme were summed up in the FSA’s 
new philosophy of ‘intensive supervision’ (Sants, 2009) and included: 
• Increased supervisory resources in terms of both quality and quantity 
• Minimum levels of supervisory staff allocated to high impact firms 
• Strengthening and expansion of the prudential risk department 
• Increased involvement of senior FSA management in the supervisory process 
• Introduction of business model risk and financial stability into the risk 
assessment framework 
• Greater emphasis on assessing the competence of firms’ senior management 
• More focus on liquidity (FSA, 2008) 
During this period, the FSA was also responsible for overseeing the UK implementation 
of the interim changes to Basel 2 (see Figure 3.4) and issued several consultation papers 
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(Financial Services Authority, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2010a). Legal instruments were 
passed in 2010 to implement the CRD 2 changes (FSA, 2010b) and in 2011 for CRD 3 
(FSA, 2011b). 
Regulatory reform 2010 onwards 
When the coalition government came into power, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
in a speech made at Mansion House in June 2010, signalled a complete overhaul of the 
existing UK regulatory structure (Osborne, 2010). This was to consist of the abolition of 
the FSA, the creation of a new Prudential Regulation Authority as a subsidiary of the 
Bank of England, the creation of an independent Financial Policy Committee at the Bank 
of England to manage macro-prudential matters and the creation of a third organization, 
to be a consumer protection and markets authority, subsequently named the Financial 
Conduct Authority (HM Treasury, 2011). Thus, the regulatory architecture was to move 
from the single, integrated regulator (the FSA) to a so-called ‘twin peaks’ structure (the 
PRA and the FCA). The timetable for this restructure was rapid, and was completed on 
1 April 2013. 
The roles and responsibilities of these three new regulatory bodies were clearly defined 
in consultation papers and in the draft legislation of the Financial Services Bill, given 
Royal Assent on 19 December 2012. The Financial Policy Committee’s key objective is to 
support the Bank of England’s statutory objective to ‘protect and enhance the stability 
of the financial system of the United Kingdom’ (HM Treasury, 2010, p. 12). The FCA is 
an independent body, with a remit to protect and enhance confidence in the UK’s 
financial system. Finally, the PRA’s objective is to promote the safety and soundness of 
regulated financial organizations. It is worth noting that the PRA was formed by the 
transfer of 1,100 staff to the Bank of England (FSA, 2012a, p. 19), and is a subsidiary of 
the Bank of England. The diagram in Figure 3.5 shows the new regulatory architecture 
and the relationship between the various bodies. 
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Figure 3.5 The New UK Regulatory Architecture 
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From the 1st April 2013, most large UK banks had to interact with two regulators, each 
with a different set of objectives. In an attempt to make this transition smoother, the 
FSA was internally re-organized and the Risk and Supervision Business Units were 
replaced by the Conduct Business Unit and the Prudential Business Unit. In April 2012, 
further progress was made with this split into two business units, with the creation of 
‘two separate but coordinated supervisors for banks, insurers and major investment 
firms covering prudential and conduct’ (FSA, 2012a, p. 14). This process completed on 
1st April 2013 with the legal cutover to the FCA and PRA. By the time the fieldwork 
interviews were conducted, the new regulatory authorities were in place and banks were 
subject to supervision by the PRA. 
Not only did the coalition government substantially re-organize the structures of the UK 
regulatory environment, the plans for the PRA’s supervisory style heralded a break with 
the past ‘light-touch’ regulatory philosophy. In their initial plans for regulatory reform, 
HM Treasury emphasized the need for greater use of supervisory judgement, based on 
forward looking analysis, and a requirement for financial organizations to comply not 
only with the letter of the law but also the spirit. This had also been recognized by the 
FSA, and prior to its demise the CEO, Hector Sants, signalled that more judgements 
would be required, with a focus on more intrusive and ‘outcome focused’ supervision 
(FSA, 2010a). This was echoed in the document which set out how the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority would operate, ‘the PRA’s approach to supervisory assessment will 
be based on forward looking judgements, with supervisory interventions clearly directed 
at reducing the major risks to the stability of the system’ (Bank of England & Financial  
Services Authority, 2012). The PRA was to continue with a risk-based approach to 
regulatory resource allocation, but was to perform the risk-assessment based more on 
future risks, and the risk to its statutory objective of financial stability.  
The PRA’s supervisory approach document also set out the PRA’s expectations of the 
firms that it regulates. It stated that it would require ‘firms to submit sufficient data, of 
appropriate quality, to inform their [supervisors’] judgements about key risks’ (Bank of 
England & Financial  Services Authority, 2012, p. 31). In addition, where the PRA makes 
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recommendations for remedial actions to mitigate risks that have been identified, it 
expects ‘firms to implement these recommendations in the spirit as well as to the letter’ 
(Bank of England & Financial  Services Authority, 2012, p. 30). Finally, the report states 
that ‘firms should not approach their relationship with the PRA as a negotiation’ (Bank 
of England & Financial  Services Authority, 2012, p. 35), signalling that the PRA intended 
to adopt a tougher and more challenging attitude.  
Ferran (2012b) suggests that this increase in judgement-led supervision, which allows 
for significant supervisory discretion, was somewhat at odds with the more prescriptive 
rules that were being made at an EU level. Unlike the implementation of Basel 2, which 
allowed room for national authorities to manoeuvre, the Capital Requirements 
Regulation 4 applied directly in the UK, with no discretion for the PRA to change the 
rules. The PRA issued a consultation paper and a series of supervisory statements50 
explaining how CRD 4 was to be implemented for credit risk, counterparty risk, market 
risk etc. (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d). This work was 
completed in December 2013. Further statements and updates related to the EU 
delegated acts on liquidity and the leverage ratio were released by the PRA throughout 
2014 (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014a, 2015a) and 2015. As Figure 3.4 shows, 
the majority of the final EU and UK regulations and detailed standards were being 
published at the same time as the fieldwork for this study was conducted in 2013-4. 
The three orders of post-crisis regulatory change 
This chapter has endeavoured to highlight the key prudential regulatory changes that 
have occurred since the financial crisis, and it is worth summarizing these here to set 
the scene for the following empirical chapters. This section draws on Hall’s typology of 
policy change (Hall, 1993), as applied to regulation by Black (2005, pp. 9-11). First order 
changes occur when the settings or levels of regulatory instruments are recalibrated 
(Hall, 1993, p. 278). Many of the changes that were introduced in the Basel 3 and 
CRR/CRD 4 standards fit into this category of change, such as the changes to the 
                                                 
50 Supervisory statements articulate the PRA’s expectations for firms to help firms determine whether they are 
meeting those expectations. They do not have the status of legal regulatory requirements. 
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definition of financial instruments that can be considered as regulatory capital or the 
very technical amendments made to the calculation of counterparty credit risk. A small 
change, such as the recalibration of the correlation factor for financial institutions can 
actually have significant financial and operational impacts. When all these changes are 
combined, they amount to a complex set of new or amended requirements which banks 
will have to navigate to achieve compliance. 
The introduction of the leverage ratio, the rules for liquidity risk and countercyclical 
buffers as part of Basel 3 are examples of second order changes, ‘where the instruments 
of policy as well as their settings are altered’ (Hall, 1993, p. 279). In addition, changes to 
the regulatory structures, such as the disbanding of the FSA and the creation of the PRA 
and the FCA can also be considered to be second-order changes, as can the creation of 
the ESRB and ESAs at an EU level. These new authorities have added to the already 
complicated constellation of actors responsible for standard-setting and regulatory 
supervision. For an internationally active bank operating in many jurisdictions, working 
out which rules apply where and who will be responsible for their supervision can be an 
onerous task. In terms of standard setting, layers of complexity are added, particularly 
at the EU level, when the political interests of Member States are added into the mix. 
This can add additional provisions to the rules to accommodate special cases and 
exceptions, and given the nature of legal documents, these can be difficult to navigate. 
For banks in the UK, the move from one supervisor to two, the PRA and the FCA, also 
had the potential to further complicate how regulatory relationships were managed. 
Finally, the changing approaches to regulatory supervision – from ‘light-touch’ 
regulation to a more interventionist style are also a second-order change, which, it has 
been argued, stems directly from the cognitive shifts associated with third-order 
changes.  
Baker (2013) considers the ideational shift towards macro-prudential regulation and the 
need for greater public intervention in the markets to be a third-order change, a change 
in the interpretive frame through which prudential regulation is understood. These third 
order changes occurred not only at a global and EU level but also in the UK. As described 
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above, underlying assumptions about the social value of banks and the efficiency of 
markets and financial innovation were publicly questioned. The abandonment of the 
rhetoric of ‘light touch regulation’ and the introduction of the discourse of ‘intensive 
supervision’ was one indication of this third order shift, as was the increased use of 
macro-prudential tools by the Bank of England, such as the FPC’s requirement for banks 
to raise additional capital in 2012 (Treanor, 2012). 
It is also worth noting that the financial regulatory reform in the UK after the crisis was 
not limited to prudential regulation. Changes were also being made to conduct of 
business regulation51 and new requirements for banks to have recovery and resolution 
plans were brought into force52. The reforms governing how banks in the UK should be 
structured were also introduced53. Finally, banks also had to determine how these other 
regulations would interact with the new prudential regime. 
The changing regulatory environment of banks operating in the UK was therefore very 
complex, with shifts occurring at several levels simultaneously, leading to significant 
levels of uncertainty. Perhaps most profound and destabilizing were the changes to the 
intellectual underpinnings of the previous regime that led to questions about the role of 
banks in society, the legitimacy of some of their activities (such as securitization) and 
how far the regulator should be able to intervene in their business and risk management 
processes. The following empirical chapters examine how banks in the UK responded to 
these changes, beginning with the types of narratives that these organizations 
constructed in response to this uncertain and dynamic regulatory environment. 
  
                                                 
51 This was largely through the introduction of MIFID II (Markets In Financial Instruments Directive) at an EU 
level (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2014b). MIFID I set out the rules that 
investment firms must follow in conducting their business, and includes reporting requirements for 
preventing market abuse, trade transparency requirements for equities, rules for investor protection, and rules 
for off-exchange markets. MIFID II extends these requirements to cover off-exchange derivatives, more 
stringent rules for investor protection and strengthened supervisory powers. 
52 Recovery and resolution plans set out how a bank would return to viability in situations of severe financial 
pressure and if this fails, the steps that would be taken to ensure an orderly resolution to avoid the need for 
state aid and to prevent further financial instability. The key legislative text is the Bank and Recovery 
Resolution Directive (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2014a) 
53 The Independent Commission on Banking considered the need for structural reforms to be made to the UK 
banking industry and came up with a series of recommendations (Independent Commission on Banking, 2011), 
which included the ‘ring-fencing’ of banks’ retail activities from wholesale activities, to insulate the former 
from any problems in the wider bank or financial system. These reforms have been implemented via the 
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013.  
94 
 
Chapter 4:  Regulatory change: banks’ public responses 
In order to be viable, organizations must adapt to their environments, requiring them to 
manage the uncertainty that this necessarily entails (Duncan, 1972). In the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis, which some UK banks barely survived, the substantial changes 
in prudential regulation (see Chapter 3) created an environment of considerable 
complexity and uncertainty. This chapter explores the public statements that the five 
largest UK banks made in response to this environment. These public representations 
are ‘stage-managed’ portrayals of a specific ‘organizational self’, akin to Goffman’s ‘front 
stage’ behaviour (Goffman, 1969). As such, the discourse and rhetoric adopted in banks’ 
statements about regulatory change cannot be taken as indicative of the changes in their 
‘back stage’ behavior. Nonetheless, as this chapter demonstrates, the manner in which 
these banks represented themselves in relation to regulatory reform changed over time 
and in ways that suggest these organizations failed to immediately grasp the full 
consequences of their role in the near collapse of the financial system. The intention is 
to give a broad sense of the nature of these responses at an organizational field level 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) before the remaining chapters go on to discuss the more 
detailed types of response revealed during the fieldwork interviews. 
Organizational theorists suggest a repertoire of possible strategies are available to 
organizations in response to the institutional pressures which create environmental 
change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Oliver, 
1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). According to Oliver (1991), these can include acquiescence, 
compromise, avoidance, manipulation and defiance (see Chapter 1). Several 
environmental and organizational factors have been posited to explain or predict why 
or how an organization might adopt a particular response. These include levels of 
environmental uncertainty, the multiplicity of demands and the level of legal coercion 
(Oliver, 1991), the nature of the institutional demands (Pache & Santos, 2010), the 
position of the organization in the organizational field or the ownership and governance 
structure of the organization (Greenwood et al., 2011). This chapter considers 
organizational legitimacy to be a critical factor for banks when discussing regulatory 
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change. However, because organizations inhabit a pluralistic institutional environment, 
consisting of multiple demands, multiple discourses and multiple institutionally-derived 
identities (Kraatz & Block, 2008), legitimacy is conferred by multiple institutional 
referents. Navigating plural legitimacy criteria is therefore crucial for organizational 
survival, and the changing discourses used by banks to discuss regulatory change are 
indicative of the struggles and tensions in balancing the demands of external 
constituencies (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Suchman, 1995). 
The institutional logics perspective can add further nuance to the understanding of how 
organizations discuss changes in their external environments. To recap briefly, the 
theory of institutional logics suggests that society is composed of a number of 
institutional orders which are family, community, religion, state, market, profession and 
corporation (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 73). Each of these has a particular organizing logic 
that patterns behavior and infuses that behavior with meaning. Institutional logics 
comprise both symbolic54 constructions - ideas and meanings – as well as material 
aspects such as practices and structures. Organizational environments can comprise a 
multiplicity of institutional logics, and therefore the uncertainty of change in one 
institutional logic – such as regulation – is exacerbated by the conflicts and tensions 
between other dominant logics in the organizational field, such as the logic of the 
market. However, at the same time, institutional logics can also be seen to provide 
organizations with rationalities and organizing principles for navigating an 
unpredictable environment and for making sense internally of the external environment.  
This chapter uses institutional logics as a heuristic device to explore how five UK banks 
(Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, RBS and Standard Chartered) discussed regulatory reform in 
their annual reports and regulatory consultation responses from 2006 - 2013. It focuses 
on the symbolic aspects of institutional logics because these are most readily available 
for analysis in texts. Phillips et al. (2004) also argue that ‘texts that leave traces’ such as 
                                                 
54 It is important to be clear about the meaning of the term ‘symbolic’ as it is used here. In literature on 
regulatory compliance, organizations can be said to symbolically rather than substantively comply (Edelman, 
1990, 1992; Edelman  & Suchman, 1997) when they give the appearance of conformity to rules rather than 
substantive adherence. However, the use here is specifically related to the ideational and discursive aspects of 
an institutional logic, and the use of such by an organization or organizational actor which may indicate either 
substantive or ceremonial compliance with external institutional pressures. 
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various types of public corporate reports are ‘likely to be generated to secure and 
maintain legitimacy’ (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 642). Annual reports and regulatory 
consultation responses are produced by firms for different audiences and to serve 
different purposes. Even though there are legal requirements for public companies to 
publish annual reports, these documents are also used by these companies to fulfil other 
objectives (Stanton & Stanton, 2002). These may be to communicate information to a 
firm’s stakeholders (customers, suppliers, investors, regulators), as a marketing tool for 
impression management (Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998), a vehicle for maintaining or 
repairing legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) or finally, as a mechanism for providing 
accountability to the firm’s shareholders (Stanton & Stanton, 2002). Responses to 
regulatory consultations are produced by firms with a more specific intention, to assert 
their particular positions on regulatory proposals in an attempt to influence the final 
policy outcome (Pagliari & Young, 2014). The primary audience, therefore, is the relevant 
standard setting body, but because these documents are publicly available, they may 
also be read by their peers, other regulatory authorities and other interested parties.  
The chapter proceeds first by explaining how the discourse analysis revealed the 
existence of market and regulatory logics in banks’ statements on regulatory change and 
the theoretical framework of institutional logics that was developed as a means of 
interpreting that data. The findings of this work then show how banks mobilized these 
distinct logics over time in response to the uncertainty of regulatory change, and how 
this varied over time and between different organizations. Finally, the chapter ends by 
presenting three explanations to account for these variations including the degree and 
type of uncertainty, a bank’s position in the organizational field and the nature of 
prudential regulation itself. 
Developing and applying regulatory and market logic 
The lens of institutional logics was a useful means for interpreting banks’ discussions 
of regulatory change because textual elements commensurate with the symbolic 
representations of institutional logics (comprising theories, frames and narratives 
(Thornton et al., 2012)), emerged inductively during the ‘bottom up’ coding process (see 
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Chapter 2). This section describes how the institutional logics of the market and 
regulation were then captured using what Reay and Jones (2015) describe as ‘pattern 
inducing’, which uses a grounded theory approach to allow the logics to emerge purely 
inductively from the data. 
The two logics that were found to be most prevalent in the banks’ arguments about 
regulatory change were regulatory logic and market logic. Discussions about regulatory 
change from the perspective of regulatory logic tended to involve the language of 
regulatory compliance, of progress towards implementation and of support and 
recognition for the need for regulatory change. Any concerns with the proposed 
amendments to the existing rules were expressed in the technocratic terms also used by 
the standard setters, policy makers and supervisory authorities. Market logic, however, 
infused arguments that cited the negative effects of the new prudential rules on banks’ 
profitability, economic growth and the competitive position of the UK banking industry. 
This discourse echoed broader societal narratives about the importance of market 
efficiency, the central role that banks play in the UK economy and the importance of 
retaining a competitive financial sector in the UK. The discussion below focuses on how 
market and regulatory logics were used by the banks and gives examples of textual 
elements coded to each logic.  
Regulatory logic categories 
The textual elements in the banks’ documents which articulated regulatory logic were 
aggregated into seven broad categories (see Figure 4.1) which are explained below and 
examples of which are given in Table 4.1. 
Concerns with proposed rules: As might be expected in the analysis of regulatory 
consultation responses (and to a lesser extent, the annual reports), the banks in the 
sample addressed many of their comments about regulatory change to the substantive 
content of the proposed new rules. Rather than disagreeing with the rules on principle 
or for reasons more associated with market logic (see below), the concerns underpinned 
by regulatory logic tended to focus on the technical or conceptual flaws within the rules 
themselves. For example, banks highlighted inconsistencies between different aspects 
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of the proposals or between the liquidity and capital rules. There were also significant 
amounts of comments that proposed alternative approaches, often accompanied by 
supporting empirical evidence or recourse to academic research. Banks also questioned 
regulatory proposals which appeared to be in conflict with the stated aims or which 
might create perverse incentives that were not intended.  
Figure 4.1 Regulatory logic categories 2006-2013 
Source: Annual reports, consultation responses 
More information required: Demonstrating the lack of clarity and uncertainty in the 
rule-making process, about a fifth of the references coded to regulatory logic requested 
additional guidance, and/or further information on the proposed rules before the banks 
could provide meaningful comments. In some cases, the banks were requesting specifics 
regarding the level at which the new regulatory measures had been set and how they 
had been calibrated. A large proportion of these requests were in response to the PRA’s 
consultation papers as opposed to those produced by the Basel Committee or the 
European Commission. This suggests that the banks expected to enter into a dialogue 
with the PRA to obtain greater clarity, and were aware that this would be less likely to 
occur with the regional and international standard setters. 
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Supportive of proposals: The banks made broad statements in support of the overall 
regulatory objectives. Whilst these responses have been coded to regulatory logic, it 
should be noted that they were sometimes caveated with concerns about the detail of 
how the objectives would be achieved. These caveats were coded to reflect market logic.  
Implementation: This category was focused on the information that the five UK banks 
gave in their documents about their progress towards implementing the new rules and 
the associated changes they had already made or were making to their business 
operations. The banks also offered assurances that they would be ready to meet the 
regulatory deadlines. 
Compliance with rules: On a similar theme, and in every bank annual report since 2009, 
there were statements about how the banks were meeting the current regulatory capital 
requirements, or were already meeting the new requirements for liquidity or capital or 
that they would be meeting these requirements by the regulatory deadline. So, despite 
many references to the potential adverse impacts of increasing capital requirements (see 
below), at the same time, the banks were indicating their ability to comply with the new 
or existing regulatory rules. 
Understand regulatory changes: In responding to the regulatory consultation papers, 
the banks were demonstrating clear engagement with the technical content of the 
proposed rules. However, the discourse analysis revealed that the banks also presented 
their understanding of the changing regulatory environment in the annual reports, 
which often included descriptions of how the organization monitored regulatory 
developments. In addition, the banks stressed that they were analyzing the new rules to 
determine the changes that they needed to make to their systems and processes in order 
to be compliant with the new regulations. 
Risks of proposed rules: Finally, the banks alluded to two key risks with the new 
regulatory proposals. The first was that the rules as they were written might have the 
unintended consequence of shifting what have traditionally been banking activities 
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(such as lending) to the ‘unregulated’ or ‘shadow banking’ sector55. The second risk was 
that the new rules might lead to a divergence between the rules and models that banks 
use to calculate regulatory capital and those that are required for risk management 
purposes. This argument derived from the Basel 2 requirement for banks to use their 
own estimates of risk parameters in both regulatory capital calculations and in the day-
to-day risk management of the firm (BCBS, 2006c). In allowing there to be different rules 
for regulatory capital and risk management, this argument claims, the credibility of the 
risk models might be questioned, resulting in poorer levels of risk management. 
Examples of textual elements coded to each of these categories can be found in Table 
4.1. 
Table 4.1 Examples of regulatory logic 
Category Representative Data Regulatory Logic Position  
Concerns with 
rules as proposed 
‘The proposals on equity minority interest appears 
faulty, as it causes a mismatch between risk and 
the capital available to absorb losses arising from 
those risks, as it completely excludes equity capital 
that can and does absorb some loss if the risks 
crystallize.’ (Lloyds, 2010b, p. 3) 
‘In the attached Appendix, we propose such an 
alternative forward-looking framework to 
compute a CVA Variability Charge (‘CVC’) which 
can be calibrated to an individual portfolio and 
which is not procyclical, is risk sensitive and uses 
existing tools already required by firms’ (HSBC, 
2010b, p. 6) 
Proposed rules are 
conceptually or technically 
problematic 
 
 
 
Propose an alternative 
approach to achieve same 
regulatory objectives 
More information 
required 
‘We would recommend that Basel clarifies its 
capital treatment for such transactions and 
whether a CVA risk capital charge is required to 
be calculated against centrally cleared client 
exposures’ (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2011, p. 4) 
‘Standard Chartered would like to understand the 
derivation of the factors and obtain more clarity 
where parameters have not been set, e.g. 
‘increases in market volatilities’ would need to be 
well-defined to enable calculation of the liquidity 
impact by firms.’ (Standard Chartered, 2010b, p. 
12) 
Further regulatory guidance is 
needed to properly evaluate 
proposals 
Supportive of 
proposals 
‘HSBC fully supports the rationale of the Basel III 
proposals which require banks to hold more 
capital. This is absolutely core to ensuring that 
governments and taxpayers are better protected 
in future than they have been in the past’ (HSBC, 
2010a, p. 8) 
‘We fully support the differential modelling of 
liquidity in the market risk capital framework. We 
Regulatory changes are 
required to prevent another 
crisis 
 
 
 
Agreement with the proposed 
new rules 
                                                 
55 This sector comprises non-banking financial institutions such as hedge funds, money market funds and 
structured investment vehicles used for securitisation. 
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Category Representative Data Regulatory Logic Position  
can see merit in both a variable liquidity horizon 
as well as a variable exit costs conceptual 
framework, and feel that either could be used to 
support the aims of the Committee’ (Royal Bank of 
Scotland, 2012b, p. 6) 
Implementation ‘Where regulatory change has strategic 
implications this will tend to affect more than one 
Principal Risk factor. Such issues are dealt with on 
a Group wide basis by cross-disciplinary teams 
working under an accountable executive reporting 
to senior management’ (Barclays, 2010a, p. 7) 
‘The actions already announced to right size the 
balance sheet are expected to ensure compliance 
with the future minimum standards, which are 
expected to be 100 per cent for both ratios by their 
respective effective dates.’ (Lloyds, 2010a, p. 95) 
Implementation of regulatory 
change is taken seriously by 
this organization 
 
 
 
The organization is already 
working to meet the new 
regulatory requirements on 
time 
Compliance with 
rules 
‘In terms of Basel III, we already meet the 
requirements of 100 per cent for both the Net 
Stable Funding Ratio and the Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio, well ahead of the required implementation 
date.’ (Standard Chartered, 2011, p. 82) 
‘The strength of our capital ratios, our ability to 
generate capital organically and our actions to 
optimise RWAs will enable us to meet our targeted 
capital ratios under CRD4.’ (Barclays, 2011, p. 9) 
The organization is already in 
compliance with the new rules 
 
 
 
The organization will be able to 
achieve compliance with the 
new regulatory rules 
Understand 
regulatory 
changes 
‘The Group continues to work to assess the impact 
that the reforms may have on its business and 
continues to play a constructive role in the debate 
with the Government and other stakeholders.’ 
(Lloyds, 2011, p. 21) 
‘It is critical that the Group both understands 
early on the drivers for this [regulatory] change 
and be able to assess the potential impact of 
prospective rules and regulations on the different 
businesses. The regulatory developments tracker 
seeks to identify, track and monitor all such 
material changes and ensure that an appointed 
senior executive is responsible for assessing the 
potential impacts on the Group’s business’ (Royal 
Bank of Scotland, 2010a, p. 202) 
The organization is working to 
understand the impacts of the 
new regulatory rules. 
 
 
The organization actively 
tracks regulatory changes and 
ensures senior management is 
involved. 
Risks of proposed 
rules 
‘Another impact of bank deleveraging and price 
increases resulting from the proposals is that bank 
customers will look elsewhere for services 
currently provided by banks. This is likely to result 
in more financial services being provided outside 
regulatory control, which would increase the 
systemic risk from the financial sector.’ (Lloyds, 
2010b, p. 3) 
‘We would strongly caution against any new 
measures that would have to be developed for 
capital buffer purposes only. Such measures 
would have limited or no link with internal risk 
management processes, and their credibility 
would pose a constant challenge’ (HSBC, 2010b, p. 
26) 
There is a risk that some bank 
activities will move to the 
unregulated sector 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a risk of divergence 
between requirements for 
regulatory capital and for risk 
management. 
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Market logic categories 
The coding categories that represented market logic are explained below and shown in 
Figure 4.2, which also illustrates the proportion of textual references coded to each 
category. Table 4.2 gives examples of extracts from the annual reports and consultation 
responses that were coded to each of these categories.  
Figure 4.2 Market logic categories 2006-2013 
 
Source: Bank annual reports and regulatory consultation responses 
Competition: As can be seen in Figure 4.2 the largest category of market logic used by 
banks was that of ‘competition’. Banks made three key arguments in this category – the 
need for international consistency in both the development of regulatory rules and their 
implementation, the requirement of a ‘level playing field’ for all banks in all jurisdictions 
and thirdly, the potential for the new rules to adversely impact competitiveness. The 
banks appeared to be concerned that the regulatory reform in the UK would be more 
stringent than that in other countries which they claimed would damage the 
competitiveness of the UK banking industry. This view resonates with the pre-2008 
consensus amongst politicians and regulators of the vital role of the financial sector in 
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the British economy and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the City of London 
(Engelen et al., 2012; Norfield, 2016).  
Efficiency: Banks’ views about efficiency were largely concerned with the practicalities 
of implementing the new rules and consisted of general objections about the scale and 
speed of the implementation timescales as well as specific technical or operational 
difficulties. At their core, these arguments were about how banks allocated their 
resources and operational efficiency. The latter is a measure of how many resources 
(cost, time and people) are required to produce outputs (such as revenue). For banks, 
implementing regulation involved significant resources without a commensurate 
increase in outputs, a situation regarded by financial theories associated with market 
logic as inefficient. This explains why in several instances, banks used words such as 
‘burden’, ‘onerous’ or ‘impractical’ in relation to the proposed changes.  
Financial performance: The five UK banks also discussed their response to regulatory 
change in terms of the impact on their future financial performance.  In the majority of 
cases, the banks did not allude directly to reduced profits or revenue. Instead, they 
framed their responses in terms of the disproportionate nature of the capital 
requirements, the increased costs of regulatory compliance or vague references to their 
future financial condition. Where profitability was explicitly mentioned, it was in general 
terms only and phrased as a potential impact of the new rules. 
Impact on organization: Bank narratives in this category focused on two key aspects – 
the potential for negative or adverse consequences for their specific organizations and 
the need to quantify the impacts of the new rules on their capital positions. Potential 
adverse impacts cited included changes to the products and services the banks would 
be able to offer customers, the value of assets and the way the bank operated. In many 
cases, the nature of the impacts was not specified. All the references in this category 
were found in the bank’s annual reports, documents aimed at investors which must 
include risks that could impact on shareholder returns. Accountability to shareholders 
is a core principle of market logic. 
104 
 
In addition, all five banks quantified and disclosed how the new capital rules were likely 
to affect their core equity Tier 1 capital (CET1) ratios. Essentially, CET1 is a measure of 
a bank’s financial strength based on the ratio of equity capital to its total risk-weighted 
assets and used by both regulators and investors alike to assess the solvency of a 
banking organization. Again, these disclosures were contained solely in the annual 
reports and their inclusion is likely to have been motivated by a need to inform investors 
and market analysts of the impact of the new regulations. 
Objections to new rules: In their responses to the proposed regulatory rules, banks 
voiced three separate criticisms. By far the most frequent position was that the rules 
themselves were too stringent, references to which were found in over 50% of the banks’ 
documents dated 2009 or later. Terms such as ‘severe’, ‘disproportionate’, ‘draconian’, 
‘punitive’ and ‘harsh’ were used to describe the new capital and liquidity requirements. 
At the heart of these objections was the premise that it is more expensive to fund a 
business by raising equity than it is by raising debt because the interest paid over the 
lifetime of a loan (debt) would be less than the proportion of profits foregone to the 
equity owners. Banks were therefore claiming that increasing the level of regulatory 
capital requirements (equity) would be more costly and might even reduce lending 
because it is more expensive to fund loans via equity. 
Economic impacts: According to the banks, the proposed increases in capital 
requirements had the potential to damage economic recovery through a reduction in 
bank lending and credit creation. In 17 out of 25 of the bank annual reports between 
2009 and 2013, the CEO review or Chairman’s statement mentioned the importance of 
striking a balance between financial stability through prudential regulation on one hand 
and economic growth and recovery on the other.  
Whilst the validity of this argument has been heavily contested (Admati, DeMarzo, 
Hellwig, & Pfleiderer, 2011; Allen, Chan, Milne, & Thomas, 2012; Caruana, 2010; Miles, 
Yang, & Marcheggiano, 2013; Santos & Elliott, 2012; Yan, Hall, & Turner, 2012), the 
consistency of this argument amongst the banking industry (Institute of International 
Finance, 2011) was representative of market logic, but one which purported to appeal 
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not just to the self-interest of the banks but to an apparent concern for broader 
economic wellbeing. 
Impact on stakeholders: Stakeholders here refers to both the shareholders and 
customers of the banks. In terms of shareholders, many of the arguments about 
potential adverse effects on financial performance or the disproportionate cost would, 
according to market logic, have a knock-on impact on shareholder returns. This 
category, however, includes textual references that explicitly state this in terms of a 
reduction in returns on equity56, leading to a decrease in the returns an investor would 
receive. In relation to the impact on customers, the banks’ main assertion was that they 
would have no alternative but to pass on the increased capital and liquidity costs to their 
customers in the form of higher prices.  
Impact on industry: Many of the arguments already discussed were also used by the 
banks to indicate where the regulatory reforms could be detrimental to the whole UK 
banking industry, especially in terms of competition. In addition, the banks contended 
that the liquidity reforms in particular had the potential to affect the financial markets, 
increasing volatility, reducing liquidity or other destabilizing effects. This is clearly in 
line with the market logic framing of minimal regulatory intervention in the market. 
Volume of change: Finally, in over three quarters of the 2009-2013 annual reports, all 
five UK banks made reference to the scale of the proposed regulatory reforms. This 
‘unprecedented’ (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2010a, p. 19) level of regulatory change was 
generally couched as a risk to the bank which would have strategic implications, most 
of which were captured by the other categories discussed above. 
Table 4.2 provides samples of text from both the annual reports and consultation 
responses that were coded to each of these categories. 
  
                                                 
56 A measure of profitability used by market participants to make investment decisions.  
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Table 4.2 Examples of market logic 
Category Representative Data Market Logic Position 
Competition ‘We would emphasise the importance of a globally 
consistent regulatory framework, that does not 
place banks operating in the EU at significant 
competitive disadvantage to those located in other 
jurisdictions’ (Royal Bank of Scotland, 2010c, p. 6) 
‘In order to maximise the contribution of UK banks 
to society, we must be allowed to compete on a level 
playing ﬁeld within a secure regulatory framework.’ 
(Barclays, 2010a, p. 8) 
Competitiveness of the UK 
will be damaged by 
inconsistent global regulatory 
rules  
 
 
UK banking industry is 
important to society and 
must remain competitive 
Efficiency ‘The requirement to inform the PRA of differences 
in the capital requirements under CRR and BiPRU 
potentially necessitates two methods of calculation 
to be run’ (Lloyds, 2013, p. 12) 
‘So many of HSBC’s people have exemplified 
commitment and endeavour again in 2010, helping 
our customers and clients to meet their financial 
objectives while taking on the additional burden of 
preparing for regulatory change.’ (HSBC, 2010a, p. 
6) 
Regulatory changes incur 
significant operational costs  
 
 
Regulatory change is a 
burden 
 
Financial 
Performance 
‘There are a number of factors that might affect our 
performance. First of all, the material and 
increasing drag on both income and costs from an 
ever more complex set of regulatory requirements.’ 
(Standard Chartered, 2011, p. 4) 
‘It is clear from the above that the industry will 
continue to bear a heavy burden of both time 
commitment and cost as it works with policymakers 
to finalise the regulatory reforms’ (HSBC, 2011, p. 5) 
Regulation is reducing 
income and increasing costs, 
therefore reducing 
profitability 
 
Implementing regulatory 
changes impacts our 
cost/income ratio 
Impact on 
organization 
‘The rules are currently in draft and subject to 
ongoing negotiation. If they were to be finalised in 
their current form, the holdings of such positions 
would generate a disproportionate capital cost and 
potentially the relevant business could be curtailed, 
closed or our hedging would be adjusted to negate 
the impact.’ (HSBC, 2012, p. 290) 
‘Although the CRD 4 rules have not been ﬁnalised, 
we expect our CET1 ratio would be around 100 bp57 
lower than our reported Basel II Core Tier 1 ratio on 
a pro forma basis.’ (Standard Chartered, 2012, p. 
121) 
Regulatory changes will 
impact our profitability and 
business model 
 
 
 
 
The new rules will reduce our 
capital strength 
Objections to new 
rules 
‘It is clear from the analysis that the impact of the 
proposed capital and liquidity reforms will be 
severe’ (Barclays, 2010c, p. 1) 
‘However, RBS finds that the current 
implementation would result in an amount of 
capital that is hugely disproportionate compared to 
the economic risk. This would result in a material 
divergence between capital and risk’ (Royal Bank of 
Scotland, 2010b, p. 4) 
Rules are too stringent 
 
 
New rules are 
disproportionate in the 
amount of capital they 
require  
Economic impacts ‘The cumulative impact of proposed regulatory 
changes would negatively impact the economy and 
process of recovery’ (Barclays, 2010b, p. 2) 
‘It is imperative to strike the right balance between 
strengthening the financial system and supporting 
economic growth.’ (HSBC, 2009, p. 5) 
Banks’ role in credit creation 
is important to economic 
growth 
If capital requirements are 
set too high, banks will not 
be able to lend as much 
                                                 
57 100bp refers to one hundred basis points, which is the equivalent of a 1% change in the CET1 ratio.  
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Category Representative Data Market Logic Position 
Impact on 
stakeholders 
‘The vast bulk of the price increases resulting from 
the proposals will fall on new lending and lending to 
small and medium sized enterprises, and there will 
be much reduced lending capacity available’ 
(LLoyds, 2010c, p. 3) 
‘This work makes clear that significantly increasing 
prudential requirements will reduce bank’s return 
on equity to unattractive levels for investors.’ (Royal 
Bank of Scotland, 2010b, p. 2) 
Increased costs of regulation 
will be passed on to our 
customers 
 
Shareholder value and the 
share price are a key concern 
and should not be negatively 
impacted by regulation 
Impact on 
industry 
‘Proposed changes could also adversely affect 
economic growth, the volatility and liquidity of the 
ﬁnancial markets and, consequently, the way we 
conduct business, structure our global operating 
model and manage capital and liquidity.’ (Standard 
Chartered, 2013a, p. 66) 
‘Imposing a restriction on ordinary market-making 
activity within the trading book may well drive the 
business to less regulated sectors of the market, 
increasing costs and reducing both liquidity and 
price transparency.’ (HSBC, 2010c, p. 8) 
Adverse effects on the 
financial markets 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory changes may 
reduce the efficient 
functioning of the markets 
Significant 
volume of change 
‘The banking industry continues to be subject to 
unprecedented levels of regulatory change and 
scrutiny in many of the countries in which the 
Group operates.’ (Barclays, 2012, p. 113) 
‘The level of industry regulation and its speed of 
change has never been greater.’ (Lloyds, 2010a, p. 
6) 
High volume of regulatory 
change 
Variation in banks’ use of market and regulatory logic over time 
Previous studies on institutional logics have demonstrated that the presence and 
dominance of logics in a particular organization or organizational field is not static over 
time (Durand et al., 2013; Greenwood et al., 2010; Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, & Van de 
Ven, 2008; Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2005, 2009; Thornton, 2004; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999). Indeed, given that organizational environments are often characterized 
by uncertainty, the tensions and conflicts between institutional logics will fluctuate over 
time. This was the case with the UK financial regulatory environment after the crisis. 
This section discusses three distinct temporal phases which emerged from the discourse 
analysis, exhibiting clear differences in how banks were employing institutional logics 
as regulatory reforms progressed. 
Figure 4.3 presents a summary of the number of textual references that were coded to 
each of the logics split across the three phases - the first phase was from 2006 – 2008, 
the second from 2009 – 2010 and the third phase from 2011 – 2013. The volume of 
comments about regulatory change peaked in 2009 - 2010, which coincides with the time 
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when the bulk of the proposed international prudential regulatory standards were 
disseminated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2009a, 2009b, 
2009c, 2009d, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). In the United Kingdom, this was also the year when 
the new Government was elected which went on to overhaul the UK regulatory 
architecture. Prior to 2009, there was relatively little discussion of regulatory change, 
particularly in banks’ annual reports. 
Figure 4.3 Banks' use of regulatory and market logic in public discourses 2006 - 2013 
 
Source: Bank annual reports and regulatory consultation responses 
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Phase 1: 2006-2008 
The beginning of 2007 saw the start of the transition period to the new Basel 2 capital 
rules, with the final implementation deadline of 1st January 2008. According to the FSA’s 
Business Plan for 2006/7, their supervisory focus vis-à-vis prudential regulation was on 
the practical implementation of the Basel 2 rules and approving the banks’ new risk 
models (Financial Services Authority, 2006b, p. 19). As seen in Chapter 3, this was 
coupled with the approach of ‘light touch’ regulation.  
In general, the discussion of regulatory change within bank annual reports was minimal 
during this period and when it was discussed, neither regulatory or market logics 
featured very highly though as Figure 4.4 shows, regulatory logic was employed more 
frequently than market logic. 
Figure 4.4 Banks' aggregated use of market vs regulatory logic 2006 - 2008 
 
Source: Bank annual reports and regulatory consultation responses 
Indeed, the discourse analysis reveals that the banks were generally supportive of the 
introduction of the new Basel 2 rules, with the majority of comments relating to their 
implementation projects and plans to become compliant within the regulatory 
deadlines. In a number of cases, the receipt of approval from the FSA for the adoption 
of the advanced risk calculation approaches under Basel 2 was considered an important 
achievement: 
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‘The Group, therefore, will be one of a small number of banks whose risk systems 
and approaches have achieved the advanced standard for credit [risk], the most 
sophisticated available under the new Basel 2 framework’ (Royal Bank of Scotland, 
2007, p. 72) 
Phase 2: 2009 - 2010 
The picture changes dramatically after 2008. This was the moment when the scale of the 
crisis began to become apparent. Lehman Brothers collapsed in the US and the UK 
government bailed out RBS and Lloyds. Between the beginning of 2009 and the end of 
2010, the BCBS, the European Commission, and the FSA produced twelve separate 
consultation papers setting out new regulatory proposals, on which banks were invited 
to comment (BCBS, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2010c; European Commission, 2009, 
2010a, 2010b; Financial Services Authority, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2010a). This volume 
of consultation papers provided the banks with the maximum opportunity for lobbying 
and attempting to influence the rule-makers (Salter, 2015; Young, 2012). 
From a national perspective, the FSA itself had been criticized for its perceived 
regulatory failings prior to the crisis and in admission, stated ‘clearly this implies that 
financial authorities in total – finance ministries, central banks and regulators, including 
the FSA – must have made what in retrospect were serious mistakes’ (Financial Services 
Authority, 2009d, p. 7). In this context, the FSA introduced its enhanced supervision 
programme (Financial Services Authority, 2008a) which was followed in April 2010 by 
the Chancellor’s announcement of the break-up of the FSA into the FCA and the PRA 
(see Chapter 3). 
During this period, the discourse analysis reveals a marked increase in the discussion of 
regulatory change in general. By far the most dominant was market logic, used by the 
banks to frame their opinions about how the changes might impact their competitive 
position and operational efficiency and how the rules were too stringent and therefore 
liable to damage economic recovery because of the impact they might have on banks’ 
ability to lend.  
Many of the responses couched in market logic were related to the sense of uncertainty 
that banks perceived, especially in relation to the general scope and scale of the 
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regulatory changes. From their viewpoint, banks claimed that it was difficult to 
determine what impact, if any, the changing rules would have on their business in the 
future: 
‘The precise nature, extent, form and timing of any regulatory changes, as well as 
the degree to which there will be effective consultation among the various 
jurisdictions involved, are highly uncertain and thus it is not possible to determine 
or estimate the likely actual impact on the Group’s business and activities.’ (HSBC, 
2009, p. 16) 
Standard Chartered went even further, stating that ‘the regulatory rules of the game are 
in a state of total flux’ (Standard Chartered, 2009, p. 4) and that even though ‘a number 
of changes have been proposed under Basel 3…significant uncertainty remains around 
the specific application and combined impact of these proposals’ (Standard Chartered, 
2010a). These can be viewed as expressions of both ‘state’ and ‘effect’ uncertainty 
(Milliken, 1987) – uncertainty about both how the big picture of regulation was changing 
and what the impacts of that change would be. 
Figure 4.5 Regulatory logic categories 2009 – 2010 
 
Source: Bank annual reports and regulatory consultation responses 
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Banks also discussed regulatory change from the perspective of regulatory logic. As 
Figure 4.5 shows, expressions of concern regarding the proposed rules were most 
prevalent. Though there was some positive support for the overall objectives, the banks 
were more likely to highlight areas of contention such as the possible negative impacts 
or technical flaws. These objections to the technical content of the new rules were 
perhaps reflective of the banks’ substantive engagement with the rules and a desire for 
standards that would be workable and practical to implement. 
Phase 3 – 2011 – 2013 
The third phase was marked by a shift from regulatory rule making into implementation 
and this was reflected in how the banks employed the two institutional logics. The final 
Basel 3 rules were released by the BCBS at the end of 2010 and revised in 2011 (BCBS, 
2010a, 2010b, 2011) and the first European Commission proposals were released in July 
2011 (European Commission, 2011a, 2011b). Whilst further lobbying opportunities 
could still have been pursued in Europe, by and large the high-level standards had been 
set and the period for transitioning to the new Basel 3 rules was due to begin on 1st 
January 2014. This period also saw the disbanding of the FSA and the strengthening of 
powers and changing regulatory approach of its two successor bodies, the FCA and the 
PRA (see Chapter 3). It is also worth noting that in 2012, Barclays bank admitted to its 
involvement in the manipulation of LIBOR58, a scandal in which RBS was also implicated. 
This was swiftly followed by revelations in 2013 of an investigation into the 
manipulation of foreign exchange rates by several banks, including RBS, Barclays and 
HSBC. Such misconduct further damaged the reputation of, and the trust in, the UK 
banking industry (Grierson, 2012; YouGov, 2012). 
 
  
                                                 
58 LIBOR is the London Inter-bank Offered Rate, the rate of interest at which banks are willing to lend to each 
other. At the time, LIBOR was an unregulated process, run by the British Banker’s Association. 
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Figure 4.6 Use of market logic 2011 - 2013  
 
Source: Bank annual reports and regulatory consultation responses  
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The data shows an overall decrease in the use of market logic by the banks over this 
period (see Figure 4.6), particularly in terms of highlighting the potential negative 
impacts of the new rules. The focus of banks’ responses using market logic switched to 
considerations of efficiency and competition. The former is the category most associated 
with the implementation of the regulatory changes, which fits with the broader shift 
from law-making to execution. More comments were also made with regards to 
competition, perhaps reflecting a concern about regulatory ‘balkanization’ and the 
emerging differences appearing between US and European approaches to banking 
regulation (The Economist, 2013).  
Whilst this period witnessed a reduction in the use of market logic, banks were 
employing regulatory logic more in their responses to regulatory change, concentrating 
on requesting more information and clarity and articulating technical concerns with the 
changing rules. According to the banks, understanding the new rules was also 
characterized by uncertainty. In an ideal world, regulatory rules would be clear, 
unambiguous, certain and specific about the criteria for compliance, a position 
acknowledged by regulators themselves (BCBS, 2013h; Haldane, 2012). However, the 
debate over the use of rules or principles in regulation (Baldwin, 1995; Black, Hopper, & 
Band, 2007; Braithwaite, 2002), has shown that regulatory rules are often ambiguous, 
open to discretion and even co-created through the interaction between organizations 
and the law (Edelman  & Suchman, 1997; Edelman & Talesh, 2011). This caused 
uncertainty in interpretation and according to the banks, created difficulties in 
determining what must to be done to achieve compliance.  
The primary source of rule uncertainty mentioned in the banks’ annual reports and 
consultation responses related to the lack of clarity and lack of detail contained in the 
draft rules: 
‘The continuing absence of clarity around areas such as the transition to the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (‘LCR’) and capital requirements leaves us with little 
alternative but to move ahead with our own interpretation in many areas or risk 
finding ourselves with too short a timeframe for implementation’ (Standard 
Chartered, 2013b, p. 1) 
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Without clear understandings or interpretations of the proposed rules, as the quote from 
Standard Chartered indicates, the banks claimed it was difficult to formulate an 
appropriate response either in terms of practical implementation or for the ‘further 
management actions’ (Barclays, 2010a, p. 168) necessary to mitigate increases in capital 
requirements. So, instead of the emphasis of the state and effect uncertainty perceived 
by banks in Phase 2, Phase 3 can be characterized more in terms of response uncertainty, 
a ‘lack of knowledge of response options and/or an inability to predict the likely 
consequences of a response choice’ (Milliken, 1987, p. 137). 
Accounting for these variations 
Whilst the overall use of market and regulatory logics by banks to discuss regulatory 
change over the entirety of the discourse analysis period was very evenly split (see Figure 
4.7), the above discussion shows that there were significant variations over time. The 
literature on organizational responses to institutional pressures and multiple 
institutional logics is instructive in attempting to account for these variations.  
Figure 4.7 Market vs regulatory logic 2006 -2013 
 
Source: Bank annual reports and consultation responses 
In Phase 1, the low level of overall discussion of regulatory change suggests that 
regulation was not a key concern for the banks during this period. This is perhaps 
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indicative of the close alignment of the institutional orders of the market and regulation 
at this time. Indeed, the BCBS explicitly stated that the aims of Basel 2 rules was not to 
increase the quantum of capital in the financial system but to ensure the distribution 
was more risk-sensitive (BCBS, 2004, p. 4). For large, internationally active banks that 
were most likely to adopt the advanced calculation approaches, minimum capital 
requirements were forecast to fall by about 7% (BCBS, 2005, p. 10). There was, therefore, 
no regulatory threat to the profitability or financial performance of the banks and 
adopting a strategy of acquiescent compliance (Oliver, 1991) in response was 
understandable. The political pressures on regulators to be non-interventionist (see 
Chapter 3) also suggests that the market was a more dominant source of legitimacy for 
banks prior to the crisis measured by high share prices (see Figure 4.8) and Returns on 
Equity of over 15% (Oliver Wyman, 2014) 
Figure 4.8 Market price of shares for five sample banks 2007-2013 
 
Source: Bankscope 
Conflict between market and regulatory logic began to emerge after the crisis, during 
Phase 2. As Chapter 3 discussed, the dominant narratives about the social value of 
banking and the ability of the market to discipline itself had been undermined by the 
events of 2007-8 (Engelen et al., 2012). The cognitive underpinnings of prudential 
regulation had also shifted. In addition, the legitimacy of the banking industry had been 
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severely damaged, not just in terms of the regulators (Financial Services Authority, 
2009e) but also the general public (Bennett & Kottasz, 2012; Edelman, 2009) and even 
shareholders. In the case of the latter, the legitimacy criteria associated with the market 
suggests that legitimacy is connected with the value of an organization’s shares and the 
possible returns for its shareholders. Figure 4.8 shows that the share prices of all five 
sample banks fell between 2007 and 2008 and, except for Standard Chartered, continued 
to decline until 2011. 
The increased deployment of market logic, particularly in bank annual reports, may well 
have been an effort to pacify one legitimacy community – shareholders – by appearing 
to challenge regulatory objectives which could further damage profitability and 
therefore shareholder returns. Certainly, some of the rhetoric employed by banks, 
particularly in the CEO statements of the annual reports support this position. More 
broadly, however, in their examination of the elite narratives that emerged after the 
financial crisis Engelen et al. (2012) claim that ‘financial elites remained remarkably 
resilient and politically effective in defending the status quo’ (p159). This account cites 
two reports written by prominent city grandees59. Both of these reports (Bischoff & 
Darling, 2009; Wigley, 2008) emphasized the importance of the financial services 
industry to the UK economy and were seen as an attempt to ‘head off reform by 
repeating and updating their pre-crisis story about the social contribution of finance’ 
(Engelen et al., 2012, p. 179). For example, the Wigley report argued that new regulation 
could pose a number of ‘threats’: 
‘One threat is that ill-conceived regulation could be rushed through. Another is that 
new regulation overcompensates for possible gaps in pre-crisis regulation, putting in 
place unduly restrictive rules which stifle enterprise’ (Wigley, 2008, p. 24) 
With such narratives being deployed more broadly, and even informing political 
responses60, perhaps banks believed they still occupied a position of political power and 
were in a position to influence the trajectory of reform. 
                                                 
59 Sir Win Bischoff, former chairman of Lloyds Bank and Bob Wigley, who had been the chairman of Merrill 
Lynch in Europe, the Middle East and Africa until 2009 
60 Engelen et al. (2012, p. 180) explain how parts of the Bischoff report were directly cut and pasted into the 
Labour Government’s white paper in response to the financial crisis (HM Treasury, 2009). 
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The consultation responses revealed a more nuanced use of market logic as banks did 
engage in attempts to negotiate and influence the details of the regulatory rules. This is 
redolent of the response strategy of ‘bargaining’, suggested by Oliver (1991), described 
as ‘the effort of the organization to exact some concessions from an external constituent 
in its demands or expectations’ (p154). This is indicative that banks were not just 
considering their legitimacy but also their interests with respect to regulatory changes.  
Another possibility for the bank’s reversion to the use of market logic immediately after 
the financial crisis might relate to the high degree of uncertainty about the future 
direction of regulation, particularly in terms of the possible impacts on future 
profitability. The aim of Basel 3 was explicitly to increase bank capital levels, which some 
commentators also argued would affect profitability (Fitch Ratings, 2012; McKinsey & 
Co, 2010). However, this was by no means certain, and neither was the argument that 
higher capital requirements would damage economic recovery or have a commensurate 
impact on credit creation (Admati et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2012; Caruana, 2010; Miles et 
al., 2013; Yan et al., 2012). Oliver (1991) suggests that a high degree of environmental 
uncertainty would prompt an organization to ‘exert greater effort to re-establish the 
illusion or reality of control and stability over future organizational outcomes’ (p170). It 
may be the case then that rather than acknowledging the indeterminacy of the debate 
between shareholder returns versus financial stability, banks were sticking with their 
established view, one which had previously had significantly wider legitimacy.  
The balance between the use of regulatory versus market logic shifted in the final phase, 
with a marked increase in the use of regulatory logic. Four possible explanations for this 
are offered here. The first is that the nature of the uncertainty relating to the regulatory 
proposals changed. As discussed above, this phase was characterized by a shift from 
legislation to implementation, which required banks to make decisions about their 
future actions. Thus, the discourse was more focused on banks trying to clarify the 
substantive details of the rules. Secondly, there is the possibility that there was a time 
lag between banks recognizing that their previous, market logic based arguments were 
no longer legitimate, and the reduction in the use of this logic in discussions about 
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regulatory change. This would certainly help to explain the steep drop in the use of 
market logic from 2010 to 2011 when shareholders were no longer their key source of 
legitimacy.  
Thirdly, banks were experiencing the changing nature of the supervisory relationship 
between the banks and the FSA at this time as demonstrated by the FSA Practitioner 
Panel’s 2010 survey. In this survey, larger firms indicated a more intrusive supervisory 
approach was ‘evident through more dialogue with the FSA, a greater amount of 
information requests that were clearly scrutinized in greater detail thank in the past, 
and a more intrusive attitude of supervision teams’ (FSA Practitioner Panel, 2011, p. 76). 
The banks, therefore, may have been receiving signals from their supervisors that raising 
strong objections to regulatory reforms was not appropriate. Without further research, 
however, this reasoning remains speculative. Finally, as noted above, several financial 
scandals were revealed during this period of time, resulting in all five of the large UK 
banks being fined large amounts by both UK and US regulators (Conduct Costs Project, 
2015). These fines were not related to prudential regulation, but did have direct impact 
on bank profitability (KPMG, 2013) and therefore expected shareholder returns. Added 
to this the likely reputational impact of regulatory sanctions on the share price (Armour, 
Mayer, & Polo, 2010), expressing overly defiant or negative views about regulation would 
have been deemed illegitimate at this time, even according to the legitimacy criteria of 
market logic. 
Variations in institutional logics between sample banks 
The impact of the financial crisis on the five banks in the sample varied significantly. In 
some cases, such as HSBC and Barclays, they weathered the storm without requiring 
direct state intervention. In others, such as RBS and HBOS (which merged with Lloyds as 
part of the rescue package), the events of 2008 required the government to intervene to 
save these banks from insolvency. This culminated in the state exchanging some £80bn 
of taxpayers’ money for a 41% stake in Lloyds and an 83% stake in RBS (National Audit 
Office, 2009). All the banks suffered some immediate reductions in profitability, but 
over time some fared better than others. This is represented in Figure 4.9.  
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Figure 4.9 UK banks pre-tax profit 2006 – 2013 
 
Source: Bankscope 
Given this variety of experience over this timeframe, it would be reasonable to expect 
some differentiation between the banks in how they used discursive devices associated 
with market and regulatory logics to shape their publicly-stated responses to regulatory 
change.  
Figure 4.10 Aggregate use of institutional logics by sample banks 2006 - 2013 
 
Source: Bank annual reports and regulatory consultation responses 
The aggregate picture of the use of the two institutional logics for this time period is 
shown in Figure 4.10. RBS has the highest overall percentage (58%) of textual items coded 
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to regulatory logic whereas Standard Chartered has the most coded to market logic 
(54%). These are not marked differences and overall, it seems as if there is a relatively 
consistent split between the use of market and regulatory logic for all five banks. What 
this aggregate picture does not show, however, is how the banks’ mobilization of the 
logics varied over time which is shown in Figure 4.11. 
Figure 4.11 Variation in use of market and regulatory logics 2008-2013 
 
 
Source: Bank annual reports and regulatory consultation responses  
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The theoretical work on organizations and responses to changes in their institutional 
environments discussed in Chapter 1 suggested several factors that can account for this 
variation in responses (Greenwood et al., 2011; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). 
These include the types of institutional demands being made and how these demands 
are represented internally within the organization (Pache & Santos, 2010), the structure 
of an organizational field and the specific characteristics of the organization such as its 
organizational identity, its ownership, governance and structure, and its position in the 
organizational field (Greenwood et al., 2011). Table 4.3 illustrates some of the key 
characteristics of the five UK banks in the sample. It is possible to draw some tentative 
associations between these characteristics and the use of the institutional logics by these 
organizations over time. 
Table 4.3 Characteristics of five sample banks 
Bank Total Assets 
(£m) 
Total Employees Key Markets Customers State Help 
Barclays 1,344,201 140,300 UK 
Europe 
Africa & 
Middle East 
Americas 
Asia 
Retail 
Commercial 
Wholesale 
No 
HSBC 1,622,024 263,000 UK 
Europe 
Hong Kong 
Rest of Asia-
Pacific 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
North America 
Latin America 
Retail 
Commercial 
Wholesale 
No 
Lloyds 857,354 97,869 UK Retail 
Commercial 
Yes 
RBS 1,027,878 118,600 UK 
Europe 
Middle East 
Americas 
Asia 
Retail 
Commercial 
Wholesale 
Yes 
Standard 
Chartered 
409,484 86,640 Asia 
Africa 
Middle East 
Retail 
Commercial 
Wholesale 
No 
Source: Bankscope, Annual Reports (as at end 2013) 
Perhaps the most obvious characteristic to highlight is how the use of regulatory and 
market logic differed between the banks that were rescued by the state during the crisis 
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(RBS and Lloyds) and those that were not (Barclays, HSBC and Standard Chartered). The 
receipt of taxpayers’ money meant that the bailed out banks faced increased scrutiny of 
their organizational legitimacy from the public and the government. Deephouse (1996) 
contends that two sets of social actors are important sources of legitimacy for banking 
organizations – regulators and the public. It would follow that the bailed-out banks 
would make increasing use of regulatory logic in the wake of the crisis to help repair 
their legitimacy.  
Figure 4.12 Comparison of use of market and regulatory logics: state aid vs. no state 
aid 2008-2013 
 
Figure 4.12 shows a comparison of the use of institutional logics between banks that 
received state aid and those that did not. It shows that comparatively, RBS and Lloyds 
together tended to mobilize regulatory logic more than their non-bailed out peers, who 
used a greater relative proportion of market logic. However, when this data is 
disaggregated further, as in Figure 4.13, RBS appears to respond to regulatory change 
using the logic of the market far more frequently than Lloyds, especially in 2010 where 
the use of market logic across all the banks was at its peak. 
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Figure 4.13 Comparison of Lloyds' and RBS' use of market and regulatory logic 2006 
- 2013 
 
 
Source: Bank Annual Reports and regulatory consultation responses 
This increased use of market logic by RBS is surprising, given the level of media and 
public anger directed towards RBS after the bail out and subsequent events, including 
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the announcement of large bonuses and pensions for senior executives such as Fred 
Goodwin (Edwards, Gammell, Allen, & Bingham, 2009; Fraser, 2014; Griffiths, 2009; 
Treanor, 2010). The organizational literature suggests that this damage to RBS’s 
reputation and legitimacy would provoke RBS to engage in significant legitimacy repair 
work (Suchman, 1995) rather than revert to the type of discourse that is associated with 
the bank’s near collapse. One possible explanation for this is that those in RBS were 
either in denial or did not understand the harm caused by its near collapse and 
subsequent bail-out. Institutional theory suggests an alternative possibility, that ‘when 
institutions are in conflict, people may mobilize to defend the symbols and practices of 
one institution from the implications of changes in others’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 
255). In this case, perhaps RBS was mobilizing the frames and narratives of market logic 
which had previously been dominant within this bank as part of its expansionist 
philosophy under the leadership of Fred Goodwin (Fraser, 2014) even though he was no 
longer the CEO in 2010. 
Greenwood et al. (2011) also suggest that an organization’s position within an 
organizational field can determine how it will respond to complex institutional 
pressures. A distinction is made between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ organizations depending 
on their size and status, with larger and more powerful organizations being central and 
smaller and lower status firms occupying the periphery. The banks in the discourse 
analysis sample were the top five banks in the UK by asset size but there was some 
variation in their field positions not only in terms of size but also where the banks 
operated. HSBC, for example, was the largest bank by asset size and was the most prolific 
user of market logic between 2008 and 2013. Greenwood et al. (2011) contend that ‘to 
the extent that [institutional] complexity threatens the advantageous position of central 
organizations, they will be increasingly resistant to it’ (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 340). 
HSBC perceived itself as central in the UK banking market, which is apparent in the 
repeated threats issued by this organization to move its headquarters to Hong Kong in 
response to government policies that it considered punitive (BBC, 2010; Turner, 2015). 
Thus, a stance of resistance might account for HSBC’s persistent use of market logic in 
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discussing regulatory change. This may have been further compounded by the 
management of HSBC considering their bank’s perceived importance to the UK economy 
meant it was somewhat immune to the pressures of regulatory changes. Based on this 
understanding, HSBC would be therefore granted a measure of discretion in how to 
respond to regulatory reform, with the use of market logic not necessarily viewed as 
illegitimate by other external constituencies such as politicians or regulators 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Whilst none of these five banks were peripheral in terms of size, Standard Chartered 
was geographically peripheral as the majority of this firm’s operations were located 
outside the UK, primarily in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Drawing once again on the 
arguments made by institutional theorists, organizations occupying a peripheral field 
location may not experience institutional pressures to the same degree as those in the 
core and are less likely to be advantaged by the institutional status quo (Greenwood et 
al., 2011). This could potentially account for Standard Chartered consistently using 
regulatory logic more than market logic in discussions of regulatory change in the UK – 
its position in the market is not under the same degree of pressure as the other four 
banks. These conclusions are necessarily speculative, given the qualitative and 
interpretive nature of the research methodology. The discourse analysis data did not 
allow exploration of other factors that might influence how organizations respond to 
complex institutional change such as organization structures and organizational 
identity (see Chapters 5 and 6 respectively). What is clear, however, is that responses 
differ between organizations, and this might be due to their pre-existing characteristics 
which act as filters so that different organizations mobilize market and regulatory logics 
in different ways to shape their public responses (Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Discussion 
The preceding analysis has shown that whilst the balance between the use of market 
and regulatory logics did vary over time and between different banks, nonetheless, these 
banks were mobilizing arguments using both logics simultaneously. What this indicates, 
perhaps, is a recognition on behalf of the banks that they were expected to both continue 
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to deliver (or improve) returns to shareholders at the same time as complying with the 
requirements for increased capital. Banks had to manage these conflicting demands to 
remain legitimate in both the eyes of the market and the regulators. The findings of the 
discourse analysis are suggestive of three factors that might affect the balance between 
the use of market and regulatory logic in how banks publicly frame their responses to 
prudential regulatory change – the degree and type of the associated uncertainty, the 
position of the organization in the organizational field and the nature of the regulatory 
regime itself.  
From 2009 to 2010, there was a significant peak in the use of market logic. This time 
frame also coincided with the release of the majority of new regulatory proposals from 
the BCBS and the EU and in the UK, the change in government and proposed reform of 
the financial regulatory regime. In addition, as discussed above, the established narrative 
orthodoxy about the social value of banking and how the financial system should be 
regulated had been undermined. This period of time represented the peak of both state 
and effect uncertainty (Milliken, 1987) in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Whilst a 
causal relationship cannot be asserted given the data and methodological approach of 
this study, it is possible to surmise that the use of market logic may reflect the level and 
type of uncertainty in the regulatory environment. Once there is more certainty, the use 
of regulatory logic increases, particularly as the rules become closer to being finalized 
and there is enough information for the banks to understand the potential impacts on 
both their finances and operations. So, the degree and nature of uncertainty in the 
environment appeared to have a bearing on how banks represented their views on 
regulatory change using institutional logics. 
Secondly, there were clear differences in how the five banks in the sample articulated 
their public responses to regulatory change. Again, whilst relationships between 
organizational characteristics and the use of either market or regulatory logic cannot be 
confirmed, the data is suggestive of there being some link between the ownership of the 
bank or its position in the organizational field and how institutional logics are mobilized 
in discussions of regulatory change. In terms of bank ownership, the relationship 
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between state ownership and the use of market logic by RBS is perhaps contrary to 
expectations. Whilst Lloyds Bank did indeed make greater use of regulatory logic in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, RBS, which was by then 83% government owned, 
increasingly used market logic to comment about the adverse impacts of the new 
regulations. This was perhaps an attempt to compromise or negotiate from a distance 
with the regulatory standard setters to reduce the stringency of the new capital 
requirements and/or to emphasize to their investors the potential impacts of the policy-
makers’ decisions. The hypothesis here is that when institutional logics come into 
conflict, organizations might amplify their use of the previously dominant logic (market 
logic in this case) if they perceive it as being under threat. Another bank which made 
extensive use of market logic was HSBC, the largest bank in the UK and one which 
believed it held a powerful position in the UK economy, demonstrated by its continual 
threats to relocate its headquarters to Hong Kong. This accords with the contention that 
an organization’s position in the core of a particular organizational field will have a 
bearing on how it responds to multiple institutional demands. It could be argued, 
meanwhile, that Standard Chartered occupied a more peripheral location and 
consequently, there was less at stake financially and therefore there was less imperative 
to defend the institutional logic of the market. Whilst the organizational factors 
identified above do have some explanatory power, it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that banks were mobilizing arguments using both logics simultaneously.  
The third contention is that prudential regulation affects the core of a bank’s business 
and can have a fundamental impact on its profitability61. Prudential regulatory rules are 
complex and contain many quantitative controls that can be altered individually or in 
concert (and at the request of the regulator) to alter the minimum capital requirements 
or liquidity ratios of the bank62, and thus directly impacting the financial position of the 
firm. As a result, this type of regulation has the potential to directly influence the 
                                                 
61 Prudential regulation is not alone in having such a profound effect on a company’s balance sheet – regulatory 
techniques such as the setting of price controls in the energy sector is another example of how regulation can 
penetrate to the core of a firm’s business. 
62 Examples include various multipliers which are applied to risk weighted asset numbers, the capital add-ons 
under Pillar 2 (which are purely at the regulator’s discretion), the correlation factors within the capital 
calculations and the regulatory floors for particular risk measures. 
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generation of shareholder returns, profitability, position in the market, decisions about 
funding and even banks’ business models. It is feasible to suppose that in mobilizing 
the logic of the market, banks are responding to this perceived threat to their financial 
survival. Indeed, the rhetorical strategies that have been highlighted in this chapter 
resonate with the types of ‘institutional work’ that Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) 
associate with the maintenance of institutions. For example, by ‘borrowing’ societal 
narratives about the social value of banks in statements such as ‘Barclays recognizes the 
vital economic and social purpose that banks play’ (Barclays, 2009, p. 6) banks were 
‘valourizing’ the role of their organizations for public consumption. Similarly, 
arguments about the need to balance financial stability with economic growth is an 
appeal to past beliefs and myths about the importance of the banking system to the 
economy. So, whilst at first glance, these types of discursive device seemed at odds with 
the actual harm caused by the credit crisis, they can be viewed as a particular type of 
response to a particular type of regulation, which targets the very core functions of a 
bank. 
This chapter is not making a normative distinction between the use of market logic and 
regulatory logic and nor is it claiming that an organization which uses regulatory logic 
more frequently to discuss regulatory change is more likely to agree or become 
compliant with those changes. Indeed, Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggest that where 
conflicts arise in an organization’s institutional environment, organizations will appear 
to comply with institutional demands by decoupling formal structures and practices 
from the technical core of their operations. In terms of regulation, this response would 
be one of ceremonial compliance only, with no substantive alteration to day-to-day 
business practices. It is not possible to explore how substantively banks have responded 
to regulatory change by examining their public texts, which project a particular 
organizational self and message externally. Instead, the next three chapters make use of 
interview data from several banking organizations (which differ from those selected for 
the analysis in this chapter) to investigate in greater depth the more material and 
concrete responses to regulatory change that have occurred since the financial crisis, 
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beginning with the practices and structures that have been put in place to manage the 
process of regulatory change itself. 
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Chapter 5:  Organizational encounters with the risks of 
regulatory change 
In 2013, a survey of European financial institutions found that 91% of Risk Managers 
considered regulatory change to be the biggest risk that they faced (Strategic Risk, 2014). 
This categorization of regulatory change as a risk to be managed by the financial 
industry is in part a response to the uncertainty created by the changing regulatory 
environment –  uncertainty about the nature of the reforms, the impacts of the changes 
and how to adapt to the changes. However, it is also indicative of the fundamental 
threats that the changes in the prudential regulatory regime were perceived to pose to 
the banks’ business models and profitability (Ernst & Young, 2013; Masters, Jenkins, & 
Guerrera, 2010; McKinsey & Co, 2010; Ötker-Robe et al., 2010). Moreover, as Chapter 4 
demonstrated, incidents of regulatory non-compliance negatively impacted the 
legitimacy of the banking industry and incurred significant costs (Conduct Costs Project, 
2015). There were, therefore, multiple risks associated with regulatory change, and this 
chapter explores the structures and practices that five banking organizations in the UK 
put in place to manage – and balance - these different risks. 
Structures and practices are regarded by the institutional logics perspective as the 
concrete manifestations of institutional logics and ‘while practices are guided by existing 
institutional logics, as existing practices are altered or new ones are established, they 
place a key role as exemplars in creating, reproducing and transforming institutional 
logics’ (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 129). Following the so-called ‘practice turn’ in social 
sciences (Ortner, 1984; Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki et al., 2001), Thornton et al conceive of 
practices as ‘constellations of socially meaningful activity that are relatively coherent 
and established’ (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 128).  
When considering the management of the risks engendered by regulatory change, using 
the institutional logics of regulation and the market developed from the discourse 
analysis in Chapter 4 can be instructive. On the one hand, viewed through the lens of 
market logic, the prospect of adverse financial consequences resulting from the new 
regulations such as reductions in profitability and therefore lower shareholder returns 
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would take priority in terms of managing the risks of regulatory change. Considered 
from the perspective of regulatory logic, however, where rule compliance is regarded as 
a key organizational priority of management, managing the risks of non-compliance 
would take precedence. As Chapter 4 showed, in line with institutional scholars who 
emphasize the pluralistic nature of an organization’s institutional environment 
(Greenwood et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 
2010, 2012), banks were publicly responding to the conflicting institutional pressures 
of their environment by adjusting their use of market and regulatory logics over time. 
This suggests that the management of the risks of regulatory change within an 
organization over this period were also subject to similar conflicts and tensions, 
requiring decisions to be made about which types of regulatory risk will command the 
most organizational attention.  
Chapter 4 only focused on banks’ external, symbolic representations of their views on 
regulatory change. As noted in that chapter, no conclusions could be drawn about the 
substantive nature of any internal organizational changes they may have been making 
in response to the regulatory reforms. However, the intention of the analysis in this 
chapter is to move the focus inside the banks by using data collected in 22 interviews 
with respondents from five different organizations. As explained in Chapter 2, the data 
here does not come from the same banks whose public statements were analyzed in 
Chapter 4. The chapter explores in greater depth how the risks of regulatory change are 
managed and the practices and structures that banks have put in place to do so. It is 
here that substantive adaptations to regulatory change are more likely to occur, but as 
the analysis in this chapter shows, it is not always clear which risks of regulatory change 
these practices and structures are aimed at mitigating. The discussion begins by briefly 
describing the types of structures and practices that emerged from the data and maps 
these on to a view of regulation as a dynamic process or lifecycle63. Then, these practices 
                                                 
63 In analysing the interviews, it was clear in some cases that new structures and practices had been introduced 
since 2008 but it was not clear precisely when. In other instances, the regulatory practices and structures were 
still evolving. Thus, the interview data presents a snapshot in time of how the sample banks were organized 
for managing regulatory change and the ability to make comparisons to previous periods of time (such as 
before the financial crisis) is therefore limited. 
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and structures are considered from the perspective that banks’ view regulatory change 
as a risk to be managed using Hutter and Power’s metaphor of ‘organizational 
encounters with risk’ (Hutter & Power, 2005). The chapter concludes with the insights 
that this analysis has for the broader understanding of how banks manage regulatory 
change. 
Managing regulatory change – structures and practices 
Structures 
Large, internationally active banks have complex structures. They operate in many 
different jurisdictions and have different business units. For example, as of 2013, 
Barclays Bank operated in over 50 countries and had seven separate business lines 
(Barclays, 2013, p. 3). Similarly, HSBC was located in 75 countries, with four separate 
business areas (HSBC, 2013, p. 1). An additional layer of complexity results from the 
legal entity structure of these large banks, a hierarchy of the separate companies that 
comprise the whole organization. An example of such a structure for the Royal Bank of 
Scotland is shown below in Figure 5.1. It is on the legal entity basis that banks are 
authorized and supervised, and the nature of the legal entity determines how accounting 
and prudential regulatory reporting must be performed for that company.  
However, the day-to-day operational and management structure of a large banking 
organization often cuts across legal entity boundaries and is more usually based on the 
separate business lines of the bank. Figure 5.2 depicts a generic bank organizational 
structure. This is for illustrative purposes only, and is drawn from a combination of 
information from bank annual reports and interview data. All the banks in both the 
discourse analysis and interview samples were organized slightly differently based on 
the degree of centralization of management, whether the bank’s entity in the UK was a 
subsidiary or the main headquarters, and the nature of the business areas and customers 
or clients.  
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Figure 5.1 RBS legal entity structure as of 2015 
 
Source: http://investors.rbs.com/fixed-income-investors/company-legal-structure.aspx 
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Figure 5.2 Generic structure of a large, internationally active bank 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that the business units are overseen by a set of central functions, which 
are sometimes also replicated within the business unit depending on its size (such as 
Finance, Human Resources, Information Technology and Risk Management). The size 
and responsibilities of the central functions will depend on how much management 
power has been devolved to the business units. Given the focus of this study was on 
wholesale rather than retail or wealth management banking, a more detailed view of a 
generic Investment Banking division is also shown in Figure 5.2. Typically, investment 
banking divisions are described in terms of three layers – Front Office, Middle Office and 
Back Office (Ho, 2009, pp. 37-38). The Front Office consists of the revenue-generating 
parts of the business, such as securities selling and trading, the provision of mergers 
and acquisition advice, banking services for large corporations and research by 
investment analysts. The Middle Office comprises the control functions that support the 
Front Office such as Risk Management and Compliance. Finally, operational support 
functions such as Accounting and Human Resources and the processing that is required 
to support trading and sales activities constitute the Back Office. Ho (2009) describes 
how these three layers operate in a hierarchy, segregated not only spatially but also in 
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terms of compensation and social background. Typically, in investment banks, the Front 
Office, being at the ‘top’ of this hierarchy also wields the greatest organizational power, 
authority and status. 
The diagram illustrates that the positioning of the Regulatory Affairs department can 
vary between banks. This is the department which has primary responsibility for liaison 
with all the banks’ regulators64 and might also be called the Regulatory Liaison Office or 
Regulatory Relations (Deloitte Centre for Regulatory Strategies, 2013). Depending on 
how the bank is structured, this department may report to Risk Management (and thus 
the Chief Risk Officer), Legal and Compliance (the Chief Compliance Officer) or even 
Corporate Affairs.  
Table 5.1 shows the organizational positions of the interview respondents, five of whom 
were located within a Regulatory Affairs department.  
Table 5.1 Organizational position of interview respondents 
Area Group Division / Region† Total 
Risk Management 4 5 9 
Regulatory Affairs 4 1 5 
Corporate Affairs 2  2 
Finance 4 2 6 
† Region indicates that an interview respondent had a regional rather than divisional role 
At the time of the fieldwork interviews (2013 – 2014), in Bank 1, Regulatory Affairs was 
in the process of being created as a separate function, with the Head of the Department 
reporting directly to the CEO. Regulatory Affairs was also a distinct department in Bank 
4. In Bank 2, Regulatory Affairs was part of the Legal and Compliance department. Bank 
3 had a dedicated Regulatory Affairs team for prudential regulation, which was located 
within the Finance function. In Bank 5, the responsibilities for Regulatory Affairs were 
split between Corporate Affairs and Legal and Compliance, with the former focusing on 
                                                 
64 This will include both prudential and conduct regulators as well as the regulatory authorities in the overseas 
jurisdictions where the bank also has operations. 
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monitoring regulatory changes and the latter managing the liaison with the regulators 
and the monitoring of ongoing compliance. 
Figure 5.3 represents an ideal-typical view of the regulatory process, consisting of three 
chronological stages. The first stage is the development of new regulations by the 
regulators, standard setters and policy-makers. In the context of this thesis, this roughly 
corresponds to the period immediately after the financial crisis (2009 – 2011) when the 
bulk of the new proposals were created. The second stage in the regulatory lifecycle is 
the finalization of the rules and the confirmation of implementation dates by the 
regulators. The implementation stage was underway at the time of the interview 
fieldwork. Finally, the third stage occurs when the regulations are legally enforced and 
is characterized by the ongoing monitoring of organizational compliance. In the case of 
Basel 3, the final implementation date was scheduled for the end of 2019 (see Chapter 
3). From the interview data, it was clear that organizational responsibilities for 
regulation varied in accordance with this lifecycle. Figure 5.3 also represents a composite 
view of how regulation was organized across the five banks in the interview sample, and 
how this differed between conduct and prudential regulation. 
During the first stage of the regulatory lifecycle, the Regulatory Affairs department 
generally had the formal responsibility for monitoring changes on the regulatory 
horizon for both conduct and prudential regulation. However, discussions with 
interviewees from Risk Management and Finance65 areas suggested that whilst they were 
not formally required to keep track of regulatory developments, they felt it was 
necessary for them do so informally. This was primarily because these areas had the 
technical expertise to makes sense of the changes and felt they needed to engage with 
them as soon as possible.  
The responsibilities for making the requisite changes involved a combination of actors 
from risk management, finance and other organizational areas affected by the new rules. 
In some instances, (such as Banks 1 and 2), dedicated teams of project managers, risk 
                                                 
65 It is likely that with the advent of the Basel 3 liquidity rules, the Treasury functions of the large banks would 
also be involved in monitoring regulatory developments. However, this could not be verified as the sampling 
strategy did not include organizational actors from Treasury. 
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management and finance experts and IT professionals were created to manage a 
programme of work to achieve compliance. In other organizations, such as Banks 3 and 
4, any changes required to implement the new Basel 3 rules were managed as part of the 
‘business as usual’ (BAU) operations of the bank, with no need for additional project 
staff to support this work. The key determining factor as to how regulatory change 
management was organized seemed to be the scale of the work required, which in turn, 
clearly depended on the scale of the operational impacts on the bank. 
Figure 5.3 Responsibilities for managing regulation across the regulatory lifecycle 
 
In the final stage of the regulatory lifecycle, the ongoing monitoring of compliance with 
prudential regulation tended to be a shared responsibility between compliance, risk 
management and finance. The practices associated with the three stages of the 
regulatory lifecycle are discussed further below. 
The distinction between conduct and prudential regulation also had a bearing on the 
parts of the organization that were responsible for regulation. Conduct regulation refers 
to matters of consumer and investor protection, financial crime and market abuse. 
Typically, such matters have been the responsibility of the Compliance functions in 
banks (Mills, 2011). Conduct regulation, and changes to these regulations, has the 
greatest relevance for the Front and Back Offices and Compliance. However, changes to 
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prudential regulation, with its emphasis on both risk management and capital 
calculations, had a greater impact on Middle Office functions such as Risk Management, 
Financial Control and Accounting. Group or Central Risk Management and Accounting 
functions are also heavily involved in prudential regulation. 
One of the reasons that different areas of the banks were responsible for managing 
conduct and prudential regulation respectively was the depth and diversity of the skills 
and expertise that was necessary for dealing with the changes to the prudential rules. 
As Chapter 3 showed, the rules were highly complex and technical, covering a range of 
risk types and requiring complex underlying technology systems. Within Risk 
Management, the mathematical requirements of regulatory risk models demanded 
specialist quantitative skills, often gained through advanced scientific degrees 
(Weatherall, 2013). Several of the interviewees in Finance had been involved in regulatory 
interpretation for most of their careers, becoming expert in specific areas of the 
prudential rules and experienced in advising other parts of the business on their 
application. Staff in regulatory liaison roles also possessed specialist relationship 
management skills such as being effective communicators, and they often had many 
years of experience in dealing with regulatory authorities, either in their banking careers 
or through previous employment as a regulator. 
This overview, whilst brief, suggests that the organizational structures in place for 
managing prudential regulatory change were somewhat fragmented, with 
responsibilities assigned to several different areas within a bank. Potentially, this could 
pose problems for the co-ordination of the work necessary for regulatory 
implementation, especially across teams that have different organizational sub-cultures 
and priorities, such as Risk and Finance (Chartis Research, 2013; Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2011). For example, Finance departments tend to focus more on the reporting of 
the previous year’s financial results whereas Risk has a more future-oriented perspective 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011, p. 10). The dispersal of responsibilities for different 
aspects of regulatory change across the organization might also lead to confusion about 
who is accountable for what and the fragmentation of important data (Turner & Pidgeon, 
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1997; Vaughan, 1992). At this point, however, these suppositions must remain 
speculative because of the lack of in-depth data about any one organization and the fact 
that there was significant re-organization underway in the banks during the fieldwork 
period, which is discussed in greater detail below.  
Practices 
During the interview fieldwork, respondents were invited to describe their roles within 
the organizations they worked for, their responsibilities and how they managed the 
challenges of regulatory change. From their responses, over sixty separate activities were 
identified during the coding process and these were then further categorized into ten 
distinct types of regulatory practices. As Table 5.2 shows, activities relating to each 
practice category were coded in more than half of the interviews showing consistency in 
practices across the banking organizations (except for monitoring regulatory 
compliance).  
Table 5.2 Regulatory practice category coding 
Regulatory Practice Category % of interviews coded to 
category  
No. of References 
Regulatory relationship management 100 101 
Internal education and awareness 82 61 
Lobbying 55 45 
Regulatory impact assessment 64 40 
Regulatory change management 64 36 
Managing regulatory requests 59 31 
Regulatory interpretation 55 23 
Business planning and mitigation 50 21 
Monitoring regulatory developments 55 17 
Monitoring regulatory compliance 14 3 
These regulatory practices have been mapped to the regulatory lifecycle as shown in 
Figure 5.4. Different categories of regulatory practice varied in importance depending 
on where a particular set of rules was in this regulatory lifecycle. During the first phase, 
actors within the organizations focused on monitoring the developments of new 
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regulations (1). This consisted of checking for the release of new discussion or 
consultation66 papers by the regulatory standard setting bodies on a national, EU and 
international level and other communications from regulators that indicated new or 
changed regulation on the horizon.67 
Figure 5.4 Regulatory practices over the regulatory lifecycle 
 
Once the relevant consultation papers had been identified, the next step was to review 
these proposals to ascertain their meaning (2). This interpretive work was necessary for 
banks’ employees to then understand the potential impacts – both qualitative and 
quantitative – of the regulatory changes. By performing ‘regulatory impact 
assessments’68 (3) bank staff developed a view of the operational changes they needed 
to make and the possible financial impacts of the regulation. These assessments enabled 
decision making about the programme of work required to achieve compliance and 
directed the priorities for the organization’s lobbying activities. 
                                                 
66 In the very early stages of making new regulatory rules, standard setters will release a discussion paper, 
describing their early thinking which explicitly invites comment from industry and other interested parties. 
67 Though it was not mentioned by any of the interview respondents, external data suppliers such as Thomson 
Reuters provide services and software to which banks can subscribe to be kept up to date with the latest 
regulatory developments and management consulting firms also provide their clients (and prospective clients) 
with frequent regulatory bulletins. 
68 The regulatory impact assessments performed by banks should not be confused with Regulatory Impact 
Assessments performed by standard setters to assess the costs and benefits from the implementation of a 
piece of regulation (See Baldwin et al., 2011 Chapter 15). 
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Lobbying (4) encompassed a broad range of activities from responding to regulatory 
consultation papers, negotiations between senior executives and senior policy-makers 
and participating in the lobbying activities of trade associations. In parallel, the output 
of the regulatory impact assessments was also used to determine all the changes 
necessary to bring the organization into compliance with the new regulations. These 
change management practices (5) included modifications to technology systems, 
business processes, data management and organizational structures. To meet the 
regulatory deadlines, these practices would ideally begin as early as possible in the 
regulatory development phase of the regulatory lifecycle and continue into the 
implementation phase. The precise timing was dictated by the scale and the complexity 
of the changes that the organization needs to make. 
Depending on the results of the quantitative impact assessment, banks may also have 
needed to take pre-emptive action to mitigate the financial impacts of the proposed 
regulations (6). Such actions included making changes to the business model, product 
mix or raising additional levels of capital (equity) (McKinsey & Co, 2010). 
The final stage of the regulatory lifecycle required the continual monitoring of 
organizational compliance with the regulation once all the changes had been 
implemented and the new rules were in force (7). For prudential regulation, banks are 
required to conduct annual self-assessments of their risk model compliance to which 
senior management must attest and which are reviewed by the banks’ Internal Audit 
department69 (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2013b). 
In addition to activities which are specific to the various stages in the regulatory 
lifecycle, three categories of continuous regulatory practices were also identified. The 
first was the communication of regulatory information within the organization (8). This 
ranged from informing the entire organization of the changing regulatory rules to 
intensive training of employees on specific aspects of the new rules that affected their 
day-to-day work.  
                                                 
69 Internal Audit is a department within a bank which provides independent and objective assurance regarding 
the risks, controls and governance to the Board and senior management of that organization. 
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The banks also had individuals or teams (depending on their size) dedicated to managing 
the relationships with all the regulators that oversee the bank (9), described as 
Regulatory Affairs departments above. This relationship management included activities 
such as responding to regulatory communications, organizing and preparing for 
regulatory meetings, tracking outstanding regulatory compliance issues and being the 
key point of contact between the regulators and the rest of the organization.  
The final category of practices, the management of regulatory requests (10), tended to 
fall into two types – regular or scheduled reporting and ad hoc requests. Regular 
requests were a set of reporting requirements issued by the national supervisor and 
consisted of pre-determined set of data that the bank had to supply in a specified on an 
ongoing basis (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2016b). Ad hoc requests tended to be 
issued by a banking supervisor as part of an industry-wide review, or to gain clarity on 
a specific issue that has arisen with that particular organization. Respondents reported 
that such requests could arise at any time and often had fairly short deadlines for 
response. 
This section demonstrates that there were a wide range of practices associated with the 
management and practical implementation of regulatory change. The relative 
importance and effort expended on these various activities varied in line with the 
regulatory lifecycle, though some practices were performed continuously. Moreover, the 
responsibilities for these practices were largely shared between three key departments 
- Regulatory Affairs, Risk and Finance – where the required specialist skills and 
knowledge were located.  
Pache and Santos (2010) propose that the degree to which competing or conflicting 
institutional logics are represented within an organization will have a bearing on how 
these conflicts are handled and the type of response strategy that is mobilized by the 
organization. The power relations between the representatives of each logic and the 
political skills they possess are also likely to have an influence on the strategic direction 
an organization takes in response to environmental change (Almandoz, 2014; 
Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010). In the case of the management of 
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regulatory risk, the argument made here is that there are specific organizational roles 
which can be viewed as the embodiment of regulatory logic – such as the employee 
responsible for regulatory liaison, or the Risk Manager who was the ‘business sponsor’ 
of the Basel 3 change programme. These individuals are therefore the agents of that 
institutional logic (Scott, 2007) and contribute to the internal representation of that 
logic. Likewise, the traders in the Front Office, responsible for maximizing revenues 
through the dealing of bonds, derivatives or shares, represent and embody the logic of 
the market. 
Managing the risks of regulatory change 
Having provided some background information on the types of structures and practices 
that the respondents described to manage regulatory change, further analytical work 
needs to be done to understand how these comprise the governance, tools and processes 
of the risk management of regulatory change. To do so, this section draws on the analytic 
themes raised by Hutter and Power (2005) in their metaphor of ‘organizational 
encounters with risk’.  
This metaphor consists of three lenses which are used to explore how organizations 
experience and respond to risks. The first, organizational attention to risk relates to the 
problematization of risk, how it is identified, measured and calculated and the 
technologies of control that are used in these activities. Secondly, sense-making about 
risk is undertaken in response to ‘errors, accidents and anomalies’, a means by which 
organizations attempt to understand risks and ‘transform new encounters with risk into 
acceptable managerial practices’ (Hutter & Power, 2005, p. 19). The final perspective 
examines the re-organizing undertaken in response to risk, including efforts to improve 
risk control and management throughout the organization. In line with Hutter and Power 
(2005, p. 6), these three perspectives are not offered as sequential stages that map easily 
on to either the regulatory lifecycle or the temporal phases that were identified in 
Chapter 4. Instead, the activities described under each heading were often undertaken 
in parallel or iteratively. At this point, it is worth reiterating that the risks that the banks 
are managing here are those associated with regulatory change such as the risks to bank 
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profitability, the reputational risk of non-compliance and/or the risk of regulatory 
sanctions. The importance attributed to each of these risks by organizational actors will 
depends on the institutional perspective from which the risk is considered. 
Organization of attention 
Key to the anticipation and management of the putative harms of regulatory change – 
adverse financial impacts and non-compliance – was the identification of all the 
potential regulatory rule changes that emerged after the crisis. This was one of the most 
frequently cited processes in the fieldwork interviews. As noted in Chapter 3, the new 
rules produced by the European Union alone since the financial crisis numbered at least 
2,000 pages (Haldane, 2012). Globally, the number was much higher. In its 2012 Annual 
Report, RBS stated that it had ‘reviewed over 320 consultations in its core markets’ 
(Royal Bank of Scotland, 2012a, p. 285). It is therefore not surprising that, as one 
interviewee contended, it was difficult to ‘keep up with the tremendous pace of 
regulation’ (Participant 17, 2014). Participants from each of the five banks in the 
interview sample explained that there were people or whole teams responsible for what 
was variously described as ‘horizon scanning’ (Participant 22, 2014), ‘upstream risk 
management’ (Participant 10, 2014), ‘regulatory developments’ (Participant 7, 2013), 
‘watching for what is on the radar’ (Participant 8, 2013), ‘monitoring what was coming 
down the line’ (Participant 15, 2014) or ‘looking at policy developments’ (Participant 18, 
2014). Banking organizations used a range of methods to monitor regulatory 
developments from scanning the standard setters’ websites on a regular basis (B2P1) to 
engaging external public affairs consultancies to keep them updated with the latest 
progress in Brussels (Participant 10, 2014; Participant 13, 2014). Interviewees from both 
Bank 1 and Bank 5 described how all these changes were added as ‘regulatory risks’ to 
a central repository of regulatory risks and issues. 
Once regulatory rule changes were identified, the interviewees stressed the importance 
of communicating them more widely to three key internal constituencies – senior 
management, impacted business areas and the wider organizational community. Firstly, 
the respondents described how senior management needed to be educated about the 
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imminent changes to ensure appropriate levels of attention were paid to the new 
regulatory rules for two purposes. One, to mobilize resources and budget to satisfy the 
compliance requirements of the new changes and two, to educate senior management 
about the likely operational and financial impacts on the organization. 
About a quarter of respondents stated that there was greater senior management 
attention on regulatory changes since the financial crisis: 
‘I brief the CFO [Chief Finance Officer], and the CRO [Chief Risk Officer] on a weekly 
basis on this sort of [regulatory change] stuff. And they get it. They have a good grip 
on it. And probably twice a month I go to committees and brief the CEO on it, and he’s 
got a pretty good grip on it.’ (Participant 20, 2014) 
Organizational actors with expertise in particular technical matters or in parts of the 
bank likely to be most impacted by the regulatory changes were also a key target of 
internal communications. Governance structures such as formal committees or informal 
groups were used for this purpose and comprised representatives from business 
functions likely to be most affected by the reforms: 
‘We've got, I guess I would describe it as trusted generals of the Finance Director, the 
Group Treasurer, we've got risk representatives - various senior risk representatives - 
on the strategy side, and on the operation side of risk. The senior finance 
representatives and it's - a little bit light in terms of business representation. But we 
get people from the businesses to join as and when. And then Public Affairs and 
Compliance.’ (Participant 15, 2014) 
Respondents who were directly responsible for tracing and monitoring regulatory 
developments stressed the need to communicate about these as early in the regulatory 
lifecycle as possible: 
‘we typically go out quite early in the process of finding the business owner, because 
we are not close enough to the customer to necessarily understand all the subtleties, 
all the implications of the proposals so we’ll go out [into the wider organization] and 
get that owner’ (Participant 22, 2014). 
An early recognition of future regulatory changes and its associated risks, respondents 
suggested, would place the bank in a better situation to manage that change, thus 
improving the organization’s ability to implement any operational modifications on time 
and potentially influencing the final shape of the regulation through lobbying.  
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Finally, respondents also highlighted that it was important to educate the wider 
organization about changes in the regulatory environment. This was partly because in 
some cases, there was a demand for this information due to an organizational 
recognition of the growing importance of regulation in the post-crisis environment: 
‘It’s far more on people’s minds, no matter who you are talking to in the 
business…everyone now wants to know…not necessarily out of personal interest but 
out of obligation, about regulation’ (Participant 13, 2014). 
Communication of regulatory changes was evidently seen as critical to managing 
regulatory risk, according to the interview respondents. However, at the same time they 
acknowledged that this was sometimes difficult. The problems associated with risk 
communication in large and complex organizations is a consistent theme in the 
sociological literature on organizations and risk (Hutter, 2001; Reiss, 1992; Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997; Vaughan, 1992). Turner and Pidgeon suggests that this can be in part 
because organizational attention is directed elsewhere, towards problems that are well-
defined (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997, p. 49). Indeed, respondents discussed the difficulties 
inherent in their attempts to get organizational members to attend to regulatory 
changes, particularly when implementation dates were some time in the future or they 
were focused on ‘firefighting’ more immediate problems: 
‘the challenge is around identifying relevant stakeholders and getting views back from 
busy people, and trying to get people to focus on tomorrow’s problem as opposed to 
today’s emergency’ (Participant 10, 2014). 
In other cases, however, interviewees reported that it has become easier to get some 
organizational groups to pay attention to regulatory change, especially if the financial 
risks of the new rules were highlighted: 
‘There’s more people now stepping into the regulatory space because the front office 
need to have a view of strategy and that kind of stuff so you have almost like 
regulatory teams in the front office…capital management type teams that are looking 
at the capital in terms of the rules’ (Participant 7, 2013). 
It is possible that because of the work that had been done to assess the capital impacts, 
these regulatory changes were better defined but perhaps more importantly, articulated 
using the logic of the market. By doing so, it appears that the areas of the organization 
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that wielded the financial power i.e. the Front Office, were more likely to pay attention. 
This echoes previous findings about Compliance Officers needing to make a ‘business 
case’ (Parker, 2002) or to identify with the profit maximizing objectives of the firm 
(Weait, 1996) in order to garner wider organizational support for compliance initiatives. 
Despite the sometimes variable levels of attention to regulatory change in the banks, the 
interview data also revealed that there was generally greater knowledge and awareness 
of regulation overall than before the crisis across all five sample organizations. This was 
especially the case when the impacts of the regulatory changes were articulated using 
market logic, such as the increased levels of capital required by the new rules. 
The risks of regulatory change were not just associated with the changing nature of the 
regulatory rules, however, the ongoing relationship with the banks’ supervisors was also 
perceived as a source of risk, especially given the increasingly intense and intrusive 
nature of the supervisory approach described in Chapter 3 (Financial Services Authority, 
2008a; Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014b). In addition, the regulators themselves 
were in a state of flux, making it more difficult for the banks to predict the outcomes of 
their interactions. As Table 5.2 shows, practices associated with the regulatory 
relationships were most commonly discussed by the interviewees, indicating that paying 
attention to their supervisors had become more of an organizational priority.  
As described above, responsibility for liaising with the prudential supervisor was 
typically centralized into one department, usually called Regulatory Affairs or 
Regulatory Liaison. The activities performed by this department included preparing for 
regulatory encounters, overseeing and minuting these interactions and then following 
up on any issues or actions that arose during them.  
‘There's the continuous relationship-building and maintenance with key people, and 
then there's the pro-active or reactive engagement on specific issues. So, that's that. 
And then of course, you have a more supervisory side - the day-to-day interactions 
between core compliance and the supervisor, but also senior management with the 
key regulators’ (Participant 13, 2014). 
Prior to meeting with regulators, representatives from Regulatory Affairs would ensure 
that the meeting participants were fully briefed and that all the necessary information 
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and materials had been prepared in advance. During the meetings, minutes were taken 
and added to a repository containing information on all contacts with the organizations’ 
supervisors. Finally, Regulatory Affairs would ensure any key actions arising from a 
meeting or other communications with the regulator were completed and that the 
outcomes or issues raised by the regulator were disseminated to the appropriate 
personnel. For the employees in Regulatory Affairs, ensuring good regulatory relations 
and facilitating regulatory compliance were core to their organizational roles and thus 
these practices and activities were indicative of an orientation towards regulatory logic. 
Interviewees from Banks 1, 2 and 4 all emphasized the importance of maintaining 
‘constructive’ relationships with the PRA, with the aim of ensuring ‘a high quality 
engagement and both sides…come away from it feeling they’ve extracted value’ 
(Participant 18, 2014). Attention to regulatory relationships can therefore be viewed as 
contributing to the management of the risks of non-compliance. Literature on regulatory 
interactions (McCaffrey et al., 2007; Pautz, 2009; Pautz & Wamsley, 2011; Smith, 2013) 
suggests that ‘cooperation, along with other conditions such as trust and common 
expectations, enhances regulatory interactions which can lead to improved regulatory 
outcomes’ (Pautz & Wamsley, 2011, p. 7). Cooperative regulatory interactions may also 
have the effect of reducing friction and tension in the regulatory relationship, with less 
management time and effort needing to be spent on dealing with problems arising from 
such tensions. However, a small number of respondents also mentioned that there was 
a balance to be struck between paying supervisors enough attention and making ‘sure 
they don’t take over your life, as you might say, because then you can’t get your job 
done’ (Participant 19, 2014). In these cases, the respondents tended to occupy senior 
positions in risk management departments and were articulating a need to reach a 
pragmatic accommodation between the tensions of attending to the institutional 
demands of regulation and the other demands of their organizational roles. 
Sense-making 
Sense-making in relation to regulatory risk management refers to a set of practices which 
create and construct the meaning of the regulatory changes and their associated impacts 
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on the banking organization. Sense-making is necessary when organizations experience 
shocks that disrupt their ongoing flow of activities (Weick, 1995, p. 85). The need for 
sense-making is further intensified in situations of complexity, uncertainty and 
instability, all of which characterize the regulatory environment after 2008. For Weick 
(1995), organizational sense-making is a collective, social activity but this does not 
necessarily mean that all organizational actors will construct the same meaning (Hutter, 
2001). Where organizations are navigating situations beset with ambiguity and 
uncertainty, several different interpretations of the same situation may be available 
simultaneously, suggesting that arriving at one particular view is potentially 
problematic. 
For actors in banks attempting to understand the new Basel 3 and CRD 4 rules, there 
were high levels of ambiguity and uncertainty. Law, including regulatory law, is by its 
nature ambiguous (Edelman, 1992; Edelman, Petterson, Chambliss, & Erlanger, 1991). 
However, to decide how best to manage the various risks of regulatory change (including 
non-compliance and adverse financial impacts), those responsible for managing this 
change within banks had to ameliorate this ambiguity by arriving at a satisfactory 
interpretation of the new regulatory rules.  
In one organization, a formalized process for ‘regulatory interpretation’ of the CRD 4 
rules had been established. This comprised an ‘interpretation working group’, 
responsible for ensuring there was a shared understanding, ‘article70 by article what each 
and every one meant’ (Participant 10, 2014). Another respondent from a different bank 
mentioned that they might, on occasion, seek external legal guidance on rule 
interpretation ‘there’s always consultancy and law firms, particularly law firms, for these 
kinds of matters’ (Participant 13, 2014). In a third organization, the main responsibility 
for the interpretation of the entirety of the CRD 4 text fell on one individual (Participant 
20, 2014). In all the banks, there were key ‘subject matter experts’ who had gained deep 
knowledge of the regulatory rules throughout their careers – usually located within Risk 
or Finance. These people were critical in the process of regulatory interpretation and 
                                                 
70 ‘Article’ here refers to a specific rule paragraph within the legal text of the CRD IV Directive 
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sense-making and appeared to constitute an informal community of experts, who would 
consult each other about rule meanings and their application to specific situations. 
These were very much informal networks, born out of shared expertise and practices. 
Three of the interviewees from Finance departments were specifically responsible for 
the ongoing interpretation of the prudential rules – both the existing rules and the rules 
that were changing. Their job was to provide guidance and advice to the Front Office 
with respect to the regulatory implications of certain types of transactions or when new 
products were being developed. One interviewee described the frustrations associated 
with this task: 
‘I’m dealing with colleagues and say well, the laws says that and they turn round and 
say well, it doesn’t make sense so I’m going to do this. And I’m saying but you can’t, 
the law is actually saying something and you can’t turn around and say you don’t like 
it’ (Participant 6, 2013). 
In this example, the representative from Finance was providing advice which ran counter 
to the interests of his Front Office colleague. However, this particular situation was 
resolved by the actor from the Front Office being obliged to follow the finance expert’s 
interpretation, representing not only an interpretive struggle over the meaning of the 
law, but also perhaps demonstrating an intra-organizational contest of power and 
interests. In this case, the Front Office employee represented or embodied the logic of 
the market, whilst the interviewee occupied a role imbued with regulatory logic. These 
two sets of actors came into conflict when sense-making over regulatory changes 
occurred. It is not clear that regulatory logic always prevailed, but the interview evidence 
does seem to indicate that greater organizational power was being afforded to 
organizational actors whose roles embodied regulatory logic than before the financial 
crisis. 
The practice of regulatory interpretation also involved organizational decision-making 
about the level of regulatory risk that the organization was prepared to tolerate. Two 
examples will help to illustrate this point. The first relates to the risk of non-compliance. 
Determining the meaning of a rule often requires a debate between the ‘letter of the law’ 
and the ‘spirit of the law’. The interpretation then not only necessitated an 
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understanding of the intention behind the rules but also a decision about the desired 
level of regulatory compliance that would be achieved by interpreting the rule in this 
specific way: 
‘You look through to the spirit of what do they actually mean, what is the intention, 
and that’s where you have the flexibility to go – this is what they’re saying, rate 
ourselves 1 to 10 on here. We’re a seven, is seven enough? Seven might be okay. 
Doesn’t mean you have to do ten out of ten.’ (Participant 3, 2013). 
This quote illustrates that conscious decisions were made about the ‘level’ of compliance 
that organizations were aiming for and considered in their interpretations of the rules. 
It also illustrates that banks’ understanding of compliance was not binary but was 
judged on a continuum, which echoes findings in other studies of regulatory compliance 
(Hawkins, 2002; Hutter, 1997). 
Different interpretations could also have a direct impact on regulatory capital levels. 
One respondent described a situation where for certain portfolios, the bank did not have 
permission to use the advanced modelling approach to calculate the capital 
requirements for market risk. However, when reviewing the rules for calculations using 
the standardized approach in greater detail, this employee realized that two options 
were available for how hedging transactions could be treated. One option would result 
in a lower capital requirement and this was the interpretation that was chosen. The 
respondent reflected that 
‘with a bit of advice you can actually change the way the business (Front Office) 
operates to avoid taking punitive or unnecessary charges which is really around the 
education about how a very specific rule works’ (Participant 5, 2013). 
This second example demonstrates that in addition to considerations of compliance, 
attitudes to risk and risk taking were also involved in decisions about regulatory 
interpretations. Higher risks would have brought higher returns but they would also 
have required higher levels of capital. 
Driven both by regulatory requirements (BCBS, 2010e) and the growth of risk governance 
(Power, 2007), banks have increasingly expressed their levels of risk tolerance through 
formal statements of ‘risk appetite’. As Power argues, ‘such an “appetite” is in the first 
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instance revealed by what organizations actually do (rather than what they claim to do)’ 
(Power, 2007, p. 77), Both the examples above illustrate that the notion of ‘risk appetite’ 
has a role to play in the process of sense-making associated with regulatory change. The 
appetite which an organization has for both the risk of non-compliance and the risk of 
adverse financial consequences come together and are balanced in the overall 
articulation of the appetite for regulatory risk, representing a truce in the conflict 
between market and regulatory logics.  
Typically, risk analysis or assessment processes include an estimation of both the 
probability of a risk and its likely impact. In the case of post-crisis regulation, the 
uncertainty was not so much due to the probability of the regulatory change – once the 
intention to reform the prudential regulatory framework was announced by the G20 in 
2009 (G20, 2009), the changes were almost inevitable. However, the uncertainty lay in 
the potential impacts of the changes on the banking organizations, a clear example of 
‘effect uncertainty’ (Milliken, 1987). Interview respondents discussed the processes they 
used to assess the impact of the regulatory changes on their organizations which were 
very similar across all five banks. Each separate regulatory change was logged as a 
‘regulatory risk’ and the first step was to conduct a ‘top down’ view of the impact on the 
bank. One interviewee described this process in detail, explaining the types of criteria 
that he and his team used to classify the regulatory risks such as ‘financial impact, 
reputational impact, operational impacts’ (Participant 10, 2014). Depending on the level 
of impact, each regulatory risk in the ‘risk log’ was assigned a classification of either 
low, medium-low, medium-high or high. This classification then dictated how the risk 
was managed in the organization. Those that were medium-high or high across the bank 
as a whole were managed centrally and prioritized over others but ’there will also be a 
long tail of lower-level, medium low or low impact issues which will obviously tend to 
get managed locally’ (Participant 10, 2014). At the time of this interview, this respondent 
stated that there were ‘about 150 [regulatory risks] which are viewed as medium-high 
stroke high for the Group’ (Participant 10, 2014). 
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An interviewee from another bank described a similar process of assessing changes as 
a ‘function of customer impacts, financial impacts, balance sheet impacts and 
reputational impacts’ (Participant 22, 2014). In his organization, they had ‘about eighty 
live issues at any one time, and it’s been as high as a hundred, been as low as sixty, but 
eighty is roughly the average’ (Participant 22, 2014). 
Despite these very mechanistic processes for measuring the impacts of regulatory risks, 
both the interviewees quoted above acknowledged that the process of assigning an 
impact classification was not as ‘scientific’ as it sounded: 
‘So on financial impacts for instance, impacts on RWAs [Risk Weighted Assets] for 
instance, there are various functional thresholds, but …. at the end of the day you 
need to exercise some sort of rounded judgements so just because you trigger one 
threshold, doesn’t automatically make it a high or medium high impact’ (Participant 
10, 2014). 
In recognizing the role of judgement in assessing the impacts of regulatory risks, this 
respondent was highlighting the difficulties inherent in trying to render the 
uncertainties of the future somehow measurable in the present. Perhaps the function of 
these risk assessment processes was not so much the accuracy of the estimated scale of 
the impact as much as its plausibility (Weick, 1995). Classifying a regulatory risk as high 
might well have been contested by other actors within the organization but the very act 
of classification made these risks more visible, drawing attention to the regulatory 
changes and putting them on the managerial agenda.  
Once an initial estimate of the overall impact of the regulatory changes on the 
organization had been determined, respondents reported that more detailed impact 
analyses were then performed to address both the risk of non-compliance and the risk 
of adverse capital impacts. The sources of the risk of non-compliance came from both 
within and outside the bank. The unpredictability of regulatory expectations was not 
something the organization could directly influence. However, the bank staff attempted 
to understand the operational changes that were necessary to comply with the new 
regulations and developed a programme of work to address them. To achieve this, 
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interviewees from three of the banks described what appeared to be a standardized 
technique called a ‘gap analysis’: 
‘the way to do it is to pretend it’s [regulatory change] already happened and see where 
the gaps are. So, say this is where we are, this is where we’re going to be, these are 
the gaps, these are the implications’ (Participant 20, 2014). 
This process of analysis allowed the organization to identify which policies, processes, 
structures, risk models and technology systems would continue to be compliant with 
the new regulations and which would need to be modified or created from scratch. The 
outcome of this analysis formed the basis for a plan of work that would then be executed 
as part of the practice of ‘regulatory change management’ described in the next section. 
This ‘operational impact analysis’ work was usually performed by organizational 
functions from the middle and back office such as IT or risk management.  
Managing the financial impacts of the regulatory changes was influenced more by 
considerations of market logic. A different type of impact assessment was used to 
estimate more precisely how each of the rule changes would affect the banks’ capital 
requirements and ultimately their capital ratios71. These were known as quantitative 
impact assessments or studies72. The estimates produced by these assessments were 
included in the banks’ annual reports to provide investors with a sense of how the 
regulations might affect the banks’ key financial ratios in the future: 
‘Basel 3 numbers have been disclosed in the annual report and accounts for at least 
the last past eighteen months though of course, the early estimates were exactly that, 
given the lack of certainty in the final rules’ (Participant 5, 2013). 
Where Basel 3 introduced new requirements, such as the additional capital charge for 
credit valuation adjustments (CVA), estimating the impacts of these changes was 
                                                 
71 Similar exercises were conducted to assess the impact of new liquidity rules but none of the interviewees 
recruited for this study were involved directly in implementing the new liquidity rules that were part of Basel 
3. 
72 It should be noted that quantitative impact studies (QIS) are also a tool used by the BCBS to assess the effects 
of changes to the Basel rules on the overall levels of regulatory capital in the financial system and in some 
cases, are used to adjust the calibration of the rules. For the Basel 3 proposals, an initial QIS was conducted 
in 2009 and the results published in 2010 (BCBS 2010). In addition, the BCBS runs a semi-annual exercise to 
monitor the impact of Basel 3 on the international banking system on an ongoing basis. Over 200 international 
banks participate in this exercise. 
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particularly problematic because the risk models and systems infrastructure required to 
perform the calculations had not yet been put in place: 
‘there’s a lag time, we know there is something that we need to understand better but 
we don’t yet have the tools to understand it in a way that we need to understand it’ 
(Participant 9, 2013). 
There was, therefore, a recognition that the capital impact estimates were inaccurate 
and when disclosed internally and externally, they were accompanied by a host of 
caveats and assumptions: 
‘Sometimes the hardest thing is actually, once you’ve arrived at your central case as 
to where you think the capital will end up, then drawing the error bar on that, which 
is the uncertainty associated with how the rules might change’ (Participant 17, 2014). 
Unlike the operational impact assessments, the internal consumers of the outputs of the 
quantitative impact assessments tended to be senior management and the revenue-
generating parts of the organization. This respondent described why this was the case: 
‘for Basel 3, most areas end up with higher capital which is clearly the regulators’ 
objective so everybody has to take that seriously and the organization has to decide 
where it is going to allocate that limited resource because raising capital in the current 
climate is not going to be a straightforward exercise. There isn’t going to be investor 
incentives to put into banks that have become less and less profitable given the risk 
return’ (Participant 5, 2013). 
This quote is also a clear articulation of the market logic that framed sense-making about 
the scale of the potential capital impacts. Again, precise accuracy in these calculations 
was not possible to achieve but an indicative scale of the impacts was a vital input for 
shaping the bank’s business and financial strategy to mitigate the capital impact, to 
prioritize lobbying activities and to inform investors (Ernst & Young, 2014; McKinsey & 
Co, 2010). 
A final point that several respondents raised about the practice of regulatory impact 
assessments was that it was not a one-off activity. As discussed previously, the Basel 3 
and CRDIV regulatory proposals evolved over a period of time, often consisting of 
several iterations of the new rules which become more and more detailed as time 
progresses. Banking organizations, therefore, needed to keep track of these iterative 
changes: 
157 
 
‘at an early state, you’re dealing with concepts and high-level proposals rather than 
more detailed draft regulations, for instance. So as and when you get more detail, you 
have to keep going back to your impact assessments’ (Participant 10, 2014). 
A tension emerges here, between having enough certainty or plausibility as a result of 
sense-making to enable action whilst at the same time, having to continually factor in 
additional changes to the impact assessments and ultimately the implementation 
programme. This tension manifested itself in interactions between different parts of the 
organization. For example, one respondent from a regulatory advisory team within a 
central finance function was responsible for ‘signing-off’ on a set of business 
requirements documents. These texts articulated the detailed changes required to 
technology systems and business processes to bring the bank into compliance with 
specific aspects of the new CRD 4 rules: 
‘The CRD 4 programme is getting very frustrated because I can’t sign off on business 
requirements documents. We obviously did a complete interpretation of the draft CRD 
4 and then we were told not to look at any changes as they went through the various 
iterations until we got to the final text. Of course, now we’ve got the final text they 
want me to sign off on the changes from the initial text to the final text…I am more 
worried about the RTS [Regulatory Technical Standards] so I am resisting this and of 
course, that gets me into trouble for not being cooperative’ (Participant 6, 2013). 
Participant 6 was a deep technical expert and with this expertise came the power to delay 
progress due to what he perceived as an intolerable level of uncertainty. However, those 
responsible for implementing the practical changes were prevented from doing so until 
his permission had been granted. This tension was between those with expertise on 
regulatory policy and implementation and those involved in the work programmes to 
implement the regulatory changes who did not have the same level of technical 
knowledge. Whilst friction between the regulatory functions and the business (or Front 
Office) is somewhat predictable, the above example shows that different parts of the 
organization who subscribe to the same underlying regulatory logic may still differ 
regarding acceptable levels of risk or uncertainty. Processes of sense-making can reveal 
variable understandings and tolerances of risk, even amongst organizational 
constituencies that might have been expected to share similar ‘ways of seeing’ (Hutter, 
2005).  
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Re-organizing 
The final analytical lens through which organizational encounters with the risks of 
regulatory change can be viewed, according to Hutter and Power (2005) is that of the re-
organization of structures, roles and management technologies within organizations. 
Such changes typically occur in response to the crystallization of risk events, and are 
‘contingent upon forms of collective sense-making’ (Hutter & Power, 2005, p. 25). A high 
degree of re-organizing was evident in the banks included in the interview sample, both 
in terms of organizational structures and practices. 
The interview data revealed that all five banks had undergone or were undergoing 
varying degrees of restructuring in direct response to regulatory change73. Most 
prevalent was the creation or reconfiguration of teams or departments specifically 
charged with managing regulatory change, the creation of new roles for managing 
regulatory relationships and hiring additional numbers of staff, including ex-regulators 
(see below). One respondent described how his organization was in the process of 
changing how the monitoring of regulatory developments was structured between the 
divisions and the Group Centre. He described how the reporting lines of the heads of 
the divisional Regulatory Affairs departments were being shifted from reporting locally 
to the divisional Chief Risk Officer to the Group Head of Regulatory Affairs. The reason 
given for this change was that many of the issues associated with the changes to the 
prudential regulations cut across divisional boundaries, such as data aggregation and 
information technology changes. 
Within the investment banking division of one of the banks in the sample, respondents 
described a new function which had been set up within Risk Management. This team was 
specifically responsible for managing the regulatory relationship with the FSA/PRA 
regarding the credit risk models (which were going through a regulatory re-approval 
process) and to provide regulatory expertise to the Risk Management teams responsible 
for carrying out the work to remediate the models and associated processes. 
                                                 
73 There was also a large degree of re-organization within the banking industry in general during the fieldwork 
period, driven more by market conditions and in response to events such as the Eurozone crisis. 
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New governance structures were also created specifically to manage regulatory change, 
where governance in this context means the structures of accountability and oversight 
for managing regulatory change. An example of such a structure is described by this 
interviewee: 
‘So we have established a full-fledged structure with a project management office and 
outside help from one of the big four [consulting companies] - we have the steering 
committee, which includes business heads, control function heads, corporate function 
heads. And then we have different working groups and task forces, all of which focus 
on the top twelve European regulatory initiatives’ (Participant 13, 2014). 
Other examples given by respondents included a Regulatory Developments Executive 
Steering Group and a Basel 3 Implementation Steering Group. The former comprised 
senior executives such as the Chief Risk Officer and the Chief Finance Officer and its 
purpose was to make decisions about ‘significant [regulatory] changes to the group in 
terms of the changes to potentially the structure, the way it conducts itself and the way 
it operates generally’ (Participant 15, 2014). 
Three out of the five banks in the sample had also created new roles specifically to 
manage relationships with the regulators. In one organization, there had not been a Head 
of Regulatory Affairs until 2010. Responsibilities for various aspects of regulation had 
been split between various members of the Group Legal and Compliance or Risk 
Management functions as this organization had not seen a need for a dedicated role. 
However, along with many other banks after the crisis, the increased regulatory scrutiny 
meant that managing the liaison with the regulators was occupying more and more 
management effort at a time when rebuilding regulatory relationships was considered 
to be an important priority (see Chapter 6). A similar sequence of events was described 
by this interviewee: 
‘The decision was taken that there was so much regulation, so much regulatory 
interaction, the regulators were also splitting - so the FSA was splitting, so there were 
more stakeholders to manage - that it actually needed its own dedicated resource to 
do that, and they needed somebody at director level, to just spend all day worrying 
about regulation’ (Participant 18, 2014) 
The creation of new roles necessitated the recruitment of new staff to fill them and 
indeed, two of the respondents had not only been hired to fill roles as Head of Regulatory 
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Affairs, but they had been recruited directly from the FSA or PRA between 2012 and 
2013. When questioned about their employer’s motivation for bringing them into the 
organization, both respondents said it had primarily been to improve the relationship 
with the regulator. This practice of corporate firms hiring ex-regulators was also 
reflected by the fact that over a quarter of the respondents in the sample had been 
employed by a regulatory body at some point in their career. 
The transition of experienced regulatory staff into industry typifies the ‘revolving door’, 
where staff move from industry to politics (or regulation) and vice versa. The ‘revolving 
door’ is considered by some commentators to demonstrate the existence of regulatory 
capture (Carpenter & Moss, 2013; Pagliari, 2012). Classic theories of regulatory capture 
contend that it occurs when industry interests are promoted and prioritized over public 
interest goals through processes such as lobbying (Stigler, 1971) and ‘revolving door 
effects’ (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992). However, more recent variants have been 
proposed, including ‘cultural capture’ (Kwak, 2013) which considers relationships and 
network ties to be a mechanism through which the regulator’s actions and beliefs can 
be shaped: 
‘The revolving door between government and industry, by creating social connections 
between people on opposite sides of the door, therefore has an influence even on 
people who are personally impervious to its attractions’ (Kwak, 2013, p. 91). 
Recent work in the US has examined the flows of personnel between industry and 
regulators (and vice-versa) (Bond & Glode, 2014; Cadogan & Cole, 2012; Lim, Hagendorff, 
& Armitage, 2015; Lucca, Seru, & Trebbi, 2014). Whilst comparable academic studies in 
the UK are not yet available, anecdotally, a similar pattern can be observed in the UK 
banking industry. Table 5.3 shows the movement of several actors from the FSA to either 
banks or management consulting firms from 2010-2014. 
Table 5.3 Examples of flow of regulators to industry in the UK (2010 – 2014) 
Name Year of 
move 
Previous role and employer New role and employer 
David Strachan 2010 
Director of Financial Stability 
Division 
Co-Head of Centre for Regulatory 
Strategy 
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Name Year of 
move 
Previous role and employer New role and employer 
Financial Services Authority Deloitte 
Sally Dewar 2011 
Head of Risk Division 
Financial Services Authority 
Head of Regulatory Affairs, Europe 
JP Morgan Chase 
Thomas Huertas 2011 
Head of International Affairs 
Financial Services Authority 
Partner 
Ernst & Young 
Andrew 
Whittaker 
2012 
General Counsel 
Financial Services Authority 
Group General Counsel 
Lloyds Bank 
Margaret Cole 2012 
Head of Enforcement and Financial 
Crime 
Financial Services Authority 
General Counsel 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
Hector Sants 2013 
CEO 
Financial Services Authority 
Head of Government and 
Regulatory Relations 
Barclays Bank 
Matthew 
Elderfield 
2013 
Financial Regulatory and Deputy 
Governor 
Central Bank of Ireland 
Head of Compliance 
Lloyds Bank 
Jon Pain 2013 
Managing Director Supervision 
Financial Services Authority 
Head of Regulatory Affairs and 
Conduct 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Christina Sinclair 2013 
Director of Retail 
Financial Conduct Authority 
Global Head of Compliance for 
Wealth and Investment Management 
Barclays Bank 
Sheila Nicoll 2013 
Director, Conduct Policy 
Financial Services Authority 
Senior Advisor,  
Ernst & Young 
Rosemary Hilary 2013 
Head of Internal Audit 
Financial Conduct Authority 
Audit Director 
TSB Bank (formerly part of Lloyds) 
Colin Lawrence 2013 
Director, Strategic Risk Advisor 
Prudential Regulation Authority 
Partner 
Ernst & Young 
Matthew Nunan 2014 
Head of Wholesale Enforcement 
Financial Conduct Authority 
Senior Compliance Role 
Morgan Stanley 
Sharon Campbell 2014 
Head of Financial Crime and 
Intelligence 
Financial Conduct Authority 
Director of Financial Crime 
Santander UK 
Julian Adams 2014 
Director of Insurance Supervision 
Prudential Regulatory Authority 
Group Regulatory Director 
Prudential (insurance company) 
Sources: ft.com, citywire.co.uk, telegraph.co.uk, guardian.co.uk, Bloomberg.com linkedin.com 
There was little evidence from the interviews about the reasons for hiring senior ex-
regulators, aside from the general need to improve regulatory relations, but it is possible 
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to speculate about a continuum of motivations. At one extreme, by bringing senior ex-
regulators into the organization, a bank was very visibly signalling to both internal and 
external constituencies (including the regulator) that they are ‘taking regulation 
seriously’ (Participant 4, 2013) without necessarily having to make any substantive 
changes (though of course, they may also be making substantive improvements). This is 
commensurate with the need to pacify external sources of organizational legitimacy as 
discussed in Chapter 4. At the other end of the scale, it is possible to surmise that banks 
sought the knowledge, skills and expertise of these regulatory officials to better help 
them to meaningfully meet regulatory requirements and supervisory expectations. It is 
also worth noting that there are significant incentives for regulatory staff to move into 
industry, given higher levels of remuneration in the banks compared to the regulators. 
The hiring of such senior regulatory officials, such as Hector Sants by Barclays Bank in 
2013 was also symptomatic of an associated trend - the apparent elevation in the 
organizational status of those responsible for managing regulation. There is a precedent 
for the creation of new ‘Chief Officer’ positions in response to specific organizational 
issues, as documented by Power in his discussion of the rise of the Chief Risk Officer 
(CRO). Power argues that  
‘these positions provide internal organizational representations of externally 
encountered norms and rules. They are part of the way that organizations manage 
uncertainties in their environments, specifically those created by legislative, 
regulatory and market pressures.’ (Power, 2005b, p. 137) 
Three explanations are offered by Power (2007) to account for the creation of the CROs 
in the literature. Firstly, that organizations are responding rationally to the increasing 
risks in their external environment. Second, the role of the CRO is part of a ‘blame-
shifting’ strategy, the person to blame when risks crystallize. Finally, there is an 
institutional explanation, whereby the rise of the CRO can be attributed to an 
organization’s legitimating project, as ‘part of good governance together with audit 
committees and internal auditors’ (Power, 2005b, p. 140).  
The ‘Chief Regulatory Officer’ can be viewed both as part of the strategy to manage the 
risks of regulatory change and an attempt to repair organizational legitimacy (Suchman, 
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1995). He or she becomes an organizational figurehead for regulatory compliance, and 
as with the Chief Risk Officer and Chief Compliance Officer, he or she might well  
‘become quickly embroiled in a complex organizational politics in which their 
effectiveness and legitimacy is constantly in question, and the role may be a dumping 
ground for high-blame problems’ (Power, 2005b, p. 139). 
At the same time, however, having a senior executive accountable for all regulatory 
matters could overcome some of the issues previously identified with the fragmentation 
of regulatory responsibilities in the organization. The ability of the ‘Chief Regulatory 
Officer’ to make substantive changes (if this is indeed the goal) will depend on two 
factors. The first is the status of the role within the organization, such as whether this 
individual is on the Board of Directors of the bank74. The second factor is the level of 
social skill that new employee has to ‘motivate cooperation in other actors by providing 
those actors with common meanings and identities in which actions can be undertaken 
and justified’ (Fligstein, 1997, p. 398). 
In addition to the reconfiguration of organizational structures, two categories of 
regulatory practices were associated with re-organizing, Change Management and 
Business Planning and Mitigation. Change Management encompasses both a set of 
practices and specific structures created to manage the organizational changes 
necessary to bring the bank into compliance. As described above, in some cases, these 
change programmes were managed outside the day-to-day (or ‘business as usual’) 
activities of the firm with project staff specially recruited to work full time on regulatory 
change. One bank had engaged a firm of external management consultants to run their 
regulatory change programme because the knowledge and expertise to do so could not 
be sourced internally. Not only are consultants a source of knowledge, however, their 
engagement can also provide legitimacy, as ‘certifiers of rationality’ that ‘signal to 
internal and external constituencies that expert knowledge is being applied’ (Ernst & 
Kieser, 2002, p. 55) within the organization. Moreover, management consultants have 
                                                 
74 Hector Sants, for example, was not a member of the Barclays Board in his role as Head of Government and 
Regulatory Affairs. It is worth noting, however, that at the time of writing, none of the five top UK banks had 
a Chief Compliance or Chief Regulatory Officer on the Board, and only one bank, Lloyds, included a Chief Risk 
Officer as Board member. 
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been identified as a significant non-state regulatory actors (Black, 2002a; Ernst & Kieser, 
2002; Hutter, 2006b; Hutter & Jones, 2007; Power, 2007) and could potentially contribute 
to the isomorphism of regulatory practices through their role as ‘model mongers’ 
(Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000) but there is little empirical work on their use within 
regulation to support this conjecture. 
Despite the potential usefulness of such external resources, another bank explicitly 
chose not to make use of them in managing regulatory change: 
‘there’s a reluctance to use external forces, consultancies and so on. Primarily because 
of the cost, but also it’s good to develop that knowledge and retain it within the 
organization as far as possible’ (Participant 15, 2014) 
In banks such as this one, the management of regulatory change was performed by its 
full-time employees. Nonetheless, irrespective of the constitution of the project teams, 
the process of change management or regulatory implementation tended to follow a 
similar trajectory referred to as a ‘project management lifecycle’. Practices described 
above such as the operational impact assessment were used to identify the changes that 
needed to be made. These changes were then broken down into discrete units of work 
and incorporated into a detailed plan. Tasks were then assigned to the various functions 
responsible for making the changes such as IT, Risk Management, Finance etc. A central 
team then monitored the progress of this work with oversight provided by the project 
or programme steering committee. 
The types of changes that were required tended to be primarily technological, enhancing 
computer systems to capture additional information, for example, or making alterations 
to risk management processes or regulatory reports. In addition, respondents 
mentioned the need to implement internal controls, such as: 
‘day-to-day checks [of risk models], reconciling them with the Front Office, things like 
that, so we definitely notice a lot of focus on the control side of things’ (Participant 9, 
2013). 
The Basel 3 regulations also required banks to make changes to their risk management 
methodologies and models and the accompanying policies and procedures: 
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‘if you use it [risk model] on a day to day basis is you would go into the control and 
credit unit and they are monitoring it almost like, or similar along the lines of an 
excess management type process and what that monthly committee would look at is 
much smarter type metrics – sector, concentration type stuff. So it’s changed 
governance structures, it’s changed processes, it’s changed controls.’ (Participant 4, 
2013) 
These types of changes, then, represented the substantive reorganization that was 
necessary to implement regulatory change, and were unequivocally aimed at mitigating 
the risk of regulatory non-compliance. 
However, a very different set of re-organizing practices was also described by several 
interview participants, categorized here as ‘business planning and mitigation’. These 
practices were primarily concerned with addressing the large increases in capital 
requirements predicted by the banks’ quantitative impacts assessments. The types of 
actions that a bank might consider ranged from fundamental business model changes, 
balance sheet restructuring to fixing small problems associated with the quality of their 
risk data. 
‘We talk about mitigating actions and one of them might be to sell a business. You’re 
not to do that until the last minute because obviously, the longer you can hold it, the 
better it is’ (Participant 6, 2013). 
Additionally, banks sought ways of ‘optimizing capital’, a rather euphemistic term for 
reducing levels of regulatory capital through changes to risk models and risk 
management processes, improving data quality or changes to accounting policies 
(McKinsey & Co, 2010, p. 15).  
‘Capital is a big thing so whilst you could say that a big driver behind the risk model 
change project…was internal credit methodology, one of the main drivers was really 
capital I think. Saving the bank a significant amount of money’ (Participant 9, 2013) 
This pursuit of capital optimization or efficiency was corroborated by an Ernst and 
Young survey which found that seventy-six percent of the banks in the survey sample 
were ‘undertaking capital efficiency initiatives to mitigate the effects of Basel 3 
requirements’ (Ernst & Young, 2014, p. 66). 
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The final type of mitigating activity described by the respondents was to address the 
banks’ capital structure itself by improving the quality or quantum of capital via a rights 
issue or through liability management: 
‘We look to make our capital as efficient as possible, so over the past couple of years 
we’ve done some liability management exercises where we’ve paid back some lower 
non-eligible capital in order to then create more eligible Tier 1 regulatory capital’ 
(Participant 18, 2014). 
The need for banks to reduce their balance sheets or raise additional capital in response 
to Basel 3 has been well publicized (Jenkins & Shaefer, 2013; Kollowe, 2010; McKinsey & 
Co, 2010; Thompson, 2013) and whilst this is sometimes framed by the industry and 
practitioners as problematic, it must be remembered that increasing the levels of 
regulatory capital was clearly one of the key objectives of the Basel Committee. The 
mitigating activities discussed above signify banks’ efforts to manage the risk of reduced 
shareholder returns because, according to the industry, ‘investors are not accepting 
lower ROEs but are instead pushing for increases in ROE. Investors are demanding cost 
cutting, including compensation.’ (Ernst & Young, 2013, p. 54). Here, the demands of the 
market are driving banks to manage the risk of reduced profitability in direct conflict 
with the regulatory imperative to increase levels of capital.  
Discussion 
This chapter set out to explore the practices and structures instigated by banks in 
response to regulatory change, examining these within the context of the management 
of the uncertainty associated with a changing regulatory environment. One of the key 
questions was the degree to which these practices and structures can be said to be 
evidence of substantive changes. At this stage, it is not possible to give a definitive 
answer because the interview data is somewhat equivocal on this matter. Of the ten 
categories of regulatory practices that were identified, only one of these was directly 
concerned with making the changes to achieve compliance with the new rules – 
‘regulatory change management’. However, within this category of activities respondents 
did describe in some detail the types of operational changes that were being made, such 
as the development of new risk models and the creation of new control processes. This 
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could be suggestive of some degree of substantive efforts to achieve compliance as could 
the significant levels of organizational restructuring to manage the risks of new 
regulations. By conferring greater authority on regulatory staff within the organization 
and hiring ex-regulatory personnel at some cost, it appears that banks are prioritizing 
the skills, knowledge and expertise of those occupying roles instilled with the logic of 
regulation. On the other hand, assigning greater powers to those responsible for 
managing the risks of regulatory change may be a ceremonial act, one designed to 
demonstrate to external audiences that regulation is being taken seriously as part of its 
legitimacy repair strategy (Suchman, 1995). Similarly, the adoption of practices to 
manage the risks of regulatory change could be viewed as a necessary part of a strategy 
of decoupling. A bank would still need to understand how to present the ‘window 
dressing’ of regulatory compliance without necessarily adapting its core activities. The 
thesis returns to this theme in Chapter 7, when the possibilities for the 
institutionalization of regulatory logic are discussed.  
Power (2007) suggests that ‘uncertainties become risks when they enter into 
management systems for their identification, assessment and mitigation’ (Power, 2007, 
p. 5). This chapter argues that by constructing regulatory change as a risk, UK banks 
were attempting to effect ‘uncertainty to risk transformations’ (Clarke, 2001, p. 11) in 
an effort to mitigate the potential harms associated with a dynamic regulatory 
environment. The perception of what these ‘harms’ are varied based on the underlying 
institutional logic through which regulatory change was viewed. From the perspective of 
the market, the key hazard of the new prudential rules was the increase in capital 
requirements and the consequences of that such as reduced returns on equity. From a 
regulatory point of view, the main threat was of non-compliance with the new 
regulations which could arise through a misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the 
rules, a failure to implement changes in time or not meeting supervisory expectations 
for compliance. 
Analyzing the types of activities and practices employed by the banks to respond to 
regulatory change clearly showed that these could be indeed be understood as practices 
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of risk management, involving as they did the identification, assessment and mitigation 
of the perceived harms of the changing regulations. This analysis revealed a degree of 
isomorphism amongst the practices of regulatory risk management, indicating some 
similarities in banks’ responses to the pressures of the institutional environment 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, there were also differences in the structures that 
banks put in place to manage regulatory change such as the reporting lines for 
Regulatory Affairs departments and the use of external consultants so it is important 
not to overstate these similarities. In constructing regulatory change as an object of risk 
management, banks face similar problems to those identified in previous sociological 
work on organizations, regulation and risk. Understandings and perceptions of risk may 
vary within an organization (Hutter, 2001, 2005) and there are likely to be differing 
perspectives as to what risks should be managed and what levels of risk should be 
tolerated (Hood et al., 2001). 
This chapter showed that institutional logics can have an influence on how the risks of 
regulatory change are understood and attended to by various actors within 
organizations. Actors who occupy organizational roles that are focused on regulation, 
such as those located in Regulatory Affairs departments or Finance Regulatory Advisory 
teams can be viewed as embodying regulatory logic. Other actors, such as traders in the 
Front Office are required (and incentivized) to contribute to the profit-maximizing 
activities of the firm and therefore are the personification of market logic. Senior 
management, however, inhabit more problematic roles whereby they have 
responsibilities to both uphold regulatory standards and ensure the financial success of 
the firm. However, as this chapter also demonstrates, just because an actor is in a 
particular organizational role imbued with a particular institutional logic, it does not 
mean that he or she cannot make strategic use of the symbols and practices of other 
institutional logics to effect institutional change. Indeed, Friedland and Alford (1991) 
contend that people can be ‘artful in the mobilization of different institutional logics to 
serve their purposes’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 254). In this case, the manipulation 
of market logic to garner support for regulatory initiatives is exemplified by regulatory 
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staff emphasizing the adverse capital impacts of the new prudential rules in their 
interactions with Front Office personnel and senior management. 
The uncertainty and ambiguity of the regulatory rules requires significant levels of 
sense-making and thus provides an arena where those organizational actors imbued 
with different institutional logics can negotiate meanings to enable action. It is here that 
differing conceptions of regulatory risk are presented and reconciled in the 
determination of the bank’s regulatory risk appetite. Levels of regulatory compliance are 
balanced against potential financial impacts and the outcome will probably reflect the 
interests of the most powerful organizational constituencies and / or those who employ 
greater strategic skills in influencing other actors (Fligstein, 1997) which, following the 
financial crisis, is increasingly likely to be those occupying senior regulatory roles. 
The elevation in the status of regulatory staff within banks provides support for the 
final claim of this chapter which is that the work to interpret and manage regulatory 
change as well as the relationships with the regulators is becoming increasingly 
professionalized within the financial sector. There appears to be an increasingly 
standardized set of isomorphic practices associated with managing the changes 
associated with the technically complex and constantly evolving prudential regulations. 
People who possess specific skills, knowledge and expertise are required to develop and 
execute these practices. They comprise a set of ‘regulatory professionals’ who constitute 
a ‘community of practice’ (Wenger, 2000) and are instrumental not only in the 
management of regulatory change but also in the management of regulatory interactions 
which is the focus of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6:  Regulatory interactions  
In the wake of the financial crisis, the legitimacy of the banks and the regulators was 
called into fundamental question. In Chapter 4, the public approbation of banks was 
noted and their attempts to regain legitimacy through their public statements was 
discussed. The legitimacy of the regulators was similarly damaged. In many of the 
‘official’ post-mortems of the financial crisis (Financial Services Authority, 2009e; 
Larosière, 2009), the failure of regulation was cited as one of the numerous causes and 
in the UK in particular, the Financial Services Authority was criticized for the lack of 
attention it paid to prudential regulation at the time (Financial Services Authority, 2009e, 
p. 87). Deficiencies in the FSA’s supervisory approach were also implicated in the failures 
of Northern Rock (Financial Services Authority, 2008b), RBS (Financial Services 
Authority, 2011a) and HBOS (Financial Conduct Authority & Prudential Regulation 
Authority, 2015). So, not only were the banks struggling with legitimacy, the regulator 
itself faced public and political scrutiny.  
In the midst of the wider ideational, legitimacy and power shifts associated with 
regulatory change after the crisis, the work of banking supervision carried on, but with 
a fundamentally altered philosophy (see Chapter 3). Supervision of banks consists of 
multiple ‘on the ground’ interactions between firms and supervisory staff from the 
regulatory authorities. This chapter explores the dynamics of these interactions and 
especially how they changed in the period after the financial crisis.  
There is a significant body of regulatory literature exploring the interactions between 
the regulators and the regulated (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Baldwin & Black, 2008; 
Black, 2002b; Black & Baldwin, 2010; Braithwaite, 1995; Braithwaite et al., 1994; 
Braithwaite, Murphy, & Reinhart, 2007; Etienne, 2012; Gray & Silbey, 2011; Gray & Silbey, 
2014; Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2003; Gunningham et al., 2004; Hutter, 1997, 
2001; Kagan & Scholz, 1984; May & Winter, 2000; Parker & Nielsen, 2011). Important 
findings from these studies have demonstrated that compliance is negotiated in these 
repeated interactions and that through ‘responsive regulation’, regulators can develop 
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more effective enforcement strategies (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Baldwin & Black, 2008; 
Black & Baldwin, 2010). The interdependence between the regulators and the regulated 
has also been noted as both a cause for concern in terms of regulatory capture but also 
as positive, with trust-based, co-operative relations leading to more positive regulatory 
outcomes (McCaffrey et al., 2007; Pautz, 2009; Pautz & Wamsley, 2011; Smith, 2013). 
This chapter contributes to the academic literature on regulatory interactions by 
examining how relationships between the banks and the FSA/PRA played out in relation 
to the increased politicization of banking regulation and the legitimacy struggles 
experienced by both the banks and their supervisors in the wake of the financial crisis. 
Firstly, the chapter describes the actors that participated in these interactions, 
emphasizing that neither the banks nor the regulator can be viewed as an 
undifferentiated whole. Secondly, the various types of formal and informal regulatory 
interactions are explained from the perspective of the research participants. The 
remainder of the chapter focuses on the changing nature of these interactions over time, 
drawn from the accounts provided by the interviewees and concludes with more general 
implications of these findings for regulatory theory and the implementation of banking 
regulation. 
Regulatory interactions – the actors 
Interactions between regulators and regulated organizations in a complex and heavily 
regulated environment such as financial services involve a vast array of actors. Chapter 
5 demonstrated that in large and complex entities such as banks, responsibilities for 
managing regulation are often dispersed throughout the organization. The fieldwork 
data indicated that in some cases, attempts were being made to centralize the 
responsibilities for regulatory relationship management by creating new teams and 
hiring more senior personnel to perform this role. Despite these changes, however, 
multiple actors from both the regulator and the banks continued to be involved in 
various types of regulatory interactions. 
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The regulator 
The focus here is on the prudential supervision of the UK banking system. From 1997 
to 2013, this was the responsibility of the FSA. The Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) was formed on 1st April 201375 and had assumed all prudential supervisory 
responsibilities at the time the interview data for this thesis was collected and therefore, 
this section describes the structure and actors from the PRA.  
The PRA operated a model whereby banks that were considered to pose a higher risk to 
the stability and soundness of the financial system were assigned an individual 
supervisor or a team of dedicated supervisors76 (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014b, 
p. 13). Smaller, lower risk organizations were supervised on a portfolio basis, and did 
not have a named supervisor (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014b, p. 37). 
Supervisors and supervisory teams were responsible for the day-to-day regulation of 
that firm, and acted as a conduit into the PRA’s Prudential Policy and Supervisory Risk 
Specialist teams who could be called on to provide input on specific regulatory issues. 
The head of the supervision team for a bank was known as the Lead or Line Supervisor 
and was the primary point of contact for the supervisee bank. Where a bank had several 
large divisions, each of these was also likely to be allocated a dedicated supervisor who 
reported to the overall Line Supervisor. The Prudential Policy team was responsible for 
setting regulatory standards in the UK and for liaising with the EU and international 
standard setters (such as the BCBS) on the making and implementation of prudential 
regulations. The Supervisory Risk Specialist directorate comprised deep technical 
experts in various risk disciplines (such as credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk) who 
supported the supervisors to analyze prudential risks and banks’ risk management 
models and practices. So, depending on the topic in question, individuals in banks might 
encounter representatives from more than one area of the PRA.  
                                                 
75 As described in Chapter 3, the FSA had been restructured into prudential and conduct business units in 
advance of the creation of the PRA and the Financial Conduct Authority and had been operating on this basis 
since April 2011 
76 The PRA continued to use the ‘risk-based’ approach to assigning supervisory resources that had been 
followed by the FSA (Ferran, 2011; Financial Services Authority, 2006a) 
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The banks 
Within the banks, the picture was similarly complex. As shown in Chapter 5, the 
interview participants were employed in different roles and in different areas of their 
respective banking organizations. Some participants were directly responsible for 
managing the relationships with the regulator, whereas others did not encounter the 
regulator at all as part of their day-to-day activities. Chapter 5 also argues that the 
employees who were in organizational roles that were specifically aimed at managing 
regulatory relationships or were responsible for other aspects of regulatory 
management were ‘internal representatives’ of regulatory logic (Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Therefore, this chapter assumes that where those actors are involved, regulatory logic 
frames these regulatory interactions. 
Those responsible for managing the supervisory relationship liaised closely with their 
counterpart at the PRA, the Line Supervisor and acted as a gatekeeper to other parts of 
the banking organization. The frequency with which the other respondents interacted 
with the regulator varied and this is shown in Table 6.1. In addition to their experiences 
with the supervisory teams, interview participants described interactions with the PRA’s 
risk specialist and policy teams, depending on their role. For example, those with an 
advisory role tended to be in contact more with the PRA policy teams than the PRA 
supervisory team whereas those in a senior risk management role were likely to 
encounter the PRA supervisory team more frequently. 
Table 6.1 Regulatory interaction frequency of interview participants 
Bank Total No. 
Interviewees 
Responsible for 
Regulatory 
Relationship 
Interact 
Frequently  
(> 4 times per 
year) 
Interact 
Infrequently 
 (< 4 times per 
year) 
No interaction 
A 12 1 5 4 2 
B 2  2   
C 2 1 1   
D 5 1 3 1  
E 1  1   
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Interview respondents indicated that there was some variance in the nature of their 
regulatory interactions according to two key factors77. The first was the seniority of the 
representatives from the PRA and the second was the PRA team within which they 
worked. Nearly half of the interviewees mentioned that they had difficulties in dealing 
with more junior members of PRA staff, explaining that these less experienced 
individuals tended to have a more rigid approach. Similar observations regarding 
younger or more junior regulatory staff have been found in previous studies of 
regulatory enforcement (Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 1997). One respondent described how 
‘some of the junior ones like to be seen to be tough in front of their bosses’ (Participant 
12, 2014). Whilst demonstrating some empathy for the more junior PRA staff, the 
interviewees suggested that they ‘asked really stupid questions of really senior people’ 
(Participant 18, 2014). It was evident that the bank staff found these interactions 
frustrating and regarded them as a barrier to the PRA making decisions on important 
issues. Another consequence was described by this interviewee: 
‘you get some junior people [from] there [the PRA] who are not particularly impressive, 
then what happens is that the Group Chief Risk Officer stops coming and you get a 
CRO meeting where the CRO isn’t there and it’s me or somebody else.’ (Participant 8, 
2013) 
Sending junior members of PRA staff to meet with senior executives from the bank, as 
in this case, appeared to alienate the latter. However, it is not clear from the data whether 
this was a common occurrence as several respondents mentioned that there was a level 
of ‘seniority matching’ (Participant 12, 2014) whereby, in a particular interaction, the 
personnel from the PRA and the bank would be roughly at the same level of seniority. 
The second key determinant that could affect the nature of the regulatory interaction 
was the team for which the PRA employee worked. According to several respondents 
who were closely involved in changes to regulatory risk models, the staff from the PRA’s 
risk specialist teams had a tendency to be what respondents described as ‘unreasonable’ 
(Participant 3, 2013) or ‘pedantic’ (Participant 20, 2014): 
                                                 
77 These two factors appeared to have the same level of significance for the interviewees from 2008 onwards 
but no comparison to the pre-crisis period was offered during the interviews 
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‘obviously as a result of models being bad [the PRA] have responded accordingly so 
reduced interaction, reduced guidance, an observation of “we’re not going to tell you 
how to do this, we don’t have the resources to do that anymore and we’ve been told 
not do that anymore so you work it out and you come to us and we’ll tell you whether 
you’re right or wrong”’ (Participant 3, 2013) 
In contrast, the PRA’s Line Supervisors were perceived as being more ‘pragmatic’ 
(Participant 3, 2013) which the respondent below attributes to ‘self-interest’: 
‘Line supervisors at least had in their self-interest sometimes to be pragmatic. 
Ultimately they were the only ones that had an interest in an organization getting 
things done because they were associated with that.’ (Participant 1, 2013) 
Whilst it is not possible to determine the claim to self-interest without gathering data 
from the PRA, it is likely that supervisors were identified more closely with the firms 
that they supervised than the other teams within the PRA because they had the ultimate 
responsibility for these relationships and were interacting with the firms they 
supervised on a more frequent basis. 
The multiplicity of actors involved in regulation within an organization such as a bank 
could encourage what one interviewee described as a ‘fishing expedition’ (Participant 1, 
2013) whereby they ‘get a scattergun approach from them [the PRA] quite often…they 
ask the same question of a number of areas’ (Participant 6, 2013). The dilemma this 
presented to the banks was that ‘if you ask the same question to ten people and then 
spot two people who said something different, then the PRA will go back and challenge’ 
(Participant 18, 2014). According to this respondent, differences arose not necessarily 
because the answers provided to the regulator were wrong but because different actors 
used different language to express the same thing or only had one particular view of the 
data. Accordingly, the respondent claimed that the PRA, however, perceived these 
differences as indicative of a problem, even when there was not one. Of course, there 
may also have been occasions where substantially different answers received from 
different parts of the organization were indicative of more serious failings so despite 
the banks’ frustrations at this supervisory practice, it is unlikely that the PRA will stop 
using it. 
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Types of regulatory interaction 
Regulatory interactions took many forms, as reported by the research participants – 
both formal and informal. These included face-to-face meetings, official letters, e-mails 
and telephone calls. This section examines these formal and informal interactions, 
bearing in mind that the information here represents a snapshot view from the time of 
the fieldwork, though there is also evidence that the nature of these interactions 
changed over time (see below). 
Formal interactions 
Previous studies that examine regulatory interactions (Hawkins, 1984; Hutter, 2001; 
Pautz, 2009; Pautz & Wamsley, 2011) have tended to focus on the repeated face-to-face 
interactions between the regulator and the regulated that typify inspection based 
regimes, such as health and safety or environmental protection. Whilst banking services 
regulation also requires the supervisors of regulated entities to meet with 
representatives from regulated organizations, the very nature of banking and prudential 
regulation means that there was very little that is tangible to inspect. The evidence of 
compliance, particularly with prudential regulation, often resides within technology 
systems which contained complex mathematical models to measure risks. Prudential 
regulators such as the PRA, therefore, are reliant on the output of these systems to 
assess the soundness of individual financial institutions and system-wide risks. From its 
inception, the PRA ran a continuous programme of risk assessment78, the intensity of 
which depended on the size, nature and complexity of the bank (Prudential Regulation 
Authority, 2014b). 
As part of this process of continuous assessment, the PRA held a cycle of scheduled 
meetings with actors from the banks who were deemed to be Approved Persons in 
Significant Influence (SI) functions79. The SI functions included Directors, Non-Executive 
                                                 
78 Before the FSA was split into the PRA and the FCA, this continuous risk assessment was known as ARROW 
and the meetings with senior executives were described as ‘close and continuous’ (Financial Services Authority, 
2006a) 
79 This framework was replaced in 2015 by the Senior Manager’s Regime, and the continuous assessment 
process is now conducted with individuals classed as Senior Managers which includes but is not limited to 
CEO, the CFO, the CRO, Heads of Key Business Areas, Head of Internal Audit and the Chairman (Prudential 
Regulation Authority, 2015d) 
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Directors, Heads of Compliance, Money Laundering Reporting, Systems and Controls 
(e.g. Finance and Risk) and Customer Dealing. Of the interviewees in the sample, only 
two people who held senior risk management positions participated in this type of 
meeting. One of these respondents described these meetings as covering both general 
topics and ‘separate deep dives into specific topics’ (Participant 19, 2014) and gave the 
example that the PRA might want ‘to look at what we’re doing if we’re starting to grow 
[a particular area] of business’ (Participant 19, 2014). This respondent also described the 
need to remain flexible in these meetings, saying that: 
‘I don’t do an awful lot of prep, because I think actually, in my role I should naturally 
be able to talk about these things…. If I felt I had to go thoroughly prepped for every 
time I had a conversation with the regulator, I'd actually be challenging myself: … do 
you actually know your job well enough?’ (Participant 19, 2014) 
Formal face-to-face meetings were also held for other purposes, often focusing on a 
particular set of issues identified by the supervisor as part of this ongoing assessment 
process. For example, in one bank there were two teams – one at Group level and one at 
Divisional level – both responsible for the bank’s prudential risk models. These teams 
held regular meetings with the PRA specifically about topics related to the compliance 
of these models. Those meetings would typically involve not only the Line Supervisor 
from the PRA but also members of the PRA’s Risk Specialist teams. 
In other instances, the PRA might be conducting an in-depth thematic review of a 
particular set of products or line of business, which would involve ‘discussions with 
staff, reviews of internal documents and some testing’ (Prudential Regulation Authority, 
2016a, p. 53). Other topics that interviewees mentioned as being on the agenda in 
meetings with the PRA included stress testing, Pillar 2 supervision (see Chapter 3), 
regular reviews of the market risk models and outputs, and cross-industry working 
groups to discuss specific regulatory matters such as risk data aggregation80 and 
prudential rules for securitization. Finally, a respondent from Bank 1 described a day of 
meetings in 2013 to which the bank had invited several of its supervisors from different 
                                                 
80 This was in regard to the implementation of the BCBS paper on Principles for Risk Aggregation and Risk 
Reporting (BCBS, 2013d) which concerned the banks’ ability to centrally combine their risk data to get a single 
view of their exposures to risks across the whole organization. 
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jurisdictions, with the aim of making sure that the regulators understood the business 
model and complexities of the organization: 
‘we have a day for the regulators so they come into London, we have a programme 
for them. They say well, we’d like to spend time with the following people since we are 
in town. We usually start the day with a breakfast meeting with the Chief 
Executive…and then the day proceeds after that, they will then go and meet different 
people across the bank’ (Participant 12, 2014). 
Thus, according to the interviewees, the reasons for the meetings with the PRA were 
wide-ranging and could be initiated by either the bank or the PRA, though the latter 
appeared to be more common. 
Prior to the meetings, the PRA was required to send an agenda, which was often 
accompanied by a request for written information and/or numerical data to be sent to 
them in advance. In all the organizations in the sample, the receipt of this agenda was 
the trigger for two key preparatory activities - the creation of the materials for discussion 
in the meeting and the briefing of the staff that were to attend the meeting (see below). 
Both these activities were usually overseen by the Regulatory Affairs team with input 
from the subject matter experts in the wider organization.  
Formal meetings with the regulators were always attended by representatives from 
Regulatory Affairs in addition to those from other areas of the organization. Minutes 
from these meetings would be taken for internal purposes only, as the PRA would not 
accept or sign-off on these, providing their own summary of the meeting afterwards in 
a formal letter. These letters would cite the PRA’s perspective on the meeting, any 
decisions that had been made and any ensuing concerns that still required resolution. 
One notable aspect of these letters was described by four participants, which was the 
difference between the tone of the meeting and that of the written communication: 
‘They can be perfectly nice in the meeting and they can come back and absolutely 
eviscerate you in a letter’ (Participant 17, 2014). 
One of the interviewees speculated about the reasons for this: 
‘there was always a close-out meeting and a verbal feedback. Of course, they then 
take that - their thesis, if you like, to a [PRA] committee, their recommendations to a 
committee. [The PRA Decision] Committee always ratchets everything up, and it'll look 
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at the letter, and say: you need to toughen up the letter. And therefore there's a big 
jump between the last little bit of verbal feedback you've got, and when the letter 
comes it's always a bit harder and starker’ (Participant 18, 2014). 
Formal interactions with the regulator, therefore, appear to follow a particular protocol 
which was understood by those on both sides of the interaction. From the PRA’s 
perspective, these meetings and formal correspondence were the key mechanisms for 
obtaining information, assessing risks and providing feedback to the firms. For the 
banks (and particularly after the crisis as discussed below) they required significant 
preparatory work but were also an opportunity to educate the regulator about the 
organization. 
Informal interactions 
As might be expected, in addition to the more formal face-to-face or written 
communications outlined above, interviewees also described continuous, informal 
engagement with their line supervisors. The nature of these communications was more 
open-ended, in some instances it was purely administrative – scheduling meetings, 
checking receipt of information, following up on queries or seeking clarification on 
others. Such interactions included regular, weekly telephone calls to check on progress 
on particular issues: 
‘There's no agenda, we just say what's been happening this week, and it's a valve for 
things that they're concerned about or things they've spotted or things they don't 
understand or things that we're fed up about. You know, we can just literally call it 
how it is.’ (Participant 18, 2014) 
In other instances, however, the lack of prescription in these communications allowed 
the regulatory liaison officers and the line supervisors to use them more strategically.  
In one case, a respondent described a situation where the line supervisor had raised a 
concern to him informally regarding an uncooperative bank employee. 
‘I can take that away and say … is it perception, is it reality? If it’s perception, and 
often it can be, it’s just you know we need to be more careful with the style of 
communication. Or actually, do you know what – you two need to get together more 
so that you understand [each other better].’ (Participant 18, 2014) 
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Similarly, this interviewee describes how, if someone in his banking organization had a 
difficult meeting with a specific person from the PRA, he would try to resolve it by  
‘picking up the phone to the supervision team, usually one of the senior ones and say, 
look, I heard about a meeting yesterday that didn’t go terribly well, because of X & Y. 
What did you think of that, what was your impression of that meeting? Could it have 
been better, could we have got a better outcome?’ (Participant 12, 2014) 
These quotes are both taken from individuals who have primary responsibility for the 
relationship with the regulator, they were both keen to resolve any concerns that arose 
in regulatory interactions. This ‘behind the scenes’ work to smooth out tensions in 
regulator-regulated relationships echoes the regulatory literature which suggests that 
co-operative, constructive relations are sought by those on both sides of the interaction 
(McCaffrey et al., 2007; Pautz, 2009; Pautz & Wamsley, 2011; Smith, 2013). From the 
regulator’s perspective, maintaining a co-operative stance is likely to result in more 
effective supervision and regulatory outcomes. From the banks’ perspective, the reasons 
are articulated by this respondent: 
‘So we both [bank and PRA] want the bank to be successful, we do want it to make a 
profit, we are a commercial institution, we want it do the right things by its customers, 
we want the business to be sustainable over the long run, we want to be trusted again, 
we want to be respected in some respect. And we want to be conservatively and 
soundly and prudentially managed, right? So they are the sort of things that we care 
about. So if you are talking to the supervisor, he will say these are the things that as 
a regulator, we want too. The difficulty comes a little bit on what is the path to get to 
some of those things’ (Participant 12, 2014). 
Dynamics of regulatory interactions from 2006 - 2013 
The fundamental need for regulatory interactions does not change over time because 
they are the primary means through which the regulator can determine compliance and, 
in the case of financial services regulation in the UK, assess the risk of individual firms 
to the regulatory objectives. However, as with all relationships, the analysis of the 
interview data revealed that there was also a dynamic aspect to these interactions which 
cannot be separated from the wider political and economic context within which they 
are conducted. This section therefore explores how the nature of these interactions 
between the regulated banks and their prudential supervisors changed between 2006 
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and 201381. This is a critical component of regulatory change, and while less tangible 
than changes to the regulatory rules it nevertheless requires a particular set of skills, 
practices and structures to be managed effectively (see Chapter 5). 
In coding the interview data, three distinct time periods emerged, each demonstrating a 
difference in the nature of the supervisory interactions as illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
Firstly, several (but not all) respondents described the style of regulatory supervision 
prior to the financial crisis. This stage has been labelled ‘light-touch regulation’ and ran 
from 2006 – 2008. The second stage, from 2008 to 2012 was most frequently discussed 
by the interviewees and was characterized by more ‘intrusive and intensive’ supervision. 
Finally, there were some respondents, primarily from the same organization, who 
claimed to have observed some softening in the supervisory approach from roughly the 
end of 2012 onwards82.  
Figure 6.1 Changes in regulatory interactions 2006 - 2013 
 
                                                 
81 Among the interviewees, there was some variance in terms of the length of time they had occupied their 
organizational role. In instances where they had been incumbent for only 2-3 years, observations relating to 
2006-2012 were limited. A number of interviewees who had been in the same role for a number of years also 
discussed supervisory interactions prior to the financial crisis, hence this time period. The timeframe 2006 -
2008 is included as interviewees also offered their opinions of regulatory interactions prior to the crisis. 
82 Whilst these three phases may seem similar to those identified in Chapter 4, it should be noted that in both 
cases, the chronological periods were derived inductively from separate data sets and that no causality or 
relationship between them is implied. 
182 
 
Phase 1 (2006 – 2008) – ‘Light touch regulation’ 
In the ten years between its inception in 1997 and the failure of Northern Rock in 2007, 
the FSA oversaw banking during the ‘great moderation’ (Stock & Watson, 2003). As 
Chapter 3 described, the approach adopted by the FSA to bank supervision was non-
interventionist, risk-based, ‘proportionate’ and based on the assumption that the 
markets were self-correcting and that the banks’ senior management would act 
responsibly to ensure their firms were prudently managed (Financial Services Authority, 
2000, 2003, 2006a, 2007). This style of regulation was referred to by the epithet of ‘light-
touch regulation’. It is not surprising, therefore, that respondents also recalled the FSA 
supervision of their banks at this time as being ‘light touch’. Indeed, Table 6.2 shows 
how various respondents described these ‘collegial relationships’ (McPhilemy, 2013) 
with their supervisors. 
Table 6.2 Interview participants’ descriptions of FSA supervision prior to 2008 
Description Source 
‘regulators were there but didn’t need any 
careful attention’ 
Participant 12 
‘extremely benign’ Participant 12 
‘very, very light touch’ Participant 12 
‘cosy fireside chat’ Participant 19 
‘partnering the banking system rather than 
a watchdog’ 
Participant 20 
‘soft-touch approach’ Participant 20 
‘laissez-faire’ Participant 21 
‘regulatory affairs was a sleepy backwater’ Participant 22 
As a result of these perceptions, the FSA was not considered a particular threat and thus 
bank staff did not dedicate much time or effort to managing their relationships with the 
UK regulator: 
‘It was partly because the bank probably didn’t think regulators were that important, 
they knew they were there. You know, the market, London following the Big Bang, 
quote “the City will self-regulate” unquote. So regulators were there but didn’t need 
any careful attention. That’s very much different now.’ (Participant 12, 2014). 
When banks did pay attention, this respondent continued, there was considerable 
resistance to regulatory requests: 
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‘In the old days, the attitude was very much tell the regulator to go away, stop 
bothering us, why do they want that bit of paper, tell them they can’t have it, you 
know, push back quite a lot.’ (Participant 12, 2014) 
This ability to ‘get away’ with pushing back on the regulator was perhaps one indication 
that the balance of power often lay more with the banks than the supervisor. 
Asymmetries in information and expertise also signified a power imbalance, weighted 
in favour of the banking organizations, resulting in the type of situation described by 
this interviewee: 
‘You’d have had the front office person just phoning up the regulator when they felt 
like it because they could…. the regulatory staff, because they didn’t know as much, 
they would treat our Front Office as gurus and therefore the relationship was skewed 
that way.’ (Participant 2, 2013). 
In terms of the substantive nature of the regulatory interactions at this time, one 
interviewee described how they were either focused either on conduct issues or the 
technical aspects of Basel 2 risk models (see Chapter 3): 
‘Well, 2006/7, it was very laissez faire. The impression you had is that the FSA had a 
conduct agenda and didn't really have a regulatory agenda in the capital space, or in 
liquidity. So really, they saw themselves as the consumer champion...And you knew 
that they were worried about sort of customer treatment, but you were sort of graded 
on the basis of the way you dealt with your customers, not the risk you were running 
or how capitalised you were.….The FSA were very purist. There was a lot about the 
purity of the models. It was a very sort of technical approach’ (Participant 21, 2014) 
The FSA’s focus on conduct of business regulation at the expense of prudential 
regulation was also a finding from the FSA’s investigation into the failure of RBS which 
states that: 
‘A significant amount of Supervision management time was spent on conduct issues, 
for example Treating Customers Fairly (TCF), at a time when the prudential risks faced 
by firms were increasing. This approach also failed adequately to foster the 
development of skills specifically focused on the prudential risks of capital, asset 
quality, balance sheet composition and liquidity’ (Financial Services Authority, 2011a, 
p. 259). 
Similarly, the more recent examination of the failure of HBOS reported that 
‘The process of assessing and validating Basel II models absorbed a very significant 
proportion of the FSA’s specialist prudential risk resource during 2006 and 2007.’ 
(Financial Conduct Authority & Prudential Regulation Authority, 2015, p. 256). 
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Despite the potential bias in these reports (driven by an understandable desire for the 
FSA and then the PRA / FCA to exonerate or minimize the blame attached to themselves), 
they do also give a flavour of the political climate at the time. The continual political 
rhetoric about ‘light-touch’ regulation, these reports claim, constrained the regulator’s 
ability to intervene more forcefully in the banks activities such as scrutinizing bank 
business models (Engelen et al., 2012; Johal et al., 2014). Indeed, when Prime Minister 
Tony Blair publicly criticized the FSA for ‘inhibiting efficient business’ (Blair, 2005), the 
then Chairman of the FSA, Callum McCarthy wrote a letter in response, stating that: 
‘When the FSA embodies so many of the principles you are advocating, it is both 
perplexing and frustrating to be described as an inhibitant to efficient regulation. We 
fully support your desire to see regulation develop in a more common sense, risk-based 
way, with proper consideration of proportionality, costs and benefits’ (McCarthy, 
2005) 
The degree of political restraint placed on the regulator was also commented on by an 
interviewee who described a situation in 2006/7 where the FSA had allowed them to 
structure a transaction in a certain way so as to attract a lower regulatory capital 
requirement. A similar request in 2009 was refused. 
‘The first time round, I thought these guys are idiots. They are just sitting there and 
we’re pulling the wool over their eyes and they’re just letting it happen and they 
probably don’t even understand the issue. Course they understood the issue. They 
really did. And after the crash, they were enabled by their management to articulate 
the fact they understood the issue and that they didn’t approve of it. So in a way, they 
were unleashed from this sort of repression that they lived under, the sort of soft-touch 
approach’ (Participant 21, 2014) 
In this example, the on the ground interactions reflected the pressures and tensions in 
the wider political environment, affecting not only determinations of compliance but 
also how those in the regulated organizations perceived and constructed their opinions 
of the regulators. 
Phase 2 (2009-2010) – more intrusive and intensive supervision 
As noted above and in Chapter 3, political and public sentiment towards the banking 
sector changed substantially in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. The disbanding 
of the FSA and the creation of the PRA and the FCA was typical of the ‘restructuring’ 
strategy used to repair legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) and demonstrated an approach to 
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bank supervision that was ‘less box-ticking and more exercise of judgement’ requiring 
‘an intimate knowledge of what is happening in individual firms’ (HM Treasury & 
Osborne, 2010). 
From the perspective of the banks, these shifts in supervisory style was not merely 
rhetorical, resulting in a noticeable change to regulatory interactions, described by the 
respondents in the terms depicted in Table 6.3. 
 
 
Table 6.3 Terms used to describe change in supervisory approach (2008 onwards) 
Term No. of References No. of Sources 
Intrusive 13 6 
Robust 6 2 
Challenging 3 3 
Demanding 3 3 
Tougher 3 3 
Assertive 3 3 
“have more teeth” 2 2 
Intensive 2 1 
Serious 1 1 
The interview participants described how this tougher mode of regulation manifested 
itself in four key changes to their regulatory interactions. First, there was an increase in 
the level of regulatory communications, in terms of frequency and quality, bolstered by 
the increasing size and greater skills of the supervisory teams. Second, the regulator was 
demanding more information from the banks. Not only was a greater volume of data 
required, the scope of that data was wider and deeper than before, encompassing 
‘everything from the balance sheet to the assets we put on the balance sheet, and how 
we run things, capital, liquidity, funding, risk management’ (Participant 12, 2014). A 
third, more subtle change was exhibited by the change in tone in regulatory meetings. 
These interactions were described as ‘more formal’ (Participant 6, 2013; Participant 17, 
2014), ‘less friendly’ (Participant 13, 2014) and even a ‘bit stiff’ (Participant 18, 2014). In 
fewer and more extreme cases, relations had soured to the point that ‘the tone of the 
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meetings was very hostile indeed, more so the more senior the person’ (Participant 10, 
2014). Others described their engagement with the regulator as harsh, tense or 
uncomfortable without being overtly hostile. Finally, the regulator’s tougher stance was 
revealed in the FSA and then PRA’s lack of willingness to enter into dialogue in terms of 
providing ex ante guidance, rule interpretation advice or wider consultations with the 
industry83.  
Young (2013) reports similar findings in his study of the post-crisis lobbying activities 
of financial trade associations. He describes how lobbyists struggled to get the same 
level of access to policy-makers in international fora as they had previously experienced. 
An example of this occurred in December 2013, when Michel Barnier, the European 
Commissioner responsible for overseeing banking reform banned all meetings between 
bank representatives and his staff (Wilson, 2013). In addition, in parallel with the 
findings above, Young found that the style of interactions changed:  
‘dialogue between regulators and financial industry groups not only became more 
formal and more restricted, but financial industry groups learned of new policy 
changes at a much later stage than they had in the past’ (Young, 2013, p. 463) 
Despite this apparent one-sidedness in regulatory discussions, the banks were not 
passive participants in these interactions. On the contrary, some banks, (or teams or 
individuals within banks) actively sought to change the nature of these interactions via 
a number of mechanisms. Such mechanisms included the types of structural changes 
described in Chapter 5, such as the creation of teams specifically to manage regulatory 
relationships, headed by ex-FSA staff. Other, more subtle signifiers of an attitudinal 
change were apparent in the reduced resistance to regulatory decisions and requests, 
the increased level of scrutiny the banks paid to the materials and information they 
shared with the regulator, and more careful consideration and planning in advance of 
regulatory meetings. As this interviewee describes, banks were a lot less likely to 
challenge the regulator:  
                                                 
83 The FSA and PRA still complied with their statutory duty to issue consultation papers, but one respondent 
described this a ‘they tend to be making statements and it might be called a consultation paper but it’s not, 
this is how it’s going to be’ (Participant 3, 2013) 
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‘It is slightly different for every firm in terms of how assertive they can be, but there’s 
definitely a change in the balance. I went to a round table at the PRA earlier this week 
so you see all the firms and you can have lots of bilateral conversations but you do 
have a few panels like that and there isn’t a lot of push back to things that the 
regulator is asking for even though they are being a lot more demanding’ (Participant 
8, 2013) 
Responses from the interview participants suggested that the preparation of regulatory 
materials to be sent in advance of the meetings or discussed during the meetings was 
given considerable attention. In terms of the formal meetings, nearly all the 
respondents84 who attended such events said that they prepared written materials in 
advance: 
‘We go with a lot of paper. Generally, it's sort of getting well prepared. We had quite 
a good meeting with them when they wanted to understand the results, so we got 
together a couple of colleagues, who are really involved in the MI [management 
information] side, and they wanted to know quite a lot about business drivers. And we 
went with a detailed deck of information and they loved it’ (Participant 21, 2014) 
Another interviewee described how these materials were of the same presentational 
standard they would use for client meetings. Others emphasized the need for the 
information contained within to be accurate, with any underlying assumptions explained 
clearly and consistently. On occasion, the meeting materials would be created by people 
who were not going to attend the meetings. In these instances, the regulatory liaison 
teams would provide direction as to the style and content of the presentation:  
‘We were given some guidance from the team that interacted mostly with the regulator 
as to these are perhaps things that you might want to make sure are in the pack or 
make sure you mention these particular aspects because that is what the regulator 
would ask about so if you could include it in the pack in advance that would be helpful.’ 
(Participant 9, 2013) 
Those organizational members that interacted most frequently with the regulator were 
responsible for ensuring that the information taken to regulatory meetings was 
appropriate. 
‘So invariably, the modelling teams will put [the presentation] together, and they are 
very smart and very good and some are good at communicating. And then we’ll do a 
                                                 
84 There were two exceptions to this, interviewees who tended to meet with the PRA as part of the Continuous 
Assessment Programme. They both felt that it was part of their role and level of seniority to be able to answer 
the regulators’ questions without having to do a lot of advance preparation (Participants 20 and 21). 
188 
 
review with the team, with us to go through and go okay, is this the right message. 
And sometimes they are being a little bit pointy and they think that the PRA continues 
to make silly decisions as far as their models are concerned and I get that because 
they are modellers and they want their models to be ‘pure’ and ‘beautiful’ as they call 
it sometimes.’ (Participant 3, 2013) 
Representatives from all five banks in the sample stressed their objective was to be open 
and transparent with the regulator, and that providing them with plenty of information 
about their organization was one way to achieve this.  
‘It’s a requirement to get information so they can understand what’s going on in the 
business that they don’t live and breathe on a daily basis so it’s only natural that some 
of the more complex areas are going to need review and challenge and follow up.’ 
(Participant 5, 2013) 
Underlying this co-operative sharing of organizational knowledge, however, was another 
motive. Several respondents reported that they felt that the regulator demonstrated a 
lack of understanding of their business, which manifested itself in asking what the banks 
deemed as the ‘wrong’ questions or becoming very pedantic about minor issues. To 
overcome this or to ‘steer’ the regulator in the right direction:  
‘We make sure we do a lot of talking and we give them a lot of information. But that 
requires constant monitoring, I would say. You can't rely on it, and it doesn't happen 
by magic, and we have to be helpful, we have to offer to bring them in to look at 
things, and teach them, and help them to be better.’ (Participant 18, 2014). 
In constructing the responses to ad hoc information requests (which generally tended 
to require numerical data, such as credit risk exposures for a particular type of 
customer), the respondents emphasized that their priority was to provide complete and 
accurate data, rather than ensuring the information contained a particular message or 
messages: 
‘Message management - much more basic is it actually in a state fit for the objective 
in itself. That’s not necessarily management, there’s something slightly negative about 
message management. The review is actually is it accurate or can you put everything 
into words. If you can’t well is it actually sufficiently accurate to give an appropriate 
description of what is happening on the ground.’ (Participant 1, 2013) 
This assertion was reiterated by this interviewee from a different bank who, as part of 
his role, was responsible for signing-off on information request responses before they 
were sent to the regulator: 
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‘I'm far more worried about the content being accurate and appropriate than I am 
about the language.’ (Participant 17, 2014) 
Preparing or briefing staff to meet with the regulator also appeared to be taken seriously 
by the banks in the interview sample. Employees who were briefed ranged from more 
junior employees who are not usually involved in such interactions through to the most 
senior members of the organization. Ahead of the scheduled meetings, preparatory 
materials would be produced and discussed in pre-meeting briefings: 
‘My team would write up the briefing, so the briefing would be written, … sent to the 
Chairman a few days in advance. I’d go and see the Chairman ahead of it and say is 
there anything you want to discuss, anything we should go over, anything that isn’t 
clear, and then the meeting itself.’ (Participant 12, 2014) 
In addition to these written briefs (which tended to focus on the substantive content of 
the meeting agenda), respondents described how they coached their colleagues in the 
‘softer’ aspects of behaviour in meetings with the regulator. This unwritten ‘code of 
conduct’ included communicating clearly and concisely, not answering questions if the 
employee did not know the answer, not bringing in papers to the meeting that staff 
member would be reluctant to share with the supervisory staff and treating the 
regulatory personnel with professional respect and courtesy (Participant 9, 2013; 
Participant 19, 2014).  
The respondents also described how they were careful about who was meeting with the 
regulator. In one bank, there was a formal regulatory contact policy, ‘which sort of sets 
out some ground rules and it lists those people who are acknowledged as being people 
who can speak to the regulators’ (Participant 18, 2014). In other organizations, there was 
not such a formal approach but nevertheless, there was a degree of mindfulness about 
the most appropriate people to meet with the regulator: 
‘We also changed who the regulators were meeting with and who was preparing the 
information. It used to be very technical people, the quantitative people responsible 
for the methodology or the IT systems people but we needed to communicate in a way 
the regulator could understand and also to frame the documentation appropriately 
and professionally.’ (Participant 10, 2014) 
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Another respondent describes how the bank itself had become more guarded and more 
formal in the management of the regulatory relationship over this period but that this 
had not happened as part of a formal edict. Rather, it was more of an implicit 
understanding that ‘we are going to be more careful with the regulator’ (Participant 17, 
2014). Not only did this manifest in the formalization of communications on behalf of 
the bank, the organization also hired an ex-regulator to act as the ‘gatekeeper’ between 
the bank and the supervisor. This need to be ‘more careful’ with the regulator could be 
viewed as a direct reaction to the tougher supervisory stance but the data shows that 
there was also a realization on behalf of the banks that in the post-crisis context, they 
had less ‘political capital’ and even perhaps credibility and had to pay more attention to 
their supervisors. 
In their discussions of the relationships with their regulatory counterparts, the 
respondents displayed a fairly sophisticated level of understanding of the FSA/PRA85 as 
an organization. These observations were not limited to interviewees who had previously 
worked for the regulator, and included respondents who generally had fewer dealings 
with the supervisory team. Respondents recognized that their supervisors were also 
operating in a challenging environment and that this might have a bearing on their 
regulatory interactions: 
‘We understand that the regulators have a lot of political pressure being put on them 
to actually prove that they are doing their jobs properly and I think that does come 
out in terms of those discussions and the points we see being pushed back to us in 
various technical or close and continuous reviews on points which we might see as 
being fairly pedantic.’ (Participant 5, 2013) 
In addition, several respondents suggested that the internal culture of the FSA/PRA 
provided some constraints on how the supervisors were able to interact with the 
regulated organizations: 
‘the people that we deal with at the PRA, it’s not their idea, and they don’t have the 
freedom to navigate away from it, they can interpret a bit, the breadth but the 
                                                 
85 Despite this understanding, interviewees usually referred to the FSA / PRA as just ‘the regulator’ and did 
not often make a distinction between the two organizations. This was largely due to the Lead Supervisors and 
other supervisory staff comprising the same individuals after the PRA was created. 
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fundamental kind of objective is being imposed on them as much as it is on us and to 
be honest it’s, you’ve got to see the bigger picture’ (Participant 8, 2013) 
Finally, as this participant explains, the less tangible aspects of the interactions are 
analyzed on both sides of the relationship which will then inform their next interaction:  
‘Every time they see you they're judging you. Every time, every interaction is a 
judgement, and everyone needs to remember that. Just as we - we do the same. They 
walk in the door and when they leave we talk about them. You analyse everybody. 
They're doing that. The difference for them is that of course they take it away and it 
informs their supervisory strategy.’ (Participant 18, 2014). 
These perceptions of the culture and working practices of the FSA/PRA, whether 
accurate or not, demonstrate how actors from regulated organizations construct a 
picture or identity of those who regulate them. Gray and Silbey (2014) discovered that 
organizational ‘actors continually engage in interpretive processes concerning the 
relevance, competence, and power of regulators as they assess what constitutes 
compliance with governing norms’ (Gray & Silbey, 2014, p. 99). Such interpretive 
processes in this case gave rise to varied descriptions of the regulator such as ‘asking 
more challenging questions’ (Participant 3, 2013), ‘they are being more demanding’ 
(Participant 3, 2013), ‘they do struggle getting in enough good people’ (Participant 21, 
2014), ‘some regulators can’t quite distinguish between being tough and actually being 
slightly rude’ (Participant 21, 2014). 
Actors within the banks experienced a more intrusive supervisory approach, manifested 
in increased levels of contact and more demanding questions. This led to a 
(re)construction of the identity of the supervisors from the FSA/PRA as being tougher 
and having ‘more teeth’ than previously. In response, bank staff more deliberately 
constructed information and meeting materials and paid more attention to the 
behavioural aspects of face-to-face interactions. This in turn can be construed as bank 
actors working to construct an identity for their organizations, an identity derived from 
the institutional logic of regulation – a ‘regulatory identity’. 
During this second stage, then, there were significant shifts in the nature of the 
regulatory interactions. A tougher, more assertive stance on behalf of the regulators was 
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met by an increase in co-operation and more deliberate construction of regulatory 
information by the banks. Increased formality on both sides of these interactions meant 
that greater preparation was required and more thought given to who should be involved 
in these interactions. Whilst there is not enough data here to make strong claims, for 
the banks in the sample, it seems as if the motivation for doing so was to provide 
information that was correct, accurate and not misleading rather than presenting a 
particular version of the truth. It would appear that adaptations were being made in 
response to the ‘relational signals’ transmitted by the parties on both sides of the 
regulatory dyad (Etienne, 2012). This claim is provisional only, however, because the 
scope of the study necessarily excluded collecting data from the regulator.  
Phase 3 2012 – 2014 – tentative regulatory softening? 
A final shift in regulatory relationships was only identified by interviewees from one 
organization in the sample, though a handful of other respondents did remark on a 
continuing improvement in the relationship with their supervisors and greater levels of 
reciprocal trust. In this one bank, however, there were some tentative signs of regulatory 
softening in relation to two specific programmes of work dedicated to remediating 
specific regulatory problems. 
Members of a risk management team in the wholesale division of this bank had 
experienced some very problematic interactions with the regulator. These concerned a 
Basel 2 internal risk model that had previously been approved but had then been 
determined to be non-compliant by the FSA (and then PRA)86. A member of that team 
describes how this relationship had improved since 2012: 
‘Over this two year period, that relationship has dramatically changed, actually to the 
extent that they’ve even allowed us now to turn on our models for our capital 
calculations’ (Participant 4, 2013). 
He attributed this softening of relations partly to the actions that the team itself had 
taken over that period of time: 
                                                 
86 This was also indicative of the participants’ observation that the PRA had tightened the interpretation 
regarding existing rules as well as implementing newer, more stringent regulations. 
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‘There’s actually a real distinct change in the trust level they have. They’ve looked 
back over the last two years and they can see that senior stakeholders were brought 
in, the programme lead was very serious about achieving what needed to be achieved 
and they’ve got a level of trust back that says okay we’ve seen how you do, we’ve seen 
how you’ve become that professional in doing it.’ (Participant 4, 2013) 
In this case, the bank demonstrated substantive changes in response to issues raised by 
the regulator. Risk models were amended, senior management involvement was 
increased, the change programme received additional funding and engaged in a large 
programme of training and education. It is worth noting, however, that the benefits to 
the organization from all this work included a significant reduction in regulatory capital 
levels which once again raises the question of motivation and whether it is of concern 
that substantive changes are the result of actions driven more by market logic than 
regulatory logic. 
So, at the end of the fieldwork period, for one bank at least, it appears that regulatory 
relationships were showing signs of improvement, implying some restoration of 
‘regulatory endorsement’ (Suchman, 1995). This bank attributed this softening in part 
to the increased efforts they had put in to managing these regulatory interactions, and 
to their own changes in approach to the regulator. This lends further credence to the 
idea that adaptions occur during regulatory interactions and that active ‘management’ 
of a bank’s regulatory identity can contribute to improvements in a bank’s relationship 
with its supervisor. 
However, this particular bank’s experience appears to be unique, as none of the other 
interviewees described any concessions being made by the regulators. One possible 
explanation is that this final stage also coincided with revelations of financial 
misconduct such as the manipulation of LIBOR and foreign exchange rates. Such 
misdeeds contravened conduct of business regulation and thus were the responsibility 
of the FCA and not the PRA. Nevertheless, these events once again increased the political 
salience of the financial industry and the need for additional regulatory reform. 
Moreover, whatever work the banks were doing to repair their legitimacy could have 
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been hindered by these very public scandals. In such a climate, it would be unlikely for 
supervisors to reduce their level of scrutiny. 
Discussion 
The examination of the regulatory interactions between the prudential regulator and the 
regulated banks presented here leads to three key arguments. The first argument is that 
there are multiple actors involved in these interactions and that the type and nature of 
these interactions can vary widely. The second is that by interrogating the day-to-day 
relationships between the regulators and the regulated, it is clear that such interactions 
are not immune to events in the wider political and social environment. Finally, the 
evidence with regards to the changing nature of regulatory interactions following the 
financial crisis indicates that through interpretive processes, actors participating in 
these interactions were actively constructing not only the identity of the regulator and 
particular supervisors, they were also engaged in actively constructing the regulatory 
identity of their own banking organization. 
As Chapter 5 demonstrated, banks are highly complex organizations and responsibilities 
for managing different aspects of regulatory change are fragmented. At the same time, 
the PRA’s continuous assessment programme and other thematic reviews require 
interactions with multiple actors within the banking organizations. In addition, the PRA 
itself consists of teams with varying types of expertise as well as the line supervisors, 
so formal meetings with banks may also be attended by policy or risk specialists. 
Variations in actors and reasons for regulatory interactions will obviously lead to 
differentiated experiences of these interactions. More problematically for the regulated 
organizations, however, it can result in inaccurate or misleading responses to questions 
because of the PRA’s perceived ‘scattergun’ approach which in turn emphasizes the need 
for more centralized ways of managing regulatory communications. Those that are 
responsible for these interactions play an important role in smoothing over the tensions 
that can arise in regulatory relationships due to differing understandings, 
interpretations of information or other miscommunications. Their overriding aim here 
appeared to be promoting co-operative and constructive relations, adding credence to 
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the claims that trust-based relationships can result in beneficial regulatory outcomes 
(Pautz, 2009; Pautz & Wamsley, 2011) but also suggesting that relationships on this basis 
also benefit the regulatees. 
Having said that, regulatory interactions do not occur in a vacuum. Accounts of the 
changing nature of regulatory interactions since the financial crisis indicated the 
influence that the wider political environment had when banks and supervisors met. 
Indeed, the interface between the regulated and the regulator can perhaps be viewed as 
the arena where wider power and legitimacy struggles with regards to the financial 
industry and the state are enacted on a day-to-day basis. Before the financial crisis, in 
the era of the ‘great moderation’ and light-touch regulation, comparatively little time 
and effort was dedicated to managing regulatory relationships and bank employees may 
have perceived their organizations to have the upper hand in terms of expertise and 
skills. However, the increased political salience of regulation after the crisis created a 
situation where regulators had to be seen to be tougher on banks and despite interacting 
with exactly the same individuals as before the crisis, this was clearly evident to the 
bankers on the ground in their post-crisis regulatory relationships. In response to the 
increased supervisory scrutiny they were experiencing, actors within the banks began to 
pay more attention to their regulatory encounters, carefully crafting presentation 
materials and preparing staff for meetings. According to the interviewees, this was 
motivated by a desire to be open, transparent and honest, once again in the hope of 
developing co-operative and constructive working relationships. In one case, it seemed 
as if this approach had worked to rebuild trust with the regulator, manifested by 
achieving regulatory approval for a more advanced risk model that resulted in a lower 
capital requirement. However, there were limited signs of the supervisory approach 
softening in general, especially given the other examples of financial misconduct that 
emerged from 2012 onwards.  
The final argument this chapter presents is that through these ongoing regulatory 
interactions which are influenced by events in the wider environment, actors within 
regulated organizations actively construct not only the identity of their regulators, but 
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also the ‘regulatory identity’ of their own organization. Black (2002b) emphasizes the 
role that communicative interactions play in understanding the dynamics of the 
regulatory regime in general and the creation of identities in particular (Black, 1998, 
2002b, 2008a). 
‘In relation to regulation, identity matters because it affects how individuals and 
organizations are viewed and thus responses to them, and because it affects action, 
for example, agenda setting or policy positioning.’ (Black, 2002, p. 183) 
Analytically (and empirically in three out of four cases), Black suggests that there are 
four possible variants in regulatory identity construction within the regulator/ regulatee 
dyad as shown by Figure 6.2.  
Figure 6.2 Regulatory identity construction flows 
 
The first is that the regulator constructs its identity vis-à-vis the organizations that it 
regulates (1), as envisaged by responsive regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), which 
supposes that the regulator will deliberately portray itself in a particular manner (such 
as a ‘benign big gun’) to influence the compliance behaviour of the regulated 
organization. Secondly, regulators will construct the identity of those they are regulating 
(2). Firms may be classified according to their perceived dispositions towards 
compliance with regulation. Various typologies have been offered either theoretically or 
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as a result of empirical studies (Baldwin, 1995; Kagan & Scholz, 1984). Third, through 
their interactions with the regulator, regulatees construct their own understandings of 
the regulator. Gray and Silbey (2014) have identified three variations in how regulators 
might be constructed – as ‘threat, ‘ally’ or ‘obstacle’. Finally, regulated organizations 
(and the actors within those organizations) construct their own identity with regards to 
regulation (4).  
Analysis of the interview data described above demonstrated that actors within the 
banks interpreted the conversations and non-verbal aspects of their regulatory 
interactions to construct identities of the bank supervisors and the PRA as a whole. 
These varied between organizational actors and between organizations but there is not 
enough data in this study to develop a systematic typology as per Gray and Silbey (2014). 
What is interesting here, however, is that bank staff make adaptions in relation to the 
identities of the regulator that they construct. If, for example, he or she considered that 
a particular supervisor did not have a good enough understanding of the bank’s 
business, that bank employee would arrange meetings especially designed to educate 
the regulator. These adaptions themselves are a process of identity construction, but in 
this case, the actors within the bank are constructing the organization’s own regulatory 
identity. Based on the descriptions provided by the interviewees, these individuals are 
hoping that the work they are doing projects a regulatory identity characterized by 
openness, trust, honesty, co-operation and a willingness to achieve compliance with the 
new regulatory rules, an identity commensurate with the organizing principles of 
regulatory logic. 
Of course, the majority of the interview respondents occupied organizational positions 
where they were primarily responsible for keeping a check on the Front Office (such as 
Risk or Finance) or for managing regulatory change. Whether this commitment to 
fostering positive regulatory relations and institutionalizing a culture of prudential 
regulatory compliance persisted throughout the organization is another question and is 
addressed in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7:  Institutionalization of prudential regulation? 
Since the financial crisis, and the more recent catalogue of financial misdemeanors such 
as LIBOR and foreign exchange rate manipulation, the issue of culture in the financial 
industry has come to the fore (Future of Banking Commission, 2010; Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards, 2013a, 2013b; Salz, 2013; Spicer et al., 2014). Whilst 
some of the focus has been on how to improve conduct and encourage ethical behaviour, 
there has also been a significant amount of attention paid to improving ‘risk culture’ 
within banks (BCBS, 2015; Financial Stability Board, 2014; Power, Ashby, & Palermo, 
2013). The Basel Committee defines risk culture as: 
‘A bank’s norms, attitudes and behaviours related to risk awareness, risk-taking and 
risk management, and controls that shape decisions on risks. Risk culture influences 
the decisions of management and employees during the day-to-day activities and 
has an impact on the risks they assume.’ (BCBS, 2015, p. 2)  
Neo-institutional scholars would recognize ‘norms, attitudes and behaviours’ as 
significant cultural aspects of institutions (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2), the persistence 
of which relies on the process of institutionalization (Zucker, 1977). 
Accounts of institutionalization found in organizational theory (Jepperson, 1991; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1999; Zucker, 1977) rest on an assumption that what is being 
institutionalized is stable and unchanging. However, investigating the possibilities for 
the institutionalization of prudential regulation and its underlying logic within banks 
must take into consideration the dynamic nature of the regulatory environment. As 
previous chapters have demonstrated, not only was there a raft of new prudential 
regulations, the regulatory architecture in the UK was overhauled, the supervisory 
approach intensified, supervisors raised their expectations of regulatory compliance and 
there was a fundamental change in the underlying regulatory philosophy towards the 
management of systemic risk. All these changes constituted a significant shift in the 
underlying regulatory logic, away from a belief in the discipline of the market towards 
more stringent capital regulations, macro-prudential regulation and a more 
interventionist attitude. Whilst it has long been the case for regulated organizations that 
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they must balance regulatory demands with the pressures stemming from the market 
imperative, the variation in banks’ responses to regulatory change demonstrated that 
achieving this balance is made more problematic by the uncertainty associated with the 
post-crisis regulatory environment.  
The regulatory ideal of achieving the full integration of regulatory requirements within 
the business corporation is only possible with specific types of regulatory techniques 
and enforcement strategies. As opposed to traditional ‘command and control’ 
regulation, techniques such as enforced self-regulation (Braithwaite, 1982; Hutter, 2001), 
management-based regulation (Coglianese & Lazer, 2003), and meta-regulation, (Gilad, 
2010) aim to ‘harness the regulatory power of the company and become an integral part 
of corporate life’ (Hutter, 2001, p. 295). Here, the regulator assumes more of a 
monitoring and oversight role, with the expectation that firms will devise their own 
compliant risk management systems and processes specific to their particular 
circumstances. Prudential regulation in the guise of Basel 2, Basel 3 and the respective 
European Capital Directives, has been cited as an exemplar of this type of regulation 
(Black, 2012a; Ford, 2010; Power, 2007). Rigorous and effective risk management and 
commensurate levels of regulatory capital are considered critical to meeting the 
overarching regulatory objective of the stability and soundness of the global financial 
system. 
As Chapters 4 and 5 illustrated, this regulatory objective can be in tension with the 
governing logic of the market, where the goal of delivering ‘shareholder value’ through 
increased profitability proliferates. Nonetheless, Chapters Five and Six also show the 
increasing amount of time, people and money that banks were devoting to managing the 
complexity and uncertainty of regulatory change in the post-crisis environment. In 
particular, Chapter 5 suggests that there are organizational practices where the logics 
of the market and regulation can be reconciled, such as in the setting of risk appetite. 
This chapter aims to explore the interplay of market and regulatory logics to ascertain 
whether there are broader indications of achieving a balance between the two whereby 
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banks accept that regulatory rules and their associated practices must now become part 
and parcel of ‘business as usual’. 
This chapter also seeks to understand the process of regulatory institutionalization 
more deeply, drawing on both neo-institutional theory and models from regulatory 
literature. The data from the qualitative interviews is used to develop a series of 
indicators; empirical factors that indicate the degree of regulatory institutionalization. 
These include not only the organizational changes necessary for regulatory compliance 
but also less tangible indicators such as attitudinal and cultural shifts. Then, the 
endogenous and exogenous conditions which can either inhibit or facilitate the 
institutionalization of regulation are examined. The implications of these findings for 
theoretical understanding of the institutionalization process are discussed and, given 
the complexity and scale of financial regulatory reform since 2008 and the high levels 
of associated uncertainty, the chapter concludes by examining whether regulatory 
institutionalization is even possible under such circumstances. 
Prudential regulation as management-based regulation 
At its core, prudential regulation has an institutionalizing ambition with respect to 
financial risk management practices within the banking industry. This is typical of meta-
regulatory regimes, such as health and safety (Gunningham, 2007; Gunningham & 
Sinclair, 2009; Hutter, 2001), food safety (Coglianese & Lazer, 2003) and environmental 
protection (Coglianese & Nash, 2006). Chapter 3 explained that the introduction of Basel 
2 was not just intended to increase the sensitivity of risk measurement for the 
calculation of capital ratios, it also aimed to improve risk management practices 
throughout the global banking industry. This was not to be achieved through detailed, 
prescriptive rules, but by banks designing and operating risk management policies, 
systems and practices in line with broad regulatory expectations. In other words, the 
objective was for ‘good’ risk management to be embedded (or institutionalized) in the 
core operations of banking organizations and for organizations to take responsibility 
for their own risk management practices. 
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Evidence of the institutionalizing ambitions of the BCBS can be found in the rules 
themselves. For example, Basel 2 sets out the minimum requirements for banks wishing 
to use the advanced calculations for credit risk, including requirements for the design 
and operation of the rating system, corporate governance and oversight, how internal 
ratings should be used, how risk should be quantified and the validation process for 
internal estimates of parameters (BCBS, 2006b, pp. 88-91). 
In respect of the banks’ internal estimates of risk, the BCBS introduced the principle of 
the ‘Use Test’. Put simply, this required banks to not only use the risk estimates that 
were produced to calculate their regulatory capital ratios but to also incorporate them 
into the day-to-day business of the bank, such as ’strategy and planning processes, credit 
exposure management and reporting’ (BCBS, 2006a). The Basel Committee’s guidance on 
the Use Test explains why this is necessary: 
‘The IRB [Internal Ratings Based]87 use test is based on the conception that supervisors 
can take additional comfort in the IRB components where such components “play an 
essential role” in how banks measure and manage risk in their businesses. If the IRB 
components are solely used for regulatory capital purposes, there could be incentives 
to minimise capital requirements rather than produce accurate measurement of the 
IRB components and the resultant capital requirement. Moreover, if IRB components 
were used for regulatory purposes only, banks would have fewer internal incentives 
to keep them accurate and up-to-date, whereas the employment of IRB components in 
internal decision-making creates an automatic incentive to ensure sufficient quality 
and adequate robustness of the systems that produce such data.’ (BCBS, 2006a, p. 2) 
The point here is that the institutionalization of the regulations was not only an explicit 
regulatory objective, but also critical to achieving the overarching regulatory goal of the 
safety and soundness of the financial system. The global financial crisis revealed the 
significant flaws in the Basel 2 rules (Financial Services Authority, 2009e; Larosière, 
2009; Tarullo, 2008) and, it has been argued, meta-regulation as a technique of 
regulatory governance (Black, 2012a; Ford, 2010). The Basel Committee responded by 
immediately introducing changes to the rules for calculating capital for securitization 
products and market risk (known as Basel 2.5) and then making more fundamental 
changes in the introduction of Basel 3. To recap, these revisions increased the quantum 
                                                 
87 Internal Ratings Based is the name for the more advanced modelling approach for calculating credit risk 
parameters, using the banks’ own risk models.  
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and quality of regulatory capital (including counter-cyclical capital buffers), introduced 
a leverage ratio and new rules for measuring and monitoring of liquidity risk. What they 
did not do, however, was fundamentally change the way in which banks were required 
to calculate capital for credit risk88 or indeed the operational requirements for risk 
management practices within banks. 
In addition to these rule changes, the BCBS also emphasized the importance of culture 
to the soundness of bank governance: 
‘A demonstrated corporate culture that supports and provides appropriate norms and 
incentives for professional and responsible behavior is an essential foundation of good 
governance’ (BCBS, 2010e, p. 16) 
Echoing this international perspective, in 2014 the PRA released a policy statement on 
how it would use its powers to address cultural failings in financial firms. The PRA 
explicitly states that it ‘does not have a particular “right culture” in mind’ but does state 
what would be indicators of cultural failings including weak risk management controls 
and practices (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014e, p. 3). Prudential regulation 
therefore explicitly acknowledges that not only are the rules themselves important, there 
must also be an accompanying culture of adequate risk management within banking 
organizations, which requires not only the letter of the prudential rules to penetrate to 
the core of the bank, but also the spirit. 
Models of institutionalization 
This chapter draws on both the wider theoretical understanding of institutionalization 
found in neo-institutional organizational literature and models of the 
institutionalization of regulation or compliance systems specifically. Typically, in the 
former, institutionalization is described as the ‘process by which individual actors 
transmit what is socially defined as real’ (Zucker, 1977, p. 728). Whilst the degree to 
which social knowledge, processes and structures become institutionalized over time 
can vary, Zucker (1977) contends that the greater the degree of institutionalization 
                                                 
88 Some changes were introduced to the way that banks calculate counterparty credit risk which is a sub-set of 
credit risk 
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(measured in terms of objectivity and exteriority), the lower the dependence on social 
control for maintenance.  
Developing this idea in terms of regulatory logic, it would therefore follow that the more 
regulation can be institutionalized as a day-to-day, taken for granted aspect of 
organizational life, the more success the regulator will have in ensuring compliance with 
that regulation. This understanding is at the heart of management-based regulatory 
techniques which require organizations to design, build and operate corporate 
compliance frameworks in line with broadly specified regulatory requirements.  
In her work on corporate compliance, Hutter (2001) researched the risk management 
systems that were implemented to manage health and safety on the British Railways. 
This in-depth study resulted in the development of a conceptual model of corporate 
responsiveness to regulation which describes the phases or stages involved in the 
institutionalization of regulation within an organization. The first stage, ‘design and 
establishment’ consists of activities such as participation in regulatory consultations, 
designing new organizational structures and processes, developing plans for change 
programmes and training and communication activities relating to new regulations. The 
second ‘operational’ stage sees these plans being put into action within the organization, 
the systems and process changes are made and become part of ‘business as usual’ and 
the awareness of, and compliance with, risk management spreads throughout the 
organization. The final ‘normalization’ stage is achieved when ‘risk management and 
regulatory compliance are fully integrated parts of the corporate culture’ (Hutter, 2001, 
p. 302). Two characteristics of this model are important to note. Firstly, this model was 
designed as a heuristic device to better understand the process of regulatory 
institutionalization, and it is on this basis that the model is used in this study. Secondly, 
Hutter emphasizes that the model is not unilinear, with an organization moving 
‘forwards’ from one stage to the next (Hutter, 2001, p. 304). Organizations may also 
move backwards and may even miss a stage as they do so. 
A similar three stage model of the ‘institutionalization of integrity’ in corporations was 
developed by Parker (2002) and identified initial senior management commitment to 
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compliance as an important first stage. This is then followed by the ‘acquisition of 
specialized skills and knowledge’ (Parker, 2002, p. 58) usually (but not always) in the 
form of dedicated compliance professionals. Finally, regulatory responsibilities are 
integrated into operating procedures and performance appraisals of those working in 
the wider organization. 
Gilad (2011) uses both these ‘professionally-centred’ models of regulatory 
institutionalization to consider the implementation of the FSA’s Treating Customers 
Fairly (TCF)89 initiative. Gilad found that, in contrast to both Hutter and Parker’s models, 
there was participation not only from compliance professionals but also the wider 
business in the initial design and management of the TCF programmes in the banks. 
Where Gilad’s study differs from both Hutter and Parker’s models is the finding that  
‘whenever regulatory demands require firms to make fundamental changes to their 
operations – in terms of scope, expenditure, norms, or practices – firms will be 
driven, once they feel compelled to act, to delegate primary responsibility for the 
implementation, and possibly also for the design and evaluation of compliance to 
managers outside compliance and down the organizational hierarchy. This is 
because compliance officers are likely to lack the resources, power, and legitimized 
authority to drive such change on their own’ (Gilad, 2011, p. 326) 
Hutter’s model was used to inform the analysis of prudential regulation in this study 
because it features much thicker descriptions of the characteristics and activities 
associated with each of the three stages. However, the idea of senior management 
commitment, the introduction of specialist compliance professionals and the integration 
of regulatory requirements into performance appraisals were taken from Parker’s work. 
Finally, Gilad’s idea that involving the wider organization could occur in the earlier 
stages of the institutionalization process was also considered when analyzing and 
coding the interview data.  
Hutter and Gilad’s empirical investigations demonstrated that the process of 
institutionalization is not straightforward in a relatively stable environment. The 
                                                 
89 Treating Customers Fairly is a regulatory principle designed to improve the way that financial firms in the 
UK conduct their business with regards to their retail customers. It aims to ensure customers fully understand 
the features of the products they buy and to minimise the sale of unsuitable products. TCF was introduced by 
the FSA in 2007 and continues to be a requirement for all firms regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. 
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significant levels of change in the regulatory environment of the banks in the UK created 
a moving target, not only in terms of the regulatory rules but also in the supervisory 
approach and relationships and thus, the institutionalization of regulatory logic was 
even more difficult. The situation was made even more complex because during the 
period of fieldwork, banks were using both the existing Basel 2 rules to calculate their 
regulatory capital on an ongoing basis as well as making preparations to meet the new 
Basel 3 requirements.  
Thus, at the time this research was conducted, there were two overlapping sets of 
regulations at different stages in the regulatory lifecycle - the Basel 2 rules with which 
the banks were (presumably) already compliant and the Basel 3 rules which were still in 
the process of being designed and implemented. In addition, as regulatory expectations 
tightened and the processes for risk model approvals became more stringent, banks 
were increasingly engaged in remediation work to bring them back into compliance with 
the existing Basel 2 rules, independently of any new work required for Basel 3. This 
posed a considerable sense-making challenge for the banking organizations in the 
sample (for details see Chapter 5), as it was not always clear what aspects of the rules 
were changing, or how they had changed from one draft proposal to another.  
The existence of two overlapping sets of regulatory rules at different stages also 
presented an empirical problem when trying to ascertain the degree to which prudential 
regulation had become institutionalized within the banking industry for two key 
reasons. The first was that it became more difficult to identify the distinct stages of 
institutionalization, even when using a heuristic model. A reasonable expectation would 
have been that some aspects of the Basel 2 rules would have at least reached the 
operational stage, perhaps even the normalization stage, whilst at the same time, it 
would have been fair to assume the Basel 3 rules would have been in the beginning 
stages of the model. The second challenge was that, even whilst the Basel 2 rules for 
credit risk might have remained stable, as Chapter 6 showed, the style of supervision 
and the toughening of regulatory expectations may have required banks to make 
additional operational changes (such as amending credit risk internal rating models) to 
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comply with these more stringent standards of supervision. Such changes would 
necessitate a move backwards from the operational (or normalization) stage to the 
design and establishment (or operational) stages. 
It is also worth noting a methodological limitation regarding the data given that it was 
not possible to collect in depth data from all the organizations in the interview sample. 
Thus, with the exception of Bank 1, the analysis relies on the accounts of only a few 
respondents from each organization. Notwithstanding these complexities, however, 
using the conceptual model of the institutionalization framework has revealed some 
interesting and important observations which are discussed below. 
Indicators of institutionalization 
To think of regulation as being institutionalized is to think of it as being a more or less 
taken-for-granted aspect of organizational life (Greenwood et al., 2008, p. 15). That is, 
compliance with prudential regulation has become integral to the operational practices, 
routines, behaviours and even the values and beliefs of the organization. The intention 
here is not to provide a precise assessment of how far prudential regulation has been 
institutionalized in the UK banking industry, as this would require a different 
methodological approach. Rather, the aim is to use the existing heuristic models of 
regulatory institutionalization discussed above to identify and add to the types of 
indicators that are associated with each stage of the model to give a sense of the degree 
of institutionalization. 
It can be difficult for organizational members to identify and articulate the various 
aspects of their organization’s operations and culture that result directly from the 
implementation of regulation precisely because they are so taken-for-granted. Therefore, 
instead of asking interview participants direct questions about the degree to which they 
perceived prudential regulation to be institutionalized in their bank, the interviews were 
analyzed to find types of activities or organizational changes that may be indicative of 
the process of institutionalization. The coding framework for this analysis was derived 
from Hutter’s model and themes that emerged inductively from the data. Four main 
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categories of indicators were found – Systems and Procedures, Governance and 
Structures, Integration into Business Practices and Knowledge and Commitment. 
Systems and Procedures refers to the operational aspects of the bank that either needed 
to be created or modified across different parts of the organization in line with 
regulatory requirements. For example, credit risk models not only required a 
mathematical methodology to be developed but this then had to be coded into computer 
software. In addition, control procedures had to be built around the model to ensure 
data was kept up to date and exceptions or errors were reported and investigated. 
The creation of executive steering groups or committees charged with overseeing 
regulatory related issues or decisions were included in the Governance and Structures 
category. This also comprised the formal organizational hierarchy and functions within 
this that have explicit responsibility for regulatory matters (see Chapter 5). It should be 
emphasized here that this category relates to both structures put in place to manage 
regulatory change and those that were required on an ongoing basis to manage 
regulation, such as regulatory reporting units. 
Indicators relating to the third category, Integration into Business Practices, were 
evident when activities that had been implemented primarily to meet regulatory 
objectives had been incorporated into regular business routines. Whilst this appears to 
be synonymous with the notion of institutionalization itself, the latter term incorporates 
not just the material practices of the organization but also the technologies, structures 
and less tangible aspects of organizational life. 
Indeed, the final category, Knowledge and Commitment, focused on these less tangible 
parts of institutions. Knowledge pertained to the levels of regulatory understanding 
across the organization, particularly in those organizational units that operated at a 
greater relational distance from the regulator. Also, drawing on Parker’s work, the degree 
of senior management commitment was considered an important factor to identify 
(Parker, 2002). 
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For each of these categories, lower level indicators were identified and these were then 
classified according to the stage of the institutionalization model to which they best 
corresponded. This framework is shown in full in Appendix 3. Examples of how this 
coding framework was applied to the interview data are shown in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Examples of coding for institutionalization indicators 
Category Indicator and Example Stage 
Systems and 
procedures 
IT Systems changes 
‘[Implementing] monitoring and processes and 
systems development. You know, it's a question of 
okay we're doing this on a spreadsheet to do the pro 
forma [capital impact figures] - it's not good 
enough, we need a more robust process, we need 
systems in the heart of it, so it's just a range of all 
of that and getting it in place.’ (Participant 20, 
2014) 
Design and 
establishment 
Systems and 
procedures 
Regulation driving changes in risk management 
‘A lot of the agenda at the moment is regulatory 
driven because…to be honest if the regulators 
weren’t doing things, a lot of these things we’d be 
self-motivated to do anyway, given the learnings of 
the crisis and things but the regulators are 
obviously, you know, coming at the moment with 
lots of different regulations that are driving action 
and system investment.’ (Participant 8, 2013) 
Operational 
Governance and 
structures 
New governance structures to manage regulatory 
change 
‘So we have established a fully-fledged structure 
with a project management office and outside help 
from one of the big four [consultancies] - we have 
the steering committee, which includes business 
heads, control function heads, corporate function 
heads. And then we have different working groups 
and task forces’ (Participant 13, 2014) 
Design & establishment 
Governance and 
structures 
Internal communication of regulatory matters 
‘We are better at communication than ever within 
the firm about what we are doing, so actually, we 
have forums where we talk to every division every 
month and cascade the regulatory conversations.’ 
(Participant 8, 2013) 
Operational 
Governance and 
structures 
Monitoring ongoing compliance 
‘The pipe tends to go from us [Regulatory Affairs] 
into Risk, in terms of risk implementation. And 
normally it's their job to liaise with Compliance. 
Broadly most things are compliant, so we try and 
understand it, try to change it, and then someone 
starts implementing it before we've finished 
changing it and at some point the implementation 
is done, and the deadline's met, ideally, and post-
implementation compliance [is achieved].’ 
(Participant 22, 2014) 
Normalization 
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Category Indicator and Example Stage 
Integration into 
business practices 
More efficient use of capital 
‘One of the things probably overarching this is in 
terms of the changes that are hitting the wider 
organisation because of the magnitude of them it’s 
driven a different capital management strategy and 
that has cascaded down from the Group to the 
Divisions and the Divisions are now having to think 
about how to do business differently and taking, in 
some cases, quite severe action because businesses 
are no longer going concerns in light of the amount 
of capital they are using.’ (Participant 5, 2013) 
Operational 
Integration into 
business practices 
Regulation as part of regular business routines 
‘it’s very much around looking at the same portfolio 
but in a number of different ways you know. 
Utilising a number of different stress tests, utilising 
more kind of market risk metrics just to get a better 
appreciation of what is going on there which is the 
right thing to be doing. And you can say that is 
purely risk-based because there is no capital impact 
from that whatsoever’ (Participant 9, 2013) 
Normalization 
Integration into 
business practices 
Regulation impacts business strategy 
‘There has been also a cultural shift which is now 
acknowledging, hey, this [regulation] is now part of 
our life, we should just deal with it, and work with it 
and actually look at it. You can't talk about business 
strategy any more without knowing about 
regulation.’ (Participant 13, 2014) 
Normalization 
Knowledge and 
commitment 
Explaining changing regulatory environment to 
wider organisation 
‘So it’s helping [to] convey those messages and 
when we do get hit you go back to the business and 
say ‘look guys, the world has changed. We got 
smacked because of 2008 and we haven’t gotten 
over that yet. The world has changed.’ (Participant 
3, 2013) 
Design & establishment 
Knowledge and 
commitment 
More time devoted to regulatory matters 
‘We spend a lot more money on regulation, so more 
people, better quality people, more senior people, 
bigger budgets, more time internally spent on how 
to respond constructively to the PRA's demands. 
That's probably the biggest change. A lot of time 
spent considering how to react and respond to 
regulatory prudential initiatives.’ (Participant 20, 
2014) 
Operational 
Knowledge and 
commitment 
Changes to bank regulatory culture: 
‘With the regulation from Basel 2.5 CRD3 coming 
in, and CRD4 as it starts to get very close to coming 
in has driven a complete mind-set change in the 
business over how it manages its capital and the 
focus it needs to put on it which is a good thing.’ 
(Participant 5, 2013) 
Normalization 
As these examples illustrate, the data analysis revealed that it did not necessarily follow 
that indicators for each category were present in each of the three stages of the 
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institutionalization model. Figure 7.1 shows how the indicators identified in the 
interview data were distributed over the three stage of the institutionalization model. 
Figure 7.1 Distribution of indicators across the institutionalization model 
 
Source: Interview data 
Whilst the categories ‘Governance and Structures’ and ‘Knowledge and Commitment’ 
had indicators that represented all three stages of the model, for the ‘Systems and 
Procedures’ category of indicators, examples were only found for the first two stages. 
Similarly, indicators of ‘Integration into Business Practices’ were only found for the 
second and third stages. This can possibly be explained by the fact that systems and 
processes were in a continual state of flux, requiring constant adaptations in response 
to new regulations or issues that had been raised by the regulator with regards to 
compliance with existing regulations. Alternatively, if the necessary system and process 
changes have been completed and become part of business-as-usual, the lack of ongoing 
changes might be more indicative that the normalization state had been reached. 
Similarly, full integration of regulatory changes into business practices is unlikely to 
occur in the first stage of the model, as these practices are themselves being specified 
as part of design and establishment.  
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A key finding is that the frequency of references to new or changing governance or 
organizational structures as a direct result of regulation was almost double those of any 
other categories of institutionalization indicator, as shown in Figure 7.2. Nearly half 
these references were coded to just three indicators - new governance structures to 
manage regulation, regulatory change programmes and new teams created to manage 
regulatory relationships. 
Figure 7.2 Proportion of references to categories of indicator 
 
Source: Interview data 
In terms of managing regulation, as Chapter 5 showed, some of the new governance 
structures were created to manage all types of regulatory requirements (prudential, 
conduct and structural changes such as recovery and resolution planning) and some 
were specific to prudential regulation. These indicators are all associated with the design 
and establishment stage of the model.  
Chapter 5 argued that these governance and structural changes were typical of the re-
organization activities that occur after significant risks crystallize into a crisis. However, 
institutionalist theory also contends that the creation of new organizational structures 
can be associated with a process of decoupling, whereby formal structures are 
implemented but act as a ‘buffer’ to allow the technical core of their operations to remain 
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unchanged (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 357). Such formal structures can be adopted 
ceremonially in the name of legitimacy and ultimately, organizational survival. Relating 
this idea specifically to law, Edelman et al. (1991) suggest that ‘an organization can point 
to structural change as evidence of its compliance, without necessarily creating 
significant change in behavior’ (Edelman et al., 1991, p. 75). Parker also cautions against 
this ‘symbolic’ rather than substantive degree of institutionalization, suggesting that is 
it one of the pathologies of meta-regulation, often demonstrated by a ‘tick-box’ approach 
to compliance (Parker, 2002, p. 142). Edelman goes on to argue that ‘it is not always the 
case that structural elaboration is merely symbolic; structural change may be a means 
of achieving real improvement’ (Edelman, 1992, p. 1543). Nonetheless, using this 
category of indicators as the only means of measuring institutionalization should be 
approached with caution. 
Indeed, those indicators that demonstrate the integration of regulation into the core 
business practices of the organization are more likely to be evidence of substantive 
behaviour changes. The most prevalent indicator within this category was the provision 
of regulatory advice  
‘to the [Wholesale] Divisions on all aspects of prudential capital policy rules. Effectively 
how to apply them in relation to particular transactions so transaction review, 
transaction sign-off, new products approval processes’ (Participant 7, 2013). 
In the case of prudential regulation (see above) the principle of the ‘use test’ is an explicit 
recognition that the success of Basel 2 depends on the embedding of the risk parameters 
in the day-to-day business of the banks. Achieving this level of integration is indicative 
of reaching the normalization stage of the model, penetrating the day to day business 
decision making processes, illustrated by this interviewee: 
‘We look at the same portfolio but in a number of different ways you know. Utilising a 
number of different stress tests90, utilising more kind of market risk metrics just to get 
a better appreciation of what is going on there which is the right thing to be doing’ 
(Participant 9, 2013). 
                                                 
90 Stress tests are a type of scenario analysis whereby the bank analyses its current risk exposures to see what 
would happen if market conditions worsen, for example if there was an interest rate risk rise or an economic 
downturn. Prudential regulations require that banks subject their internally modelled risk parameters to a 
rigorous programme of stress testing that informs senior management decision making. (BCBS, 2009) 
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The other indicator that was associated with the normalization stage of the model was 
when regulatory considerations impact the business strategy of the bank.  
‘It’s driven a different capital management strategy and that has cascaded down in 
terms of from the Group to the Divisions and the Divisions are now having to think 
about how to do business differently and taking, in some cases, quite severe action 
because businesses are no longer going concerns in light of the amount of capital they 
are using’ (Participant 5, 2013). 
Indeed, the introduction of higher capital requirements and new liquidity requirements 
as part of Basel 3 / CRD 4 have had significant effects on banks’ business models. A 
recent survey found that  
‘Eighty-one percent of respondents said they are evaluating portfolios, and 44% said 
they are exiting lines of business, up from 29% last year [2014]. This is being driven 
by pressure to mitigate falls in return on equity following the capital increases’ (Ernst 
& Young, 2015, p. 3).  
Whilst this was not an explicitly stated objective of these new regulations, banks are 
deleveraging and/or exiting those business areas or products that are capital intensive 
or expensive to fund. These business model changes go to the very core of the 
organization, but it is important to recognize that the motivating logic beneath these 
decisions is more likely to be that of market and profitability considerations (as 
illustrated in the quote above) rather than a desire to fully embed regulatory logic and 
divest more risky businesses in the public interest. 
The two indicators that featured most frequently in relation to Knowledge and 
Commitment were the improved levels of regulatory knowledge in the wider 
organization and an increased senior management focus on regulation, according to the 
interview respondents. Increased knowledge about the prudential regulations 
manifested itself in both the Front Office and Credit Risk Officers91 actively seeking out 
information about regulation and also displaying a greater depth of understanding of 
how the rules relate to their roles: 
                                                 
91 Credit Risk Officers are those who are responsible for assessing the creditworthiness of a counterparty, 
using a combination of the outputs from risk models, financial data and judgement based on the past 
relationship with that counterparty. They are also responsible for ensuring that lending to such counterparties 
is within the prescribed credit risk management limits. 
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‘I had an interesting conversation with a credit officer yesterday and if you wound the 
clock back a year ago, he wouldn’t have been able to have the same conversation 
because he wouldn’t have had the in depth knowledge that he has [now]’ (Participant 
9, 2013). 
Since the financial crisis, the interview respondents explained that levels of senior 
management focus and attention on regulatory matters had increased significantly: 
‘There are very very few people certainly at the senior and upper management level 
in this bank that do not spend a lot of time with regulators. So I think the whole 
regulatory agenda has come straight on to the board’s agenda. So at every board 
meeting, every month, the board spend a lot of time on regulatory matters’ 
(Participant 12, 2014). 
This corresponds with both Hutter’s findings and Parker’s contention that senior 
management commitment is vital to the beginning of the institutionalization process 
(Hutter, 2001; Parker, 2002). This indicator was therefore coded to the Design & 
Establishment stage but arguably, this commitment must be sustained throughout the 
institutionalization process to ensure the requisite funding is made available and to 
instill the necessary cultural shift that is required to achieve the final stage. Indeed, 
much of the literature which addresses cultural improvements in the banking sector 
focuses on the ‘tone at the top’ and how this then cascades down into the rest of the 
organization (Financial Stability Board, 2014, pp. 5-7). Increased senior management 
commitment and knowledge about regulation may also have been connected to the 
increasing regulatory requirements for individual accountability for regulation. In 2014, 
the PRA and FCA released a joint consultation paper on strengthening individual 
accountability within the banking sector, with a focus on Senior Managers and the 
strengthening of their regulatory responsibilities under the new Senior Manager’s 
Regime (SMR) (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014d). 
The final set of indicators included those related to changes to Systems and Procedures 
as a direct result of regulatory changes. The complexity of the prudential calculation 
requirements, the technologically advanced risk models and the data intensive 
regulatory reporting requirements required sophisticated information technology 
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systems, especially given the volumes of transactional data held by the banks. Changes 
to these systems took time and resources: 
‘We’ve got a number of programmes specifically aimed at making it easier to get [risk 
and regulatory] information out. We’re putting in a whole load of systems but they 
take time and they don’t always work straight away’ (Participant 6, 2013). 
It is not surprising then that the majority of the discussion about Systems and 
Procedures indicators focused on the seemingly continual updating of computer 
systems, not only to comply with the new Basel 3 rules but also to meet the tougher 
expectations for the Basel 2 models. Interestingly, a third of the respondents welcomed 
the fact that regulation was driving these system changes because: 
‘if we as an institution were smart enough and did sit down and specify exactly what 
we wanted to do…..it would track what the regulation was trying to put in’ (Participant 
4, 2013). 
There appears to be some alignment between the organizational ambitions to improve 
risk management systems and processes and those changes that were required by the 
regulatory rules or to meet the supervisors’ expectations. Indeed, there was some 
evidence in the interviews that regulatory requirements acted as a catalyst to make 
changes because the associated investment was deemed to be mandatory. This is 
explored further in the next section. 
Considering these indicators together across all the banks in the interview sample 
reveals where these organizations are in the process of the institutionalization of 
prudential regulation. Figure 7.3 shows, for each bank in the interview sample, the 
proportion of references coded to each stage of the regulatory institutionalization 
model. This chart is presented along with four strong caveats. First, the size of the 
sample means that it should not be regarded as a representative picture of the UK 
banking industry or indeed of each banking organization. Second, it is not necessarily a 
statistically accurate picture for each bank, given the variation in the number of 
interviews completed per bank. Third, the interviewees occupy organizational positions 
which require them to interact closely with regulation on a daily basis and thus their 
perceptions of the indicators of institutionalization may differ to those of organizational 
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members who are less closely impacted by regulation. Fourth, there may well have been 
a tendency for respondents to overestimate the progress their respective organizations 
had made towards the institutionalization of regulation, given that a high proportion of 
the interviewees occupied organizational positions where they had direct responsibility 
for aspects of regulatory change.  
Figure 7.3 Institutionalization stage by bank 
 
What the chart does show, however, is an indicative view, at a particular point in time of 
where certain personnel considered their organizations to be in terms of the 
institutionalization of regulation. It is very clear that the level of normalization of 
regulation across these five banks is very low, and that these organizations are primarily 
at the Design & Establishment stage of institutionalization, with nearly two thirds of all 
interview references coded to this stage. Hutter (2001) suggests that  
‘phase 3 may in reality be a rarity, even an impossibility. Even if it is attained it is 
likely to be only temporary, as one of the major problems encountered in managing 
risks is maintaining full compliance once it has been achieved and maintaining 
regulatory objectives as a priority within the company’ (Hutter, 2001, p. 303).  
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With this in mind, the next section explores the conditions that can both facilitate and 
inhibit banks from moving up the stages of the model. 
Inhibitors and facilitators of institutionalization 
Inhibitors  
When analyzing the interview data, it was clear that there were several factors or 
conditions which inhibited the process of regulatory institutionalization. By an inhibitor 
is meant a factor or condition that prevents an organization from moving to the next 
stage of the model, prolongs the time spent at a particular stage or causes the 
organization to revert to a previous stage. 
Inhibitors were classified in terms of their source – whether they originated from within 
the organizations or from the external regulatory environment as Figure 7.4 illustrates. 
Figure 7.4 Internal and external inhibitors to institutionalization 
 
Starting with the internal inhibitors, the two factors which featured most frequently in 
discussion with the respondents were organizational limitations or constraints on 
regulatory implementation and the shortcomings of the IT systems and risk and 
regulatory data structures. Whilst the financial cost of making regulatory changes was 
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often cited as a constraint, the ability to attract the right skills and expertise to interpret 
and understand the requirements was perhaps of greater concern to the respondents: 
‘I think it's to do with the fact that we don't have, you know, within every bank and 
every regulatory body we don't have an army of ... em, astrophysics graduates from 
Oxford with first-class degrees, who can actually get their head round all this stuff’ 
(Participant 20, 2014) 
The scarcity of skilled regulatory staff within both banks and regulatory authorities 
during the fieldwork period (2013 – 2014) was also more widely acknowledged across 
the financial industry (Deloitte, 2014; Enver, 2014; Oakley, Kortekaas, & Schäfer, 2013). 
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 3, the post-crisis context was a period of significant 
regulatory change, engendering commensurate changes to occur within banks. At the 
same time, banks were dealing with the fall out of the crisis in terms of reducing the 
size of their balance sheets, managing the toxic assets on their books and winding down 
non-performing parts of their businesses. Such significant changes to an industry and 
its regulatory regime echo that of Hutter’s observation that the privatization of the 
British Railways and the corresponding restructuring of the regulatory regime resulted 
in the ‘railway industry reverting to the first stage of the model’ (Hutter, 2001). Such 
significant shifts in a firm’s non-regulatory environment will also have a bearing on its 
ability to institutionalize regulation. 
According to the interview participants, skill shortages and the volume of changes 
manifested as change fatigue. As one respondent articulated it, he was ‘tired of being 
tired of change’ (Participant 7, 2013). Such ‘regulatory jetlag and exhaustion’ (Participant 
3, 2013) might put a strain on those responsible for implementing regulation, potentially 
resulting in mistakes and also encouraging a ‘tick box’ approach to simply getting the 
work done, the antithesis of institutionalization. Indeed, industry reports highlighted 
‘change fatigue’ as a key concern for banks, claiming regulatory change was absorbing 
all the ‘change capacity’ so there was very little focus on business improvement and 
development (Oliver Wyman, 2014; Thomson Reuters, 2012).  
The limitations of information technology systems and the data required for regulatory 
and risk reporting were also identified as significant inhibitors to institutionalization. 
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As the quote below describes, this is often due to the age and fragmentation of the 
computer systems and associated data92 in question: 
‘It’s actually getting that [regulatory] information [that is difficult]. Partly that’s legacy 
systems, if you think of how old some of our systems are and we’ve built things on top 
of them to get something so it’s actually getting that level of granularity that can be 
the problem. And then some of the information they [the regulators] want will have 
to come off the risk system which is fine. All the systems do tie up but not necessarily 
the way that is intuitive….so I’ve got a line in the accounts. To get the detail I want 
I’ve got to go to the risk systems but the risk systems and accounts are not fully aligned 
in the way that I need them to be in order to do that exercise’ (Participant 6, 2013). 
Problems with IT infrastructure in the financial industry were highlighted when major 
retail banks experienced significant systems failures which affected their customers in 
2014 (Flinders, 2014; Osborne, 2014). Such failures were largely attributed to chronic 
underinvestment and complex and fragmented legacy systems. These factors have 
consequences other than system failures as illustrated in the Transparency Report 
issued by UBS to its shareholders. This report identified fragmented risk data as a 
contributing factor to the substantial losses it incurred (UBS, 2010). The BCBS also 
concluded that: 
‘One of the most significant lessons learned from the global financial crisis that began 
in 2007 was that banks’ information technology (IT) and data architectures were 
inadequate to support the broad management of financial risks’ (BCBS, 2013d, p. 1). 
In an attempt to improve the risk data structures in banks, the BCBS issued ‘Principles 
for effective risk data aggregation and reporting’ with which those banks designated as 
Global Systemically Important Banks have to comply by 2016 (BCBS, 2013d). Thus, the 
regulators have themselves acknowledged the problems associated with the 
decentralization of risk data as a barrier to effective risk management and the ability to 
fully embed prudential regulation in the organization. 
IT system limitations may well be a symptom of the other major internal inhibitor to the 
institutionalization, the lack of attention paid to regulatory change by the wider banking 
organization. There is often a tension between those who are responsible for regulatory 
                                                 
92 It is estimated that for regulatory reporting purposes, banks in Europe will need to complete sixty separate 
forms comprising 30-50,000 data items (Haldane, 2012, p. 12) which must be populated or aggregated from 
hundreds of thousands of data attributes in banks’ source systems. 
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change and the rest of the business (Parker, 2002; Power, 2005b; Weait, 1993), who 
ultimately not only approve the required budgets but must provide the technical 
expertise required to understand the detail of the regulation:  
‘SL: So I guess you are sat in between the regulators and the business in the 
way and it can’t always be the most comfortable place to be? 
P10: Yes, I mean we’re often seen as the bearer of bad news. Because you try to 
obviously articulate things and say what the regulators are proposing 
saying and I mean clearly for a lot of people, it’s, they’ve had to shift and 
accept the new realities’ (Participant 10, 2014). 
One strategy organizations may use to overcome this as identified by Gilad (2011) is to 
involve the relevant business people in the Design & Establishment phase of the 
institutionalization process. Interviewees described how they would attempt to identify 
appropriate business owners and include them in the governance structures and 
communication processes about regulatory change (see Chapter 5). 
However, this strategy was not always successful, given that there was often a significant 
time lag between when the standards setters released the first consultation paper and 
the final legislative rules93. Then, it was a matter of finding the regulatory impacts that 
were most likely to focus organizational minds, which usually tended to be financial: 
‘Banks are probably better at things that have fundamental economic impact in an 
obvious way, so things that change the amount of capital you have to hold, I think 
everyone gets that now, people to start to adjust their business model in advance, but 
I think some of these other things where the financial impact is less obvious, erm, they 
don’t. They see it as a kind of compliance thing and they leave it to the last minute 
and they struggle every time’ (Participant 8, 2013). 
The final internal barrier to institutionalization was the complexity of the banks’ 
organizational structures in combination with the regulatory requirements that cut 
across these organizational dividing lines. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, many different 
parts of a bank were involved in both the management of regulatory change and 
ensuring ongoing compliance with regulatory requirements such as scheduled reporting. 
In terms of managing change, this respondent described the difficulties involved: 
                                                 
93 For the European CRD 4 / CRR legislation, the first consultation paper was released on 26th February 2009 
and the final rules appeared nearly four years later on 17th July 2013. 
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‘We need to find a smarter way of doing this because otherwise we’re really going to 
struggle to deliver this because (a) each and every cross-cutting issue needs to be 
mobilised many times over in each and every division (b) even once you get the 
divisional efforts mobilised, there’s no framework for actually co-ordinating them and 
that’s inefficient and leads to a whole host of issues’ (Participant 10, 2014) 
The need for the central co-ordination of regulatory change during the design and 
establishment phase was recognized by several respondents. However, as systems and 
processes become operationalized within separate organizational silos, there is the risk 
that the fragmentation of practices and understandings of risk and regulation will 
reoccur, engendering the ‘silo effect’ (Tett, 2015) and preventing the move to the final 
stage of the institutionalization model (Hutter, 2001).  
Turning now to the external factors that inhibit regulatory institutionalization, top of 
the list was the regulatory rules themselves in terms of both how they were changing 
and how they were designed. The uncertainty of the regulatory rules emerged as the 
most prominent theme, with respondents remarking that the fluctuation in the rules 
throughout the legislative process prevented the banks from reaching a stable design 
and plan for implementation until very close to the final deadline. Similarly, due to the 
nature of the legislative process in the EU, detailed technical standards were being 
produced after the main legislative text was in force, which could possibly have changed 
the established meaning of the rules. In such instances, organizations had to revisit the 
changes they had already made in light of this new information, requiring them to 
remain in the Design & Establishment stage for longer. 
The complexity of the regulatory rules and the inconsistencies between them also 
tended to prolong the first stage of the institutionalization model. Complex rules 
required more time to unpick, to interpret, and to explain to others in the business who 
also need to understand them: 
‘Complexity is absolutely okay when it comes to the detailed implementation of 
something which requires maths to understand it but at the overall level, you shouldn’t 
have to do it you shouldn’t have to have that level of if this then that explanation to 
get the very top level’ (Participant 2, 2013). 
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Even once implemented, embedding the use of the risk parameters calculated by the 
internal risk models could require a sizeable training programme. In one bank this 
consisted of a global roadshow that trained over 700 people on the use of a new model. 
The complexity of the Basel 3 framework has been acknowledged by regulators (BCBS, 
2013h; Haldane, 2012) with some suggestions as to how to simplify it, but it is expected 
these will take some time to develop in consultation with the banking industry94. 
Supervisors have tightened their regulatory expectations, toughened their supervisory 
style and reduced the provision of detailed guidance to banks since the financial crisis 
(see Chapter 6). At the time the fieldwork was conducted, the PRA was also relying more 
on forward-looking judgements rather than mathematical outputs from models 
(Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014b, p. 5). These factors compounded the 
uncertainty of the regulatory environment, particularly as judgements regarding 
compliance were being made ex post with little or no supervisory direction given ex ante. 
Thus, even though banking organizations might have believed they had fully 
operationalized (or even normalized) compliant regulatory or risk management 
practices, their supervisor could subsequently deem them to be inadequate, requiring a 
further iteration of design and implementation. 
Indeed, several respondents mentioned that their organizations had received approval 
for Basel 2 risk models prior to the crisis that afterwards, given the tighter regulatory 
expectations, would not have been approved at all. One of these banks had created a 
team specifically to improve the risk models that had already been approved but were 
subsequently judged as inadequate by the PRA: 
‘Yes, our team didn’t exist three years ago. My role came into play about five years 
ago to look at credit risk model compliance against the rules. [The team] didn’t exist.’ 
(Participant 3, 2013).  
Where gaps in compliance were identified, appropriate changes were made to these 
models which were then re-integrated into the risk management operations and 
                                                 
94 It is also possible that efforts to reduce the complexity of the rules may actually require significant 
operational changes, moving banks back to a previous stage of the model or keeping them at the Design & 
Establishment stage for longer. 
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regulatory reporting of the firm. This resulted in a repeated cycling to and fro between 
the design and establishment stage and the operational stage of the model.  
A lack of clarity or transparency in the supervisory approach was also identified by the 
respondents as being problematic. For example, supervisors have the powers to require 
banks to hold additional regulatory capital if they consider those banks to have 
inadequately assessed their risks95. The banks claimed that it was not always clear why 
they were required to hold additional capital or how the PRA arrived the level they 
should be holding: 
‘I remember [a senior FSA official] coming to speak to our senior management and 
our chief executive, finance director - we were having an exchange of views around 
Pillar 2 and he thought he was giving us deep insights by telling us that they kind of 
plucked some of the multipliers out of the air’ (Participant 15, 2014) 
The banks suggested that if there was a ‘lack of science’ (Participant 15, 2014) or that 
the regulator formed a view prior to the review meeting (Participant 17, 2014), this acted 
as a disincentive to the embedding of risk management processes and capital 
calculations within the bank as the regulator had predetermined their overall level of 
capital, irrespective of the banks’ own calculations.  
Additionally, several interviewees alleged that they thought the supervisor would think 
of a number for Pillar 2 and then use the various levers (such as the various capital 
multipliers, floors and add-ons) in the regulatory rules to encourage the bank to reach 
this target. Whilst this is impossible to verify (Pillar 2 capital discussions between banks 
and the PRA remain confidential), it is worth noting that the PRA recently announced 
changes to its approach to assessing capital under Pillar 2 with the explicit intention of 
providing additional transparency (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2015c). 
The final external inhibitor to regulatory institutionalization was the volume of post-
crisis regulatory change. The fact that there was a large body of regulatory change in 
and of itself does not inhibit the institutionalization of regulation, but it will prolong the 
                                                 
95 These powers are available to the PRA under Pillar 2 of the Basel rules. Supervisors assess both the risks to 
the firm that should be captured and calculated under Pillar 1 and then also the risks to which banks might 
become exposed in the future. Banks must also run an annual Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process 
which is an input to the supervisory review. Supervisors may require banks to increase their capital 
requirements as a result of this review. 
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process. What became very clear from the research findings, however, was that the 
uncertainty associated with the changing rules and supervisory approaches caused 
significant difficulties, particularly when there was a lack of clarity regarding when (and 
if) the regulatory requirements would stabilize, and therefore how they could be 
incorporated into the strategic planning of the organization: 
‘When you look at the amount of regulation which is still to come, and you compare it 
with what has been put in place since the financial crisis, there's actually more to come 
than we've already had….but when you look at what the consequence of that is, it's a 
huge challenge because it's very difficult to plan in the face of uncertainty, and all 
banks are required to plan, and plan years ahead’ (Participant 18, 2014). 
If regulations continue to evolve and change, banking organizations will continually 
move back and forth between the Design and Establishment stage, and the 
Operationalization stage of the model as they build, test and then implement the 
requisite operational modifications.  
Facilitators 
Despite the inhibiting factors discussed above, the interview data did reveal some 
recurring themes that suggest features of prudential regulation that may help rather 
than hinder the process of regulatory institutionalization. 
The first of these was the financial impact of the regulatory requirements. Prudential 
regulation is explicitly designed to ensure levels of regulatory capital within banks are 
sufficient to absorb the losses that they may incur. In addition, one of the stated 
objectives of Basel 3 and CRD 4 was to increase the overall levels of capital across the 
international banking system. For individual banks, as discussed in Chapter 5, it was 
critical for them to assess the impact of these rule changes on their own capital positions 
and to actively manage their capital as it became an increasingly scarce resource. This 
led to the embedding of regulation in business practices oriented to capital 
management: 
‘It’s now the case that businesses are much more held to account which has driven 
from top down that interest in what is driving the capital and then from that, has 
then driven that sort of lower level tactical activity…it’s driven things like are we 
using the most risk sensitive measures…as a large and sophisticated organization, 
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we would be expect to be using the most advanced risk measures which generally 
are rewarded with the most appropriate levels of capital rather than taking very 
crude simplistic approaches which tend to be not necessarily more punitive but less 
sensitive to your risk management techniques.’ (Participant 5, 2013) 
What this quote also reveals is the motivation behind incorporating active capital 
management in banks’ business-as-usual activities. Approaches to calculating regulatory 
capital which are ‘risk sensitive’ often lead to lower capital requirements, or ‘more 
appropriate’ levels, as the respondent above comments. Understanding in advance how 
particular trades will impact regulatory capital requirements and using the most 
sophisticated models to calculate them was therefore not necessarily motivated by a 
desire for regulatory compliance. Rather, these ‘Business Planning and Mitigation’ 
practices were instigated in response to the market imperative, to protect the 
profitability of the bank and increase the return on equity for the banks’ shareholders 
(see Chapter 5). 
In the post-crisis environment, regulators (and market participants) raised concerns 
about the variability of risk weighted assets (RWAs, the denominator of the regulatory 
capital ratio) across the banking industry (BCBS, 2013f, 2013g; European Banking 
Authority, 2013; Le Lesle & Avramova, 2012). Whilst a significant amount of this 
variability could be attributed to difference in ‘business models, accounting standards 
or the implementation of international regulatory requirements’ (Bank of England, 
2011b, p. 38), there was a residual level of variation that could not be accounted for by 
these factors. According to the Bank of England, ‘evidence from the recent crisis suggests 
that the observed variation in RWAs might not entirely reflect genuine differences in 
risk-taking’ (Bank of England, 2011b, p. 39). The use of advanced internal risk models 
‘strengthens banks’ incentives to adjust their RWA calculations — not because their 
assessment of risk has changed, but as a way of minimizing regulatory capital charges’ 
(Bank of England, 2011b, p. 39).  
The point here is that whilst it is likely that elements of regulation that have a financial 
or economic impact on firms can facilitate institutionalization, this appears to be driven 
by the need to conform with market rather than regulatory logic. Banking organizations 
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may well have implemented practices and routines that appear to meet regulatory 
objectives, such as the accurate measurement of risk and therefore regulatory capital. If 
the motivation behind such activities is that of minimizing regulatory capital, rather 
than determining appropriate levels, regulatory and market goals will be in tension, 
resulting in what Parker describes as a ‘pathology’ of institutionalization where 
compliance and business goals conflict (Parker, 2002, pp. 145-149). Organizational 
members occupying roles embodying regulatory logic (see Chapter 5) and working to 
achieve the institutionalization of that logic may well be concerned that whilst the 
outcomes of these practices are compliant, there will not be the corresponding change 
in the behaviours and values associated with them. This matters because these are the 
same actors that liaise with the PRA and will have to demonstrate that the bank has ‘a 
culture that supports its prudent management’ (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014e, 
p. 3). Alternatively, organizational members inhabiting roles responsible for the 
financial success of the firm might argue that as long as banks are performing capital 
calculations correctly and in compliance with the regulations, there is no conflict, 
despite the goal to minimise capital. This position, however, will be harder to defend to 
the the PRA, given the increased regulatory focus not just on mechanical calculation 
rules and models but also on matters of governance and culture (Financial Stability 
Board, 2014). 
The second facilitating factor also featured financial considerations. In a severely cost-
constrained post-crisis environment, the pot of money within banks for discretionary 
internal investment decreased, and was likely only to be spent on those changes that 
were deemed mandatory. Investment to achieve regulatory compliance usually fell into 
this category, and, as this respondent discusses, what was considered mandatory was 
broader then just meeting the minimum requirements: 
‘The understanding of the regulation and their requirements and the technical nature 
of it is actually going up a lot more than it used to. I think, and once again I could be 
wrong on that, but I think, and getting broader’ (Participant 3, 2013). 
Additionally, another interviewee felt that the pressure from regulators was helpful to 
improve internal risk management 
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‘My concern would be that if the pressure comes off too much, then the internal 
pressure on our ability to take budget and improve things will decline and that would 
be our worry. I would hate to see us get to the point where we kind of flop over the 
line for CRD 4 and all of the other good stuff that should follow, maybe some of the 
controls or additional processes that we could do to make it smarter, or we’ve gone 
half way to developing something and yet for just a little bit more money, just a little 
more budget would improve it so dramatically, basically beyond the expectations of 
the regulator’ (Participant 4, 2013). 
This is a clear example of how the tougher stance adopted by the PRA manifests within 
the regulated organization. Regulatory (and risk) professionals within banks understood 
that the regulator had more power than in the previous era of ‘light touch’ regulation 
(see Chapter 6) and leveraged this power internally to argue for a significant share of 
the budget. This money was also then used to integrate regulatory practices into internal 
risk management and further the institutionalization process. 
Investment funding to support regulatory changes to risk management processes is 
closely linked to the final facilitating factor, which is the alignment of external regulatory 
and internal risk management objectives. When questioned, several respondents 
asserted that the changes that were being made to implement the new prudential rules 
were changes that they would ideally be making to improve their internal risk 
management processes anyway.  
‘A lot of the change is smart, it’s stuff that frankly we should have been doing and we 
should have been pushing ourselves as an institution to do….Although the project I’ve 
been working on has a finance / capital implications, really, truly I’m only focused on 
the internal credit risk methodologies and improving our processes from an internal 
credit risk standpoint’ (Participant 4, 2013). 
This respondent made the point that the data that was required for the internal risk 
models was data that was useful for other purposes: 
‘SL Would those changes be the same if you were doing it purely for risk 
management or would you be doing it in a different way? 
P3 There are some definite benefits that the business has got from [the 
regulator] forcing that we need this information for the models so you 
must capture that and therefore you will understand a lot more about your 
portfolio as a result’ (Participant 3, 2013). 
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The earlier discussion of the indicators of institutionalization also emphasized the 
convergence of regulatory and internal aspirations for improvements to risk 
management practices. As Chapter 5 showed, risk management functions have become 
increasingly involved in working to manage prudential regulatory change and 
implementation. A recent survey showed that Chief Risk Officers in financial institutions 
are increasing their focus on regulatory compliance and expanding the size of their 
teams to do so (Ernst & Young, 2015). This increased involvement of risk management 
in regulation is indicative of regulatory logic pervading these organizational roles to a 
larger degree than before the financial crisis, giving risk managers more organizational 
power and control. 
Gaining additional benefits from implementing regulation over and above regulatory 
compliance is an important facilitator of regulatory institutionalization. Chapter 5 
discussed how regulatory professionals would use of the symbols and practices of 
market logic to obtain wider organizational support for the management of regulatory 
change. In a similar manner, by emphasizing the financial incentives of regulatory 
compliance such as cost reduction, increased revenue and operational efficiency, firms 
were attempting to derive ‘additional value’ from regulatory compliance by meeting 
internal business goals as well as external regulatory goals from the same operational 
change. Here, then, there is another opportunity for firms to reconcile the conflicts 
between regulatory and market logic by finding strategic ways to profit from regulatory 
change. Plenty of assistance is available from external management consultants who can 
advise their clients on gaining competitive advantage from regulatory compliance 
(KPMG, 2014; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2015).  
Additionally, the interviewees mentioned that practices such as stress testing and better 
data aggregation were critical to effective risk management and that because they were 
regulatory requirements, it was easier to get organizational support (and funding) for 
making the necessary changes. Institutionalization, then, is more likely to occur if 
regulatory requirements are aligned with the goals of particular organizational members 
within certain functions. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, however, large banks have 
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fragmented organizational structures and levels of regulatory engagement vary widely 
with occupational roles. To achieve regulatory institutionalization, the challenge is for 
those organizational members in roles that embody regulatory logic to obtain co-
operation and commitment from the wider organization and to do so, they must possess 
the status, power and requisite skills (Fligstein, 1997) within the wider organization in 
the first place to ensure they can obtain co-operation and commitment. Indeed, this is 
in line with Tolbert and Zucker (1999) who contend that the ‘full institutionalization of 
a structure is likely to depend on the conjoint effects of relatively low resistance by 
opposing groups, continued cultural support and promotion by advocacy groups and 
positive correlation to desired outcomes' (Tolbert & Zucker, 1999, p. 184). 
Discussion 
The analysis of the institutionalization of prudential regulation in UK banks in the 
period following the financial crisis paints a picture of an industry that is firmly in the 
design and establishment stage of the institutionalization process. Whilst this is 
somewhat understandable given that Basel 3 regulations had been finalized only shortly 
before the fieldwork began, the majority of the Basel 2 rules pertaining to credit risk 
and the accompanying operational processes had been in place for several years. As this 
chapter has demonstrated, the banks cited several internal and external factors that can 
prevent or inhibit them from achieving the full integration of the prudential rules into 
their business-as-usual practices. Internal inhibiting factors included constraints on 
implementation, the limitations of systems and data, lack of firm wide attention to 
regulatory change and the complexities of the organizational structure. External factors 
that were likely to inhibit institutionalization were the regulatory rules themselves, the 
supervisory approach, the volume of regulatory change, the regulatory deadlines and 
regulatory uncertainty. The three facilitating factors were the financial impact of the 
new rules, the mandatory nature of regulatory changes attracting funding and in some 
cases the regulatory requirements aligned with the banks’ risk management aspirations. 
Taken together, these findings point towards four key insights – a deeper understanding 
of the process of regulatory institutionalization, the complexity of regulatory 
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implementation, the interplay between regulatory and market logics that is revealed 
during the implementation process and finally, the question of whether 
institutionalization is even feasible in the post-crisis regulatory environment. 
By building on the conceptual models developed by Hutter and Parker, and tested 
empirically by Gilad, (Gilad, 2011; Hutter, 2001; Parker, 2002), this study identified four 
categories of factors that indicate institutionalization – systems and procedures, 
governance and structures, integration into business practices, and knowledge and 
commitment. However, not all of these indicators should be given equal weight when 
trying to ascertain the degree of normalization of regulation. Neo-institutional theory 
allows for the possibility of the ceremonial compliance, associated with the creation of 
structures specifically designed to appear compliant but which protect the rest of the 
organization from having to implement substantive change (Bromley & Powell, 2012; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pache & Santos, 2010, 2012). Thus, examining changes to 
governance and structures alone may not give a true picture of the degree of 
institutionalization. As Hutter (2001) suggests, there are other factors that must be 
considered such as integration into business processes and increased levels of 
knowledge and commitment. However, these factors, which are indicative of the final 
stage of the model are also the hardest to identify, as they are cultural and cognitive.  
The investigation of the factors that both help and hinder regulatory institutionalization 
has highlighted some of the complexities associated with the implementation of 
prudential regulation within banks. Even assuming that banks are behaving as ‘good 
corporate citizens’ (which may not necessarily be the case) and intend to achieve full 
and integrated regulatory compliance, there may still be significant obstacles along the 
way. Firstly, organizational attention to regulatory implementation will vary, with certain 
organizational constituencies unwilling to become involved due to other conflicting 
priorities. These conflicts can also affect how resources are allocated to regulatory 
change, though the data showed that in general, regulatory implementation was 
considered mandatory so this was less of a problem than it had been before the crisis. 
Even when organizational attention is focused on implementation, the complex 
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structures of large, internationally active banks combined with the fragmented (and 
often out of date) infrastructure and technical complexity of the rules makes the task 
incredibly challenging. Nevertheless, there are signs that banks are attempting to meet 
some of these challenges, particularly by ensuring there is greater senior management 
focus on and commitment to regulatory implementation and that there is sufficient 
funding available to make the necessary changes. 
In terms of senior management commitment to regulation, Chapter 5 illustrated that the 
organizational status of the Head of Regulatory Affairs (or similar functions) has been 
elevated since the financial crisis, with the hiring of senior ex-regulators (Masters, 2011, 
2012; Treanor, 2013) and increased Board time devoted to regulatory issues. It was not 
possible to determine from the fieldwork data whether this increased executive focus 
on regulation was substantive or ceremonial or whether it was driven from within the 
organization as opposed to being imposed by external regulatory changes such as the 
Senior Managers Regime. Despite the cause, perhaps what is happening here is a shift in 
power away from those in the revenue making parts of the business to those that sit in 
the control functions. Whilst this is clearly desirable from a risk and regulatory 
perspective, this chapter also demonstrated that conformity with market logic drives 
the factors that are most likely to facilitate the institutionalization of regulation. It is 
not clear whether this is deliberate on behalf of the standard setters – to appeal to the 
theories and narratives of market logic to encourage the integration of the prudential 
rules96 or whether in fact, there is a closer alignment between regulatory and market 
logics than the post-crisis political and regulatory rhetoric would suggest. 
Notwithstanding the previous point, what this chapter clearly demonstrates is that 
prudential regulation, in the form of Basel 3/CRD 4, is unlikely to become normalized 
in the UK banks until the rules themselves are stabilized and the level of domestic, 
European and international regulatory change reduces. Uncertainty is the biggest 
                                                 
96 This is not to imply that the regulators and standard setters have been ‘captured’ by the banking industry, 
rather that by framing regulatory requirements using market logic, compliance is more likely to be achieved. 
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inhibitor to regulatory institutionalization, irrespective of whether it is uncertainty 
about regulatory rules or a change in the supervisory approach. 
Postscript 
In a recent speech, Andrew Bailey from the PRA stated that  
‘There is [still] work in Basel but that is much more about refining the framework 
than a step change in capital requirements. As part of this there is work to agree 
and implement the leverage ratio internationally, and to improve the use of models 
to estimate capital requirements so that they are used only for asset classes that 
lend themselves to modelling of this sort’ (Bailey, 2015). 
However, according to the work that was still ongoing by the Basel Committee (see Table 
7.2), the rules had not been stabilized (BCBS, 2014d). These policy measures were also 
likely to require operational impact analyses, quantitative impact analyses and then 
appropriate modifications to systems and procedures, signifying a move back to the 
design and establishment stage of the institutionalization model. There is, then, a trade-
off here, between constantly adjusting regulation to get a ‘better design’ and enabling 
regulatees to institutionalize prudential regulation. It is not clear that this trade-off is 
understood or acknowledged by standard setters and supervisors. In December 2015, 
the Governor of the Bank of England publicly stated that the remaining BCBS work on 
capital and liquidity did not amount to Basel 4 and that the industry’s concerns about 
the possible capital impact and implementation costs were exaggerated (Binham, 2015; 
Groendahl, 2015). 
Table 7.2 BCBS remaining work for refining Basel 3 (as at 2014) 
Type of Policy 
Response 
Policy Measures Status Finalisation 
Review of the 
standardised 
approaches 
Credit risk 
 
Market risk 
 
 
Operational risk 
Consultation by end-
2014 
Second public 
consultation 
completed 
Proposed revisions 
published October 
2014 
End-2015 
 
End-2015 
 
 
Mid-2015 
Capital floors Replacement of the Basel II 
transitional floor with a 
permanent floor based on the 
Standardised Approaches for 
Consultation by end-
2014 
End-2015 
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credit, market and 
operational risk 
Credit risk internal 
models 
Constraints on credit risk 
model parameter estimates 
Alignment of definitions of 
exposures under IRB and 
revised Standardised 
Approaches 
Guidance to support the risk 
models framework  
Consultation by 
mid-2015 
End-2015 
Market risk internal 
models 
Greater standardisation of 
traded market risk model 
requirements 
Second public 
consultation 
completed 
End-2015 
Leverage ratio Complementary measure 
aimed at restricting the build-
up of excessive leverage and 
at mitigating model risk 
Exposure definition 
finalised –
monitoring and 
calibration 2015-17 
Disclosure 2015 
Implementation 
2018 
Enhanced disclosure Improvements to existing 
disclosures to describe 
different risk model 
approaches 
Additional disclosure 
requirements 
Policy released for 
consultation 
 
 
Policy under 
development 
End-2014 
 
 
 
End-2015 
Additional analysis 
and ongoing 
monitoring 
Analysis of retail and small 
and medium-sized enterprise 
credit portfolios 
Analysis of off-balance sheet 
lending commitments 
Analysis ongoing End-2015 
Framework review Strategic review of the capital 
framework against 
Committee objectives 
Review under way  
Source: BCBS (2014d, p. 6) 
Furthermore, at the time of writing, there are indications that the tough stance taken by 
the Government towards the banks after the crisis is softening. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer talked of a ‘new settlement’ with the financial services industry (HM Treasury 
& Osborne, 2015), the departing Lord Mayor of London stated that ‘regulators must seek 
the support of practitioners. Working together and ending up in the right place: not with 
light regulation, but the right regulation’ (Lord Mayor of London, 2015). There is also 
speculation that the resignation of Martin Wheatley, the Chief Executive Officer of the 
Financial Conduct Authority was at the behest of the Chancellor of the Exchequer due 
to the tough stance Wheatley was considered to take towards the City (Griffiths, 2015; 
Inman, 2015; Moore, 2015). The recent rhetoric has been interpreted as a new 
‘rapprochement between the regulator and the City’ (Binham, 2015). The political, social 
and economic context has a substantial influence on how regulation is supervised and 
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enforced (see Chapters 4 and 6). These recent speeches and changes in senior regulatory 
personnel might well be signaling a swing in the regulatory pendulum back towards less 
stringent regulation, with the possibility that the tensions between regulatory and 
market logic are again recalibrated in favour of market logic, regulatory change is 
regarded as less of a risk and the institutionalization of regulation becomes even less 
likely.  
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
This thesis has explored how banks in the United Kingdom responded to and managed 
changes to prudential regulation between 2006 and 2014. The sheer volume and scope 
of changes in the regulatory environment over this period were a direct response to the 
financial crisis. Aiming to prevent such crises happening again in the future, policy-
makers reformed how risk management in the banking industry was regulated by 
changing not only the rules themselves, but also the way in which banks were 
supervised. Furthermore, the intellectual foundations of financial regulation had been 
brought into question by the events of the crisis and alternative theories about how to 
deal with systemic risk, such as macroprudential regulation (see Chapter 3), were 
incorporated into the new regulatory regime. This thesis has argued that these shifts 
created a moment of profound uncertainty for those banking organizations subject to 
this regime, providing a rich empirical context within which to investigate questions 
about how organizations respond to and manage regulatory change, how the dynamics 
of the relationships between the regulated and the regulators are affected by these wider 
environmental changes and what the prospects are for real, meaningful behavioural 
changes within the financial industry when the rules and approaches to supervision are 
in flux for a considerable period of time. 
Prudential regulation is an example of management-based regulation, a ‘new governance’ 
technique (Black, 2012a; Ford, 2010; Power, 2007) where the bulk of the responsibility 
for managing economic or societal risks is assigned to corporations. This is done on the 
basis that they have the capability and willingness to internalize the legal requirements 
of the regulations and incorporate them into the day-to-day business of organizational 
life. Prudential regulation is concerned with the regulation of risk management – of the 
financial and non-financial risks that are inherent in the banking industry. Information 
and expertise asymmetries between banks and their regulators motivated the decision 
to allow banks to use their own risk models in the calculation of capital adequacy 
(Tarullo, 2008; Weber, 2010), and this continued after the crisis, though the rules were 
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tightened to explicitly increase capital requirements. As Chapter 3 described, the 
prudential rules were amended to improve the quality of capital, introduced a leverage 
ratio, countercyclical capital buffers and required the monitoring and reporting of 
liquidity risk for the first time. In addition, as evidenced by both the PRA’s documented 
approach to supervision (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014b) and the interview 
participants (see Chapter 6), banks were held to higher standards in the aftermath of 
the crisis, with more scrutiny of their risk management processes and the PRA’s 
expectations of ‘firms to have a culture that supports their prudent management’ 
(Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014e, p. 3). 
Banks emphasized the uncertainties resulting from the changes in their regulatory 
environment, both in their public discourses and during the fieldwork interviews. The 
sources of this uncertainty varied over time – in 2009, the broad objectives of the 
regulatory reforms had been articulated by the G20 and the BCBS but details and impacts 
remained unclear. As the legislative process progressed, the uncertainty associated with 
the final details of the rules diminished but that related to their ambiguous nature and 
potential impacts persisted. Banks also appeared to struggle with understanding what 
comprised a compliant solution, as they experienced the regulator to be more reluctant 
to give guidance than before the crisis. This thesis has shown how, in order to manage 
this uncertainty, banks implemented specific structures and practices, effectively 
transforming uncertainty into a risk (Clarke, 2001; Power, 2007) – the risk of regulatory 
change.  
This final chapter highlights the four key conclusions from this thesis beginning with 
the argument that the uncertainty and ambiguity of the post-crisis regulatory change 
amplified the tensions that commonly exist between market and regulatory objectives 
in a regulated, commercial organization. Operating in a pluralistic institutional 
environment (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010) meant 
that banks still needed to be considered legitimate by multiple external constituencies, 
especially the market and the regulator. This need to balance the legitimacy demands of 
these two institutional referents manifested itself in how banks presented their views 
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about regulatory change in public, how they adapted their material practices to manage 
regulatory risks and how they conducted their relationships with their bank supervisors.  
The second major contention is that within banking organizations, the actors most 
closely involved the management of prudential regulatory change occupied 
organizational roles which were the embodiment of regulatory logic. These actors were 
not limited to the Compliance function but spanned several departments, most notably 
Risk Management, Finance and Regulatory Affairs. These actors comprised a ‘community 
of implementation’, an informal grouping coalesced around shared knowledge, skills 
and expertise and whose importance increased with the increasing regulatory scrutiny 
after the crisis.  
Thirdly, by exploring the routine mechanics of regulatory implementation, this thesis 
has discovered the considerable amount of organizational work that is required to adapt 
to external regulatory changes to achieve compliance. Much of this work is focused on 
acts of sense-making to enable action to be taken, necessary due to the ambiguity of the 
regulatory rules. This sense-making is also where internal conflicts between market and 
regulatory demands are negotiated and reconciled, unavoidably resulting in a series of 
trade-offs between internal constraints of one sort or another and achieving the 
necessary level of regulatory institutionalization required by management-based 
regulation. 
The final finding concerns the nature of prudential regulation itself, and the prospects 
for the cultural and behavioural changes required within banks to fully embed these 
rules in their day-to-day business. The continual development of the prudential 
regulatory rules, and the significant shifts in how they were supervised by the PRA in 
the UK, had an inhibiting effect on the degree to which banks were able to 
institutionalize their compliance with these regulations. Every time the rules were 
amended, banks had to re-evaluate their existing systems and processes, make the 
necessary changes and then reintegrate the amended versions into their operational 
routines. Arguably, however, this is not necessarily damaging to the overall objectives 
of prudential regulation. Continual redevelopment of the rules and increased levels of 
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supervisory scrutiny result in a greater degree of organizational attention to regulatory 
change, which, coupled with the increased organizational status of regulatory staff, 
means that regulation is higher up on the list of organizational priorities. Continuous 
changes to regulation also make the process of institutionalization harder to achieve. 
Managing regulatory change – a balancing act 
This thesis used insights from institutionalist organizational theory as a means of 
understanding how banks responded to the changing regulatory environment. 
Particularly instructive was the institutionalist conception of organizations operating 
within a pluralistic environment, meaning that an organization is  
‘embedded within multiple normative orders and/or constituted by more than one 
cultural logic. It is a participant in multiple discourses and/or a member of more than 
one institutional category’ (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 243) 
Applying this view to banks’ publicly discussed views about regulatory reform (Chapter 
4) and to the material practices and structures put in place to manage this change 
(Chapter 5), this thesis argues that regulatory change intensifies the tensions that exist 
between the demands of the market and regulatory requirements, requiring 
organizations to engage in a continual process of negotiation between two sets of logics. 
Moreover, the findings show that the weighting given to each logic varied over time in 
relation to the broader political, economic and social context and in accordance with 
how each of the institutional logics of the market and regulation were represented 
internally within the banking organizations.  
Chapter 4 presented the analysis of how banks had framed their public discussions 
about regulatory change before, during and after the financial crisis. It was evident that 
both market logic and regulatory logic were dominant in the banks’ discourse, and whilst 
deployed simultaneously, the prominence given to each logic respectively changed over 
time. To explain the changes in the relative weightings of each logic, this thesis drew 
upon the concept of organizational legitimacy which proposes that organizations are 
dependent on legitimacy, a kind of ‘logic of appropriateness’, for their survival and that 
they will go to great efforts to create, maintain and repair their legitimacy (Suchman, 
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1995). In a pluralistic institutional environment, organizations have many external 
referents of legitimacy, each with its own legitimacy criteria. In the case of banks and 
regulatory change after the financial crisis, it would have been reasonable to expect that 
banks would be prioritizing the rehabilitation of their legitimacy with respect to their 
regulators and customers over their shareholders, given the levels of public approbation 
for the industry at this time (Bennett & Kottasz, 2012; Edelman, 2009, 2010). In fact, the 
opposite was shown to be the case by the results of the discourse analysis. The use of 
market logic peaked in the period 2009-2010, and some speculative explanations have 
been offered for this – such as the banks perceiving a need to pacify or reassure 
shareholders about the potential impacts of new regulations. Or, it could have been 
reluctance by the banking industry to accept that many of the tenets of market-based 
theories had been discredited by the financial crisis. Finally, it may have been a last-
ditch attempt to defend the regulatory status quo before acquiescing to the increased 
stringency of the new regulatory regime.  
Alternatively, however, as this thesis argues, the post-crisis regulatory situation was 
characterized by uncertainty and complexity and for the banking industry in 2010, this 
was further compounded by the turmoil in market conditions caused by the sovereign 
debt crisis. Arguably, in such an environment, where significant ideational shifts had 
occurred (Baker, 2013; Black, 2012b) and policy responses were heavily influenced by 
broader political changes (especially the election of the coalition government in 2010), 
determining what the relevant legitimacy criteria even were was extremely problematic. 
Therefore, in line with the theoretical predictions about strategic responses to 
institutional pressures made by Oliver (1991), in response to a high degree of 
environmental uncertainty and in an effort to appear in control, banks reverted to well-
worn arguments about the adverse effects of higher capital requirements on their 
profitability and ability to create credit. As regulatory uncertainty diminished from 2011 
onwards, banks’ views about regulatory change were increasingly expressed in terms of 
regulatory rather than market logic. During this period, banks were experiencing the 
more intrusive supervisory approach of the FSA (FSA Practitioner Panel, 2011), which 
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perhaps helped to clarify the criteria to which they needed to conform if they were to 
regain regulatory legitimacy. 
In their public documents, each bank was presenting a singular view about their 
perspectives on regulatory change. These external representations were the result of 
deliberate and careful management of an undifferentiated organizational self, especially 
in the case of the annual reports. A different view of how the banks were adapting to 
regulatory change was revealed by the fieldwork data which showed there was a degree 
of dissonance between what the banks said about regulatory change and what they were 
doing in response to it. For example, at roughly the same time that banks were publicly 
stating their concerns about the new rules, the interviewees described how their 
organizations had begun to implement new governance structures, hire more staff and 
create new teams specifically for managing regulatory change (see Chapter 5). However, 
it is an oversimplification to suggest that banks were resisting the new regulations 
publicly but getting on with achieving compliance internally. The research presented 
here suggests that the picture was a great deal more complex, again because of how the 
existing tensions between market and regulatory logic within the banks were 
exacerbated by regulatory change and uncertainty. This thesis argues that these 
complexities are demonstrated by the three key findings below.  
Firstly, with respect to the internal balancing of market and regulatory logics, this thesis 
argues that different organizational constituencies or groups of actors were associated 
with the internal representation of different institutional logics, providing 
‘organizational members with cognitive templates that influence their perception of 
which objectives and practices are appropriate’ (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 460). 
Employees based in Regulatory Affairs, for example, can be thought of as internal 
representatives of regulatory logic, ‘institutional agents’ (Scott, 2008) who are involved 
in a professional project of institutionalization (Suddaby & Viale, 2011). Their day-to-
day work focused on promoting conformity with the demands of the institutional logic 
of regulation. Other organizational actors, such as traders in the Front Office were 
internal representatives of market logic, focused on maximising profits and minimizing 
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(or ‘optimizing’) capital requirements. The need to respond to and manage regulatory 
change required these two sets of institutional agents to come together to make 
decisions, and to reconcile the conflicting demands of regulation and the market. 
Secondly, Chapter 5 showed that these processes of reconciliation manifested in explicit 
sense-making practices about the risks of regulatory change – the risk of non-compliance 
or regulatory breaches and the risk of adverse impacts on the firm’s financial position. 
Material practices associated with sense-making included quantitative and operational 
impact assessments, regulatory rule interpretation and methods for deriving additional 
benefits from implementation. Organizational sense-making (Weick, 1995) was therefore 
pivotal in the negotiation of the ongoing settlements between conflicting institutional 
demands. Such negotiations were rarely articulated by the respondents in these terms 
but were referred to instead as making decisions about the ‘level of compliance’ or the 
way in which a rule could be interpreted to reduce capital requirements. Sociological 
work on risk and organizations has demonstrated that perceptions and understandings 
of risk vary within organizations (Hutter, 2001, 2005; Short & Clarke, 1992b). In the case 
of banks and regulatory change, this thesis contends that differences in perceptions and 
tolerances of the risks of regulatory change were shaped by the institutional lens 
through which these risks were viewed. Sense-making processes involving internal 
representatives of both market and regulatory logics resulted in a prioritization of how 
these various risks should be mitigated.  
Lastly, the intra-organizational decision-making required by this prioritization process 
was fundamentally political, as the outcome, even if a compromise, reflected to some 
degree the interests of the most powerful organizational constituency. Prior to the 
financial crisis, in a climate where market logic dominated not only politics but also 
regulation (see Chapter 3), the analysis in Chapters 4 and 6 suggested that prudential 
regulation was not a priority for the banks, other than to implement advanced Basel 2 
models to reduce capital requirements. In the words of one interviewee, ‘regulatory 
affairs was a sleepy backwater’ (Participant 22, 2014). However, the evidence presented 
in this thesis points to the increasing power afforded to regulatory professionals after 
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the crisis such as the hiring of more senior staff, the creation of new regulatory teams 
and functions and increasing remuneration for compliance staff (Oakley et al., 2013). 
Previous studies have shown that regulatory expertise can be a source of authority 
within the organization (Edelman et al., 1991; Weait, 1993, 1996), particularly in 
situations of uncertainty and ambiguity. Control of information has been identified as a 
key power resource within organizations (Pettigrew, 1972) and the increased levels of 
regulatory requests from the PRA provided additional opportunities for regulatory 
professionals to mobilize this resource by acting as ‘gatekeepers’ of information flowing 
between the banks and the regulators. Kraatz and Block (2008) claim that in a pluralistic 
environment, ‘a degree of balance may evolve, for instance, as one constituency 
acknowledges its mutual dependence on another’ (p251). Supporting Kraatz and Block’s 
assertion, the interview data revealed that the Front Office (which typically wields the 
greatest power in a wholesale bank) became increasingly dependent on regulatory 
professionals with specialist expertise to help them understand and mitigate the 
impacts of the proposed rules.  
However, it should also be recognized that the increased power of regulatory 
professionals that accompanied regulatory change is also dependent on the broader 
political and economic context. Creating new structures to manage regulatory change 
can also be viewed as a signal from banks to their external constituents that regulation 
is being taken seriously, a strategy to regain or improve their legitimacy position vis-à-
vis the regulator. Should the external environment shift back towards ‘light-touch’ 
regulation, for example, the status of regulatory professionals might be diminished and 
the settlements that have been reached between market logic and regulatory logic might 
be disrupted. Kraatz and Block (2008) warn that ‘balances that are struck among various 
objectives, constituencies and role identities are often precarious’ (p. 251) and this thesis 
has no reason to suggest that this would not also be the case with prudential regulation. 
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Regulatory professionals and regulatory change 
Examining the practices and structures that banks employed to manage post-crisis 
prudential regulatory change revealed that responsibilities for different aspects of this 
work were distributed across several parts of these organizations. Studies of financial 
regulation have sought to understand the role that Compliance Officers, situated within 
the ‘Compliance Function’ of a financial organization play in the implementation of 
regulation (Lenglet, 2012; Parker, 2002; Weait, 1993, 1996). They have been found to be 
the actors primarily responsible for the interpretation and ‘translation’ of legal rules, for 
overseeing their implementation and for monitoring ongoing compliance. Whilst 
Compliance Officers are still very much present in UK banking organizations, this thesis 
has found that they play a lesser role in prudential regulation than they do in conduct 
of business regulation. This thesis therefore attributes the label ‘regulatory 
professionals’ to this wider group of employees involved in the management and 
implementation of prudential regulatory change. The term ‘professional’ was selected 
advisedly, following Scott (2008) who suggests that professionals function as 
‘institutional agents’ who are ‘definers, interpreters and appliers of institutional 
elements’ (Scott, 2008, p. 223). Compliance Officers are a sub-set of regulatory 
professionals, with specialist skills and expertise. 
Two key arguments are made here about the place that regulatory professionals occupy 
within organizations in respect of managing regulation in general and regulatory change 
in particular. The first is that that the existence of a group of regulatory professionals 
that bridges formal departmental boundaries within an organization and that regulatory 
knowledge and expertise is suggestive of a community that comes together for the 
purpose of sense and decision-making in the face of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Secondly, regulatory professionals, especially those who manage regulatory 
relationships, can be viewed as instrumental in the construction and maintenance of an 
organization’s regulatory identity 
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Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that these regulatory professionals possess specialist 
knowledge essential to the effective management of prudential regulatory change; 
expertise in quantitative risk models and their associated processes, the capital impacts 
of the prudential rules, the application of the rules to complex products and 
transactions or the software used to support risk and capital calculations. In addition, 
Regulatory Affairs departments were staffed by individuals equipped with specialist 
relationship management skills and knowledge of the supervisory process, often gained 
from their previous employment by regulatory authorities. This thesis applies the term 
‘communities of implementation’ to describe these informal networks of regulatory 
professionals, linked by shared skills and expertise. This term borrows both from Haas’ 
notion of ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992) and Wenger’s ‘communities of practice’ 
(Wenger, 2000). For Haas (1992), epistemic communities are networks of ‘knowledge-
based experts’, sharing similar normative and cognitive beliefs and expertise that 
influence transnational policy and governance. Like epistemic communities, 
‘communities of practice’ are groups of people who are joined together by shared 
knowledge and expertise, but they ‘grow out of a convergent interplay of competence 
and experience that involves mutual engagement’ (Wenger, 2000, p. 229). Regulatory 
professionals within banks comprise a similar type of community, having in common 
the possession of technical knowledge and expertise about prudential regulation. 
Moreover, because these organizational actors are also institutional agents of regulatory 
logic, they also share the underlying beliefs, norms and theories of that logic. This is 
similar to the ‘shared repertoire of communal resources available to members of 
communities of practice’ (Wenger, 2000, p. 229). 
These communities of regulatory professionals perform important interpretive and 
sense-making work, using their technical expertise to provide clarity and meaning to the 
prudential regulatory rules which can be both technically complex and ambiguous (see 
Chapter 5). This work is important for the organization’s ability to implement regulation 
because it provides a basis for action, for translating regulatory texts from ‘conceptual 
expression to material incorporation into daily routines’ (Lenglet, 2012, p. 60). Thus, 
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these groups of regulatory professionals can be thought of as ‘communities of 
implementation’, coalesced not only around their expertise but also around specific sets 
of practices for managing and implementing regulatory change. 
Returning to the idea of the pluralistic institutional environment within which banks 
operate, Kraatz and Block (2008) state that an organization ‘possesses multiple, 
institutionally-derived identities which are conferred upon it by different segments of 
its pluralistic environment’ (p.243). This thesis found that as regulatory scrutiny 
intensified after the financial crisis, the management of regulatory relationships became 
more formalized in the sample banks (see Chapter 6). Banks devoted more time and 
effort to communicative strategies not only to manage or repair legitimacy (Suchman, 
1995) but also to construct their regulatory identities (Coupland & Brown, 2004).  
Banks and their supervisors are involved in an ongoing relationship of interdependence, 
each providing the other with relational signals (Etienne, 2012). Actors on each side of 
the relationship make adaptations in response to the other (Hawkins & Hutter, 1993; 
Hutter, 1997). Not only does the regulator use these signals to make determinations 
about regulatory compliance (Hawkins, 1984, 2002), this thesis found that banks also 
interpret these signals to understand what discourses and practices the regulator deems 
to be appropriate. This information is then used in the creation or maintenance of a 
bank’s regulatory identity. Chapter 6 argued that regulatory identities are therefore 
constructed as part of the ‘dialectical dance’ between the regulator and the regulated. 
This dance is not performed in isolation but is heavily influenced by the wider political 
and social environment.  
Regulatory professionals play a key role in the careful management of an organization’s 
regulatory identity which becomes even more crucial in times of increased regulatory 
intensity, such as that which occurred after the financial crisis. Creating and maintaining 
a particular identity is a considerable challenge for large, complex and fragmented 
organizations such as banks, which contain constituencies governed by competing or 
conflicting institutional logics (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Moreover, ‘organizations have 
multiple authors and stakeholders who may produce several and different identity 
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narratives over time. An organizational identity narrative reflects power positions and 
authorial preferences’ (Chreim, 2005, p. 570). In constructing a regulatory identity as 
part of a legitimacy repair strategy (Suchman, 1995), banks were concerned with 
presenting a ‘united front’ to the regulator. Chapter 6 revealed the types of practices 
involved in this process, such as having an unwritten code of conduct for interactions 
with the regulator and the careful construction of materials for use in regulatory 
meetings. This thesis argues that such practices were about constructing and then 
‘safeguarding’ the consistency of the regulatory identity, and that this tended to be the 
role of actors within Regulatory Affairs departments or in Risk Management teams that 
had responsibilities for regulatory liaison. In this instance, these regulatory 
professionals are acting as gatekeepers of their banks’ regulatory identity, and once 
constructed, they employ various discursive practices to ensure that the organization’s 
particular regulatory identity is sustained.  
Regulatory implementation and compliance 
For large, corporate organizations such as banks, compliance with regulation requires a 
significant level of preparatory work even before assessments about compliance or non-
compliance can be made. Where management-based regulation requires new systems, 
policies and procedures to be implemented or significantly modified in line with 
regulatory requirements, as in the case of prudential regulation, this workload is even 
higher. This thesis has added to existing understandings of the nature of regulatory 
implementation by revealing the material practices involved in this process – the sense-
making and re-organizing that banks undertake to ready themselves for supervisory 
judgements about compliance. The process of regulatory implementation – the final goal 
of which regulators consider to be the normalization of compliant behavior within the 
organization – is not a smooth path. This research has identified several factors which 
can both help and hinder this endeavour. Moreover, whilst the goal of management-
based regulation (and associated techniques) is to effect substantive behavior 
modification in the target organizations, this thesis contends that determining the 
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degree to which regulated organizations have indeed adopted a substantive rather than 
ceremonial response to regulatory change is problematic. 
Banking organizations engage in a number of practices to prepare for the final goal of 
compliance with new or changing regulatory rules. Understanding how the rules were 
changing, establishing what these changes meant for the organization and then 
executing the corresponding operational modifications were all critical to successful 
regulatory implementation and achieving compliance. As Chapter 5 suggested, the need 
for this intensity of activity is largely due to the uncertainties related to regulatory 
change. These reflect Milliken’s three types of perceived environmental uncertainty 
(Milliken, 1987) – the unpredictability of the changes after the crisis (state uncertainty), 
the lack of clarity over their impacts (effect uncertainty) and the lack of guidance with 
regards to the correct response (response uncertainty).  
For UK banks, managing regulatory change and implementing regulation was not just 
about achieving compliance, even though the findings are suggestive that was indeed 
one of their goals. It was also about understanding and mitigating the potential adverse 
impacts on their company’s financial performance. As discussed above, additional work 
was therefore required by these organizations to resolve these tensions and conflicts 
between various organizational constituencies, involving many acts of sense-making and 
negotiation all of which had to be accomplished within the deadlines set by the 
regulatory authorities. These tensions and conflicts, and the uncertainties also required 
a number of compromises or trade-offs.  
There were tensions between the availability of the final detailed rules and the time that 
remained for regulatory implementation, a trade-off between certainty and time. Given 
finite resources, a limited timeframe for regulatory implementation and a lack of ex ante 
regulatory guidance, there was a conflict between achieving a certain level of compliance 
to meet the deadline whilst acknowledging that adaptions may fall short of supervisory 
expectations. This is a trade-off between available resources and achieving a greater 
degree of compliance. Some organizations also postponed the development of strategic 
and long-lasting technology solutions and put in place short term tactical solutions 
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because of the lack of certainty, the immovable deadline and resource constraints. This 
was a trade-off between achieving regulatory compliance versus making long term, 
strategic changes which are more likely to facilitate the institutionalization of regulation. 
Finally, banks potentially had to make decisions as to where best to assign resources – 
whether to devote more time, effort and money to making changes that would mitigate 
the potential economic impacts of the new rules, or whether to allocate resources to 
achieve the best level of compliance (assuming this is possible to determine). This thesis 
therefore contends that an organization’s capacity to comply depends not only on its 
motivation and resources, it also depends on its ability to navigate the uncertainties in 
an unstable environment and to balance compliance with other organizational 
constraints.  
New governance techniques, such as management-based regulation (Coglianese & Lazer, 
2003; Ford, 2008; Gilad, 2010; Gunningham & Sinclair, 2009; Hutter, 2011c), rely on the 
ability of regulated organizations to embed compliance with regulatory standards in 
their organizational routines. In doing so, the intention is that conformity with 
regulation permeates not just the material policies, processes and IT systems but also 
the less tangible aspects of organizational life. Neo-institutional theorists refer to these 
aspects as ‘cultural-cognitive’, the informal beliefs and values that become taken-for-
granted and constrain cognition (Scott, 2007). In other words, the full 
institutionalization of regulatory logic requires a cultural shift as well as material 
changes for substantive compliance to be achieved. A set of inhibiting factors uncovered 
by this study suggest that in the case of prudential regulation, this is unlikely to become 
an empirical reality until the prudential rules are stabilized for a period of time. Some 
of these factors confirm existing findings about firms’ capacity to comply, which argue 
that the availability of financial and non-financial resources is an important determinant 
of regulatory capacity (Borck & Coglianese, 2011; Gray & Shadbegian, 2005; Howard‐
Grenville et al., 2008; Winter & May, 2001). Chapter 7 found that a lack of financial 
resources manifested in inadequate prior investment in computer systems and data 
management techniques which frustrated attempts to operationalize the changes 
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required for Basel 3 compliance. However, following the crisis, representatives from the 
participating banks reported significant increases in budgets for regulatory 
implementation, with the constraints on capacity stemming more from shortages of 
expertise and time rather than money. This was corroborated by reports of skill 
shortages and rising salaries for regulatory and compliance staff (Arnold, 2014; Enver, 
2014; Oakley et al., 2013). 
Of greater significance were limiting factors external to the banks. Foremost of these, 
once again, was the uncertainty that had pervaded the regulatory environment since the 
financial crisis. Uncertainty about the content of the regulatory rules, supervisory 
expectations and regulatory deadlines all contributed to the banks’ sense of trying to 
implement a moving target. Each time the regulatory rules were changed, even if the 
changes were minor, banks engaged once again in the cycle of sense-making, design, and 
implementation. This continuous cycling is unlikely to cease until the regulatory 
goalposts stop moving and the Basel rules stop changing. Until then, the prospects for 
the full institutionalization of prudential regulation (and therefore substantive 
compliance) are slim. 
Regulatory literature and neo-institutional organization theory both draw attention to 
the fact that regulatory compliance or conformity to institutional pressures is not 
necessarily always substantive (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Edelman et al., 1991; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). Instead of firms making adaptations to their core activities 
in response to regulatory pressures, they may portray a semblance of conformity but 
actually, these changes are ‘decoupled’ from the routine activities of the organization. 
Decoupling, as a type of avoidance (Oliver, 1991) is just one of the multiple strategies of 
response available to organizations but is prominent in regulatory studies. Parker and 
Gilad (2011) ask whether it is even possible to identify characteristics or motivations 
that can help to distinguish between companies implementing compliance systems as a 
substantive response to social goals and those who adopt a more calculated response of 
ceremonial compliance (Parker & Gilad, 2011, p. 189). This thesis confirms this view, 
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recognizing the difficulties involved in distinguishing between ceremonial and 
substantive responses to regulatory change.  
In Chapters 5 and 7, this study demonstrated that banking organizations have 
elaborated existing or created new structures for managing regulatory change. The 
presence of these structures alone does not necessarily imply that these same 
organizations are implementing substantive material modifications to bring them into 
regulatory conformity. Edelman (1992), in the context of equal opportunity law, stated 
that ‘organizations respond to law by creating new offices, positions, rules and 
procedures…as visible symbols of their attention to [equal opportunity] issues and their 
efforts to comply’ (p1542). Such ‘structural elaboration’ does not necessarily guarantee 
substantive change. Indeed, as Chapter 7 concluded, looking to structures alone to 
determine the degree to which regulatory logic has been institutionalized is not 
sufficient because structures do not reveal the cultural-cognitive aspects of institutions, 
the ‘shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames 
through which meaning is made’ (Scott 2008 p7).  
Over and above these empirical limitations, however, the findings in this thesis indicate 
that organizations do not consistently adopt the same response to regulatory change 
over time. Compliance is not a one off event but is a process that occurs over time and 
within a broader political and social context (Edelman et al., 1991, p. 74). Changes in the 
regulatory environment will have a bearing on whether compliance is ceremonial or 
substantive or even somewhere in between. In addition, in large and complex 
organizations such as banks, it is possible for multiple compliance strategies to co-exist 
because of the multiple internal constituencies embodying or representing different 
institutional logics.  
Moves from ceremonial to substantive compliance are also influenced by the wider 
political environment. Ceremonial compliance is more likely in situations where 
regulatory enforcement is weak (Edelman, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Regulatory 
authorities may be under-resourced and unable to adequately surveil their regulatees. 
Or, as in the case of the FSA, the government may exert political pressure to maintain 
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low levels of regulatory scrutiny. When this changed after the financial crisis, 
supervisory expectations toughened and were more demanding of banking 
organizations to demonstrate substantive compliance. Banks had to be able to provide 
detailed data for their supervisors to analyze and question, requests that would have 
been problematic to fulfil without having implemented the compliant systems and 
processes. Given that that this more intrusive regulatory approach resulted in increased 
levels of inspection and evaluation, strategies of decoupling or ceremonial compliance 
were less likely to be successful (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) so it was unlikely that banks 
would have moved from a position of substantive compliance to one of ceremonial 
compliance but that is not to say that this is not possible, especially if relations between 
the UK government and the banking industry continue to thaw. Finally, Suchman and 
Edelman (1996) argue that the conflicting institutional demands of the banks’ external 
environment combined with a high degree of uncertainty may mean that ceremonial 
compliance is the only possible response because ‘it is often easier to proclaim 
flexibility, efficiency, aggressiveness, accountability and impartiality in ceremony than 
to be all of these things in practice’ (Suchman & Edelman, 1996, p. 921). Uncertainty 
then, might make substantive compliance and the institutionalization of regulation more 
difficult, putting at risk the ability of prudential regulation to achieve financial stability. 
The irony of prudential regulation? 
Prudential regulation is fundamentally about the control of risk within the financial 
system. A consistent theme throughout this thesis has been the uncertainty of the post-
crisis regulatory environment. This thesis argues that there are inherent features of the 
prudential regulatory regime that cause uncertainty, which is exacerbated further when 
it undergoes significant reform. Banks considered regulatory change to be one of the 
key risks they faced during the research period, posing threats to both their future 
financial performance and their ability to achieve compliance with the new rules. As 
discussed above, the prospects for the institutionalization of prudential regulation were, 
rather ironically, undermined by the regulatory reform process following the crisis. This 
section discusses the features of prudential regulation which create uncertainty and lead 
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to this apparent paradox. These are: the unpredictability of supervisory judgements with 
respect to mandatory adjustments to levels of regulatory capital, changing supervisory 
expectations with regards to compliance which are not enshrined in rules and the 
standard setting process itself. However, a more optimistic perspective on regulatory 
institutionalization is also offered in that whilst the institutionalization of the regulatory 
rules themselves is inhibited by continual change, the processes and practices of 
managing regulatory change are increasingly becoming normalized within the banking 
industry, effectively increasing organizational attention to regulation. 
Prudential regulation relies on harnessing a bank’s own risk management capacity as a 
means of safeguarding financial stability. At the same time, the prudential rules 
governing banks are very prescriptive, with precise criteria for the measurement and 
calculation of minimum capital requirements. The prudential rules require banks to 
implement what amounts to a complex and dynamic control system, comprising various 
measures that can be altered or recalibrated to increase or decrease a banks’ regulatory 
capital requirements. A seemingly small adjustment to one of these measures can have 
a large impact, such as the application of multipliers to the risk model outputs or the 
removal of regulatory approval to use a risk model for a particular class of products. 
Like policies such as price fixing in the energy markets, prudential rules can have a 
fundamental impact on a banks’ financial position. If bank supervisors such as the PRA 
are not satisfied by the robustness of a bank’s risk management framework and capital 
calculation mechanisms, it can use the various measures in that bank’s prudential 
control system to increase its regulatory capital requirements. In extremis, the PRA also 
has the power to remove previously granted permissions to use internal risk models or 
even remove approvals to participate in certain product markets (Prudential Regulation 
Authority, 2014b). This gives the supervisors the discretion to exercise judgement rather 
than using a more ‘tick-box’ approach. It therefore adds a level of unpredictability into 
the supervisory process from the bank’s perspective, compounding the uncertainty 
already present in their regulatory environment. 
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Chapter 3 described how the prudential standards set by the BCBS have continued to 
change since they were first introduced since 1988. The pace and volume of this change 
increased further in response to the global financial crisis and the BCBS is still working 
through additional reforms (BCBS, 2014d). It is not just the content of the rules that have 
changed, the assumptions and theoretical beliefs about prudential regulation also 
shifted (Baker, 2013; Moloney, 2012). Regulatory objectives also altered, particularly 
those about what constitutes adequate levels of capital in the financial system. Whilst 
the move from Basel 1 to Basel 2 was intended to keep levels of capital across the 
financial system relatively stable, Basel 3 explicitly aimed to increase capital levels. 
These ideological shifts and changing regulatory objectives affected the supervisory 
philosophy, with regulators such as the PRA raising their expectations of compliance 
even if the rules themselves were unchanged. Again, this exacerbated the uncertainty 
associated with the supervision and enforcement of the prudential rules. These 
expectations were not written into the reformed standards but were communicated 
during the routine regulatory interactions between banks and their supervisors (Chapter 
6). Finally, the legislative mechanisms through which the global BCBS standards were 
translated into EU or national law also contributed to the uncertainty experienced by the 
banks. Each draft of rule changes initiated the cycle of sense-making, planning and 
implementation within the banks, resulting in the types of compliance trade-offs 
discussed above. 
Whilst this iterative implementation process was no doubt costly for the banks, it is not 
necessarily the case that navigating this high level of uncertainty was harmful in terms 
of meeting the objectives of prudential regulation. By requiring banks to engage deeply 
in practices of sense-making and interpretation, the uncertainty of regulatory change 
necessitated a dialogue between the ‘institutional agents’ of market and regulatory 
logics within banking organizations. Possibilities for reconciliation and accommodation 
were found through particular risk management practices, such as the setting of risk 
appetite or strategies for deriving business benefits from compliant activities. It can be 
argued that a greater degree of regulatory change and increased regulatory intensity 
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leads to greater organizational attention to regulation. The irony of prudential 
regulation then, is that whilst the possibilities for the institutionalization of the new 
prudential standards are thwarted somewhat by their continual state of flux, an 
institutionalization of a different sort is encouraged. This is the institutionalization of 
the management of regulatory change, an acceptance by banking organizations that 
regulation has become part of ‘business as usual’. 
Reflections on the limitations of the study 
Many of the limitations of this thesis are methodological and relate in part to the 
sensitivity of the topic of regulation and problems of gaining access to people within the 
financial services industry. Additionally, some aspects of how regulated organizations 
manage regulatory change could only be partially explored because of the nature of the 
research design. This section explores these issues and suggests ways in which they 
could be addressed through triangulation with other methods, gathering additional data 
or being examined from a different perspective. 
As explained in Chapter 2, the selection of respondents for this research was primarily 
based on access and snowball sampling (Bryman, 2015) given the difficulties of 
negotiating access. Despite attempts to include representatives from other areas of the 
banks, the sample was limited to organizational members from risk management, 
finance and regulatory departments. Whilst these interviewees provided rich data 
regarding the practices of managing regulatory change and managing interactions with 
the banking supervisors, this study could be extended in two directions. Firstly, the same 
types of interview questions could be asked of organizational actors from the Front 
Office to see how they responded to regulatory change, and how their perceptions of 
regulation had changed since the financial crisis. Employees in the Front Office are 
primarily focused on revenue-making activities and incentivized through their 
remuneration to maximize profits, practices associated more with market than 
regulatory logic. Extending this research project in in this manner could explore the 
extent to which these actors considered regulatory change in terms of market logic and 
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how they approached the process of negotiating priorities with the regulatory 
professionals in their organization. It would have been instructive, therefore, to 
investigate their responses to regulatory change and how, as agents of market logic, they 
perceived the challenges of the changing regulatory environment and its associated 
uncertainty.  
Secondly, increasing the number of interviews in each sample bank would help to 
explore some of the more tentative findings presented in this thesis. For example, the 
literature on managing risk in organizations (Short & Clarke, 1992a; Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997; Vaughan, 1992) suggests that the communication of risk (and possibly regulatory) 
information within complex organizations is problematic. This did appear to be the case 
for the organizations in this study where responsibilities for managing regulatory 
change were very fragmented but there were only one or two examples of where this 
had caused difficulties. Similarly, the existence of apparently comparable categories of 
regulatory management practices across five organizations is suggestive of a degree of 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), but more data would be required to make a this 
a stronger claim. Finally, in the interviews, even though there was a degree of consistency 
of explanations for the greater degree of preparation for regulatory interactions, the 
sample was too small to realistically confirm the respondents’ claims that this was to 
ensure accurate and complete information was given to the PRA, rather than actors 
within the banks ‘spinning’ this information to show them in the best light. Whilst 
attempts were made to recruit additional participants, this proved to be very difficult 
given the sensitivity of regulatory issues in 2013-14. Perhaps when the pace of regulatory 
change slows or the regulatory climate becomes less politicized, this may prove to less 
problematic. 
From the exploration of the material practices involved in regulatory change, it was clear 
that a large amount of organizational work is required to implement regulatory changes, 
translating the ‘law on the books’ to the ‘law in action’ within specific concrete contexts. 
In a particularly complex and technical domain, such as prudential regulation, this 
requires multiple decisions and assumptions at every step of the process. Not only do 
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these decisions have to balance conflicting organizational priorities but they also have 
to navigate practical and technological constraints that policy-makers may not have 
anticipated when creating the written texts. Despite several respondents mentioning 
some examples of this they encountered in their work, there was not enough data to 
draw any conclusions about how these processes might impact the achievement of 
regulatory compliance in the banking industry. Understanding the more detailed 
mechanics involved in this process, such as how regulatory rules are rendered into 
computer code or how existing processes are amended to include regulatory 
requirements would require would require ethnographic methods. Participant 
observation would reveal the myriad micro-decisions and processes necessary to 
implement regulation and would highlight how tensions between conflicting logics were 
reconciled at this very detailed level to achieve compliance. This approach would also 
help to resolve the difficulties outlined above with respect to distinguishing between 
ceremonial and substantive compliance.  
Finally, the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted over the course of a year and 
required interview participants to reflect on the regulatory changes they had observed 
over the previous five to six years. The data therefore reflected the interviewees’ views 
about retrospective events at a specific point in time. Two implications follow from this. 
The first is the possibility that their recollections were not entirely accurate, or were 
made sense of given their experiences and knowledge at the time of the interviews. 
Secondly, and more importantly, this did not allow for a direct comparison of their views 
of the situation with regards to regulatory change before and after the financial crisis. 
To make such a comparison would require a longitudinal study, with interviews 
conducted before and after the trigger for regulatory change. Obviously, without the gift 
of foresight, it is difficult to predict another financial crisis that might act as a trigger 
for regulatory change but other, less dramatic triggers such as changes in government, 
or new regulatory initiatives in response to emerging risks are often signalled in 
advance. 
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Implications for future research 
The focus of this research project has been the organizational practices and processes 
and the interpersonal interactions that banks engaged in to manage and respond to the 
post-crisis changes in prudential regulation. Prudential regulation is designed to keep 
the banking system safe and stable and when this fails, as the financial crisis 
demonstrated, the economic and social costs are high. The effectiveness of these rules 
in maintaining financial stability lies in part in their effective implementation within 
individual banking organizations. How banks make sense of these rules, how they adapt 
their internal practices and structures and how they interact with the supervisory 
authorities all contribute (or not) to the strength and soundness of the global financial 
system. The way that prudential regulation is designed puts the onus of prudent risk 
management onto the banks themselves and, as such, requires banking organizations to 
internalize a set of norms, values and practices that are part and parcel of everyday 
organizational life. Exploring these seemingly innocuous, routine and quotidian 
mechanics in this thesis has revealed some fundamental implications for sociological 
and socio-legal work on organizations, risk and regulation. 
In 2015, after the fieldwork was completed, there were indications that politicians in the 
UK were beginning to take a more moderate attitude towards the City in 2015, talking 
of a ‘new settlement with financial services’ (HM Treasury & Osborne, 2015). If this 
heralded a reduction in political pressure for the PRA and FCA to be tough on the banks, 
it is likely that the regulatory pendulum could swing back the other way, towards less 
stringent and intrusive supervision. If this were to happen, the findings in this thesis 
suggest three possible consequences. The first would be that banks dedicate less time, 
effort and attention to regulation in general, diverting resources away from regulatory 
implementation and into profit-making activities. Secondly, with less intensive scrutiny, 
opportunities for evasive responses to regulation grow, resulting in an increase 
ceremonial compliance. Thirdly, regulatory professionals are likely to experience a 
reduction in their organizational status, frustrating their attempts to maintain co-
operative regulatory relationships and reducing their ability to institutionalize 
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regulatory logic throughout the organization. The ultimate result might not be another 
financial crisis, given that the regulatory rules have also been strengthened but it would 
signal a return to the dominance of market logic, and potentially pose an increased risk 
to financial stability.  
For banks, managing the post-crisis regulatory changes has primarily been a matter of 
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. These decisions ranged from the 
detailed interpretation of a single rule to determining how to reconfigure their business 
models to mitigate the increased capital requirements. Furthermore, this thesis has 
found that this high degree of uncertainty inhibits a bank’s ability to institutionalize the 
requirements of prudential regulation and that this is because of the intrinsic features 
of this regulatory regime. In other words, by mandating behavioural and normative 
changes to reduce the risks of financial firms failing, prudential regulation has the 
potential to be self-defeating if some of the factors which cause this uncertainty are not 
addressed. Standard setters therefore need to be mindful of the balance between 
continual attempts to improve the design of prudential regulation and the ability of 
banks to fully embed the regulatory requirements whilst they are in a state of flux. There 
is a bigger question here though, and that is whether this creation of uncertainty is an 
inherent problem of management-based regulation in general (and other ‘new 
governance’ techniques) and if so, what the options are to tackle this without 
undermining the rationale for using such techniques in the first place. That is not to say 
that there is no uncertainty associated with more traditional ‘command and control’ - 
firms also struggle to understand how to achieve compliance with this type of 
regulation. However, with management-based regulation, uncertainty is further 
compounded by the lack of prescriptive criteria for rule compliance and a lack of clarity 
regarding supervisory judgements. This is a problem which requires further theoretical 
and empirical attention, potentially in other regulatory domains. 
The worst financial crisis in nearly a century was in part a failure of regulation, and this 
triggered the need for the regulatory changes that have been considered. This research 
has demonstrated the sheer volume and types of work involved in the internal 
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processing of this regulatory change – the effort involved to focus organizational 
attention on what needs to be done, the high degree of sense-making and re-organizing 
that is required, as well as the significant levels of human and financial resources this 
involves. Of course, changes to regulatory regimes do not always occur as a result of 
regulatory failure. The regulatory environment is difficult to separate from the political 
system and significant events in the latter are bound to have an effect on the former. 
The impact of the vote by the UK to leave the European Union in June 2016 is, at the 
time of writing, extremely unclear. As this thesis has shown, the prudential regulatory 
regime that is currently operating in the UK is enshrined in EU law and there is no 
indication yet how or if this situation is likely to change. In this next moment of great 
uncertainty for banks in the UK, this research implies that internal institutional tensions 
may once again be exacerbated, the resources, skills and expertise to navigate this 
terrain will become even more scarce and regulatory institutionalization could be even 
more difficult to achieve. 
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Appendix 1 – Discourse analysis corpus 
 
Bank Document Year 
Barclays Annual Report 2006 
Barclays Annual Report 2007 
Barclays Annual Report 2008 
Barclays Annual Report 2009 
Barclays Annual Report 2010 
Barclays Annual Report 2011 
Barclays Annual Report 2012 
Barclays Annual Report 2013 
HSBC Annual Report 2006 
HSBC Annual Report 2007 
HSBC Annual Report 2008 
HSBC Annual Report 2009 
HSBC Annual Report 2010 
HSBC Annual Report 2011 
HSBC Annual Report 2012 
HSBC Annual Report 2013 
Lloyds Annual Report 2006 
Lloyds Annual Report 2007 
Lloyds Annual Report 2008 
Lloyds Annual Report 2009 
Lloyds Annual Report 2010 
Lloyds Annual Report 2011 
Lloyds Annual Report 2012 
Lloyds Annual Report 2013 
RBS Annual Report 2006 
RBS Annual Report 2007 
RBS Annual Report 2008 
RBS Annual Report 2009 
RBS Annual Report 2010 
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Bank Document Year 
RBS Annual Report 2011 
RBS Annual Report 2012 
RBS Annual Report 2013 
Standard Chartered Annual Report 2006 
Standard Chartered Annual Report 2007 
Standard Chartered Annual Report 2008 
Standard Chartered Annual Report 2009 
Standard Chartered Annual Report 2010 
Standard Chartered Annual Report 2011 
Standard Chartered Annual Report 2012 
Standard Chartered Annual Report 2013 
Barclays BCBS: International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring 
Apr-10 
Barclays BCBS: Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector Apr-10 
Barclays EC: Possible Further Changes to the Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD4) 
Apr-10 
Barclays EC: Consultation on countercyclical capital buffers Nov-10 
Barclays BCBS: Capitalisation of Bank Exposures to Central 
Counterparties 
Feb-11 
Barclays EC: Possible measures to strengthen bank capital 
requirements for counterparty credit risk 
Mar-11 
Barclays BCBS: Fundamental Review of the Trading Book First 
Consultation Paper 
May-12 
Barclays BCBS: The non-internal model method for capitalising CCR 
exposures 
Sep-13 
Barclays BCBS: Fundamental Review of the Trading Book Second 
Consultation Paper 
Oct-13 
Barclays PRA: CP05/13 Strengthening Capital Standards: 
Implementing CRD4 
Oct-13 
HSBC BCBS: International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring 
Apr-10 
HSBC BCBS: Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector Apr-10 
HSBC EC: Possible Further Changes to the Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD4) 
Apr-10 
HSBC EC: Consultation on countercyclical capital buffers Nov-10 
HSBC BCBS: Fundamental Review of the Trading Book First 
Consultation Paper 
May-12 
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Bank Document Year 
HSBC BCBS: Fundamental Review of the Trading Book Second 
Consultation Paper 
Oct-13 
HSBC PRA: CP05/13 Strengthening Capital Standards: 
Implementing CRD4 
Oct-13 
Lloyds BCBS: Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector Apr-10 
Lloyds EC: Possible Further Changes to the Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD4) 
Apr-10 
Lloyds PRA: CP05/13 Strengthening Capital Standards: 
Implementing CRD4 
Oct-13 
RBS BCBS: International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring 
Apr-10 
RBS BCBS: Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector Apr-10 
RBS EC: Consultation on countercyclical capital buffers Nov-10 
RBS BCBS: Capitalisation of Bank Exposures to Central 
Counterparties 
Feb-11 
RBS EC: Possible measures to strengthen bank capital 
requirements for counterparty credit risk 
Mar-11 
RBS BCBS: Fundamental Review of the Trading Book First 
Consultation Paper 
May-12 
RBS BCBS: The non-internal model method for capitalising CCR 
exposures 
Sep-13 
RBS BCBS: Fundamental Review of the Trading Book Second 
Consultation Paper 
Oct-13 
RBS PRA: CP05/13 Strengthening Capital Standards: 
Implementing CRD4 
Oct-13 
Standard Chartered BCBS: Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector Apr-10 
Standard Chartered EC: Possible Further Changes to the Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD4) 
Apr-10 
Standard Chartered EC: Consultation on countercyclical capital buffers Nov-10 
Standard Chartered BCBS: Capitalisation of Bank Exposures to Central 
Counterparties 
Feb-11 
Standard Chartered EC: Possible measures to strengthen bank capital 
requirements for counterparty credit risk 
Mar-11 
Standard Chartered BCBS: Fundamental Review of the Trading Book First 
Consultation Paper 
May-12 
Standard Chartered BCBS: The non-internal model method for capitalising CCR 
exposures 
Sep-13 
Standard Chartered PRA: CP05/13 Strengthening Capital Standards: 
Implementing CRD4 
Oct-13 
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Appendix 2 – Interview guide 
1. Opening the Interview 
Scene setting and introductions 
2. Background to the organization and the interviewee 
2.1 To begin with, could you please tell me a little about the function you work in for 
Bank X and also about your role in particular? 
Probe for:  
• Size of their function (number of people) 
• Seniority 
• Participation of the function in regulatory-related activities, particularly Basel 
2&3 
• Interaction with other regulatory functions 
• Previous roles 
3. Managing the Regulation 
3.1 What do you consider to be the main changes in the regulatory environment since 
2008? 
Probe for  
• Changes with biggest impact and why 
• Rules 
• Approach 
• Structure 
3.2 Has this affected how you manage the capital adequacy (Basel 2&3) regulations and 
if so, how?  
Probe for: 
• Changes in number of resources directly involved in regulatory activities, 
number of people indirectly involved 
• Changes to systems / processes / standard operating procedures  
3.3 What are some of the key challenges you have encountered in managing these 
regulations since 2008? How have you overcome these challenges? 
4. Managing the Regulator 
4.1 How is the relationship with the FSA (PRA) managed in your organization? 
Probe for: 
• Strategy for managing the relationship with the regulator 
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• Who interacts with the regulator and in what capacity?  
• Does the participant have contact with the regulator? If so, in what capacity and 
which part of the Regulator? Who? What level of seniority? 
• Is the relationship actively managed? How? 
• What would cause something to be escalated to more senior levels (either in your 
organization or to the regulatory organization)? 
• How has this changed over time? 
4.2 What is the nature of the interaction with the Regulator? How are meetings with 
/information requests from the regulator dealt with in your organization? 
Probe for: 
• Types of questions that the regulator asks / agenda items 
• Processes for dealing with information requests / meetings 
• Ad hoc vs regular information requests and what is included 
• Decisions about what information should be presented to the regulator 
• Type of interaction – face to face, email, formal letters 
• Who visits? Changed? 
• Nature / character of interaction – hostile, amenable etc. 
• Changes over time? 
4.3 Can you describe any additional changes that you have noticed in managing the 
interaction with the FSA / PRA since 2008? What are the main challenges involved in the 
interactions with the FSA / PRA? 
5. Conclusion 
5.1 Is there anything I haven't asked about that you wanted to tell me? 
6. Wrap up, next steps and thanks. 
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Appendix 3 Coding framework - indicators of regulatory 
institutionalization 
 
Indicator Category Institutionalization Indicators Model Stage 
Systems and 
Procedures  
Training regarding regulatory changes Design & Establishment 
Regulation driving change Operational 
Changes to processes Design & Establishment 
Changes to policies Design & Establishment 
Changes to risk models Design & Establishment 
Implementing manual solutions Design & Establishment 
Changes to IT Systems Design & Establishment 
Changes to internal controls Design & Establishment 
Governance and 
Structures  
Seniority of regulatory managers Operational 
Re-organising for regulatory change Design & Establishment 
Regulatory change programmes Design & Establishment 
New team or personnel to manage regulatory 
relationships 
Design & Establishment 
New governance structures to manage regulation Design & Establishment 
Monitoring ongoing compliance with regulation Normalization 
Internal communication of regulatory issues Operational 
Increased levels of regulatory expertise in bank Operational 
Increase levels of staff to deal with regulatory 
change 
Design & Establishment 
Implementation of regulation Design & Establishment 
Approach to regulatory implementation Design & Establishment 
Hiring ex-regulatory personnel Design & Establishment 
Integration into 
Business Practices  
Mandatory regulatory reporting Operational 
Regulation impacts business strategy Normalization 
Regulation as part of day to day business 
operations 
Normalization 
Provide regulatory advice to business on ongoing 
basis 
Operational 
Other uses of regulatory driven changes Operational 
Increased budget for regulatory purposes Operational 
Change business operations to use capital most 
efficiently 
Operational 
Management of capital requirements Operational 
Knowledge and 
Commitment  
Senior management focus on regulation Design & Establishment 
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Indicator Category Institutionalization Indicators Model Stage 
Risk measures part of performance measurement Operational 
Organisational attention to regulatory change Operational 
More time spent on regulatory matters Operational 
Importance of taking regulatory change seriously Operational 
Increased levels of regulatory knowledge in the 
wider organization 
Design & Establishment 
Explaining changing regulatory environment to 
business 
Operational 
Change to bank regulatory culture Normalization 
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